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ABSTRACT 
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: A BALANCE OF POWER 
by William Jeffery Stephens 
May 2009 
Throughout world history states have banded together to form 
coalitions, alliances, and economic agreements with each other to protect 
and secure their borders, develop their economic prosperity, and grow 
their political relationships. Alliances, economic agreements, and political 
relationships have come and gone, decreased or increased, and continue 
to be at times as fluid as water. During the Cold War the international 
system had a bipolar structure, with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact 
allies balancing against the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization allies. What makes countries align themselves with other 
countries economically, politically and militarily? There are many 
questions that have yet to be answered and some that probably never will. 
Since the end of the Cold War China has begun to develop into the next 
balancing superpower to the United States, a position that was previously 
held by the Soviet Union. This dissertation will identify the various realist 
and neo-realist theories as to why governments form military alliances or 
coalitions, and economic and political relationships, along with the factors 
that alliance theories are formed on. 
II 
It will also posit the theory that China and the United States could 
produce the next Balance of Power in the international system. 
As China has increased its military strength, political influence, and 
economic power, its capacity to counter or balance against the United 
States and its allies has also increased. China is filling the void once held 
by the Soviet Union by increasing its political influence, economic power, 
and its security relative to that of the United States since the end of the 
Cold War. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades China has increased its military, political 
and economic power, expanding its global reach and its degree of 
influence with other states. China is developing a military that is already 
stronger than those of most states in the world and could eventually rival 
that of the United States. It is also growing economically at a pace that 
few states can contend with, with an annual rate of nearly 10 percent of its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since the end of the Cold War in 1989. 
There has been some controversy over what rate China has grown at, 
though Fishman (2005) finds that "Since China set about reforming its 
economy a generation ago, it has grown at an official rate of 9.5 percent" 
(p. 12). Others suggest that the growth could be a little shy of this rate, 
though this is still astonishing. Shenkar (2005) states, "Some observers 
discount the Chinese growth numbers as exaggerated, but shaving a 
point, as they suggest, of a GDP growth rate of seven to eight percent 
would still leave China with the most rapid growth rate in either the 
developed or developing world over a sustainable time period" (p. 2). 
China is also developing its political capabilities, building 
relationships with states around the globe, and participating in United 
Nations (UN) discussions and decisions more openly than in the past, 
when China generally kept to itself, safeguarding its sovereignty in the 
belief that the Communist Party would govern the Chinese people and that 
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outsiders would not direct Beijing how to manage its affairs. As states 
develop economic, military and political relationships with China, many 
oppose the United States and its allies, thus creating a balance of power 
between the two. This balance of power is comparable to the balance of 
power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold 
War. 
In the last decade there has been a significant American and global 
focus on the Middle East and the Global War on Terror. There are also 
many other problems that arise daily around the globe, but China's 
growing influence and interactions with other states have become 
increasingly prominent. This dissertation will focus on the extent to which 
the United States has begun to lose its global influence, while China 
concurrently increases its global influence. 
From a historical perspective, one could consider China's actions 
as those of a rising power, in accordance with the tenets of both realism 
and neo-realism. As Bush and O'Hanlon (2007) assert, "A special 
interaction occurs in the international system when a formally weak 
country quickly accumulates money and military muscle and thereby 
reorders the previous power hierarchy. And it is usually the strongest and 
most established state, the one that has the greatest stake in the existing 
order, that watches the upstart most carefully" (p. 13). Further, Bush and 
O'Hanlon (2007) stress that "some scholars claim that world politics are 
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actually the most unstable when a rising power confronts the leading 
status quo power" (p. 13). 
Research Question 
The research question for this dissertation is as follows: What 
factors have driven China to increase its power relative to that of the 
United States through the development of economic, political and security 
relationships with other states in the international system since the end of 
the Cold War? 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis for this dissertation is as follows: As a result of its 
growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy and 
military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, 
political and security relationships with other states in the international 
system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United 
States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these 
objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising 
powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-
realism. 
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Background 
To develop a clear understanding of why alliances form, research 
was conducted on international relations theories, international systems 
theories, and alliance theories in order to gain knowledge as to how states 
become regional and global powers in the international system. According 
to Walt, 
States form alliances primarily to balance against threats. Threats, 
in turn, are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive 
capabilities, and perceived intentions. Throughout the cold war, the 
Soviet Union posed a greater threat to the major powers of Eurasia 
than the United States did. As 'balance-of-threat' theory predicts, 
these states balanced by allying with the United States, creating a 
global coalition that was both remarkably stable and significantly 
than the Soviet alliance network (1987, p. vi). 
For the most part, alliances are formal agreements that are formed 
and agreed upon through written and signed documents (treaties) such as 
the Washington Treaty through which the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was established in April 1949. Coalitions are less 
formal, ad hoc and temporary arrangements that are reactions to specific 
threats such as American President George W. Bush's "coalition of the 
willing" formed to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 
(Snyder, 1990). This dissertation will focus on security alliances and the 
factors that cause alliances to form, the increasing political influence of 
China, and the economic growth that China has exhibited since the end of 
the Cold War. It is important to note that this dissertation will not focus 
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only on military alliances and coalitions, but also examine economic and 
political relationships that do not involve formal alliances. The latter two 
types of relationships have been indispensable to China's economic 
growth and increases in its global political influence. 
One question that needs to be addressed is: what is 'power' and 
how does a state become a superpower as power is the core concept for 
realists (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). One definition of power is from Robert A. 
Scalapino, who writes, 
Power is a many-faceted force in the contemporary world. 
Undoubtedly, military strength, including the capacity to keep 
abreast of the revolutionary changes in military strategy now taking 
place, is of critical importance in addressing a nation's role in a 
regional or global balance of power. However, a nation's strength 
is also determined by such factors as size and location and, 
notably, by its economy, its political stability, and its overall 
relations with key external nations (2004, p. 368). 
Other considerations and definitions of power also need to include 
the further distinction of "hard power" and "soft power". Hard power is the 
state's ability to use force or economic means to influence another state's 
actions. Soft power is a state's use of diplomatic means to influence the 
actions and decisions of other states. What Nye finds it that a states soft 
power comes from three sources; its culture, its political value, and its 
foreign policies (2004). As China continues to gain power it has done so 
especially in the area of "soft power". China has made numerous state 
visits and has invited various state dignitaries to China in an effort to grow 
its relationships and enhance its global political standing. 
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As is true of the Middle East, Asia is a region of the world where 
America's presence and policies could lead to war or cooperation (Jisi, 
2005). Consequently, the United States will need to remain focused on 
Asia as well as the Middle East. Problems continue around Taiwan and 
the China Sea. China and the United States have held relationships that 
have been both positive and negative throughout history. Currently the 
U.S. position over Taiwan and the region is: "To help maintain peace, 
security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote our broad 
foreign policy objectives we are implementing fully the terms of the Taiwan 
Relations Act by maintaining robust unofficial relations between the 
American people and the people of Taiwan" (Bush, 2002). Many suggest 
that the Taiwan and its current position, that of a separate state and not 
one with China, may be the catalyst that could push China and the United 
States to war. 
Bush and O'Hanlon (2007) suggest how this war could come into 
play: 
Taiwan could take a major political step toward strengthening its 
sovereignty that its leaders might believe is reasonable and 
moderate but that China views as a separatist declaration of 
independence. Alternatively, even if Taiwan remains comfortable 
with the status quo, China could grow impatient about Taiwan's 
refusal to agree to prompt unification on its terms. In a fog of 
miscommunication and politics, and enraged China prepares to 
attack the island while Taiwan's leaders assume American support. 
The United States, bound by decades of promises and a strong 
sense of moral obligation to Taiwan, warns China should not use 
military force and strongly suggests that the United States will 
defend the island (p. 10). 
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China would like to impose a "One China" concept that is inclusive 
of Taiwan. The August 2002 Annual Report to the President and to 
Congress (ADR) states, "Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be both 
a critical and formidable task. The possibility exists that a military 
competitor with a substantial resource base will emerge in the region" 
(Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 11). Moving forward on the subject of Taiwan, the 
United States has stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy: "China 
and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without 
coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan "(Bush, 
2006, p. 42). 
Andrew Scobell has indicated that China's military has become a 
more modern force that is better educated, equipped with a more dynamic 
capability and mindset that focuses not on what was the "people's war" but 
now on warfare that is aimed at peaceful means by better technology 
(Scobell, 2005). Scobell also suggests that the economic reforms 
launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have fueled an uninterrupted growth 
that has lasted for over 25 years sustaining economic growth and 
prosperity in China (2005). 
Fishman indicates that China's military from a personnel 
perspective is over five times the size of that of the United States with 
more than two and a half million people (2005). Fishman also identifies 
that there are more than 220 million surplus workers in China's central and 
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western regions which is considerably more than the number of people 
working in the United States. (Fishman, 2005) 
Overview of Research 
This dissertation will identify the factors found in the realist and 
neo-realist literature on the formation of military alliances and other 
economic and political relationships between states and apply them to 
China's growth, economically, politically, and militarily, in an attempt to 
support the theory that China's growth to superpower status has 
influenced the development of such relationships involving China, the 
United States and other states and international organizations. It will also 
demonstrate that China's political influence has increased considerably, 
as has China's economic power. Ultimately, the dissertation will present 
evidence to suggest that as a result of these three developments, China is 
in a position to join the United States in forming the next bipolar global 
balance of power. This dissertation does not intend to support the same 
balance of power that was once in place between the United States and 
the Soviet Union with a contentious escalation of military hardware and 
state tensions during the Cold War, but that there is a new balance of 
power between China and its allies and the United States and its allies 
where the two powers have the ability to offset each other in both positive 
and negative ways that have been evident since the end of the Cold War 
and remain so in today's international system. 
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Justification for Research 
With America's present emphasis on the Middle East, there needs 
to be a greater American emphasis on the Asia Pacific region, especially 
with respect to China. If the United States continues to focus on the 
current hot bed, there is the possibility that it may miss the growth of what 
could become the next great power that will have the ability to balance 
American power. Power transitions, resurgent Asian nationalism, and 
poor policy choices in Washington have supposedly undermined U.S. 
leadership in Asia. According to critics, the Bush administration has been 
distracted by Iraq, has failed to deal adequately with China's economic 
and political rise, and has alienated many Asians with its singular focus on 
counterterrorism (Cha, 2007). Economic, political and military growth and 
influence continues at a rapid pace. If China not kept in check, the 
influence and power of the United States will continue to diminish is. 
China does have a vision of returning to its past greatness. 
Structure of the Research 
This dissertation will include six main chapters and a concluding 
chapter. Chapter II reviews the literature on the structure of the 
international system and the behavior of the states interacting therein in 
order to better understand the characteristics of unipolar, bipolar, and 
multipolar international systems and behavior of states interacting therein 
under the tenets of realism and neo-realism on one hand and liberalism 
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and neo-liberal institutionalism on the other as these theories will 
formulate the thought behind balance of power theory and a bipolar 
balance of power. This dissertation will follow the basic realist premise 
that states are the most significant and influential actors in the 
international system and, in turn, the "search for power and security is the 
dominant logic in global politics, and that states as the primary actors in 
the arena have no choice but to accumulate the means of violence in the 
pursuit of self preservation: the 'international' is a self-help system" 
(Burchill, 1996). From the neo-realist perspective, this dissertation will also 
address the external means that influence international systems. Burchill 
(1996) finds that "neo-realists such as Waltz point to the anarchical 
condition of the international realm which imposes the accumulation of 
power as a systemic requirement on states" (p. 90). 
Chapter III discusses the methodology for the dissertation, 
providing the outline and guidance for the structure of the research. The 
explanatory theoretical basis for the dissertation is drawn from the realist 
and neo-realist perspectives. The qualitative method of historical research 
will be used to provide the background and data needed to conclude and 
support the dissertation with comparative analysis of China's growth 
relative to the United States. 
Chapter IV will examine the growth of China's economic and 
military power and political influence in Asia and at the global level over 
the last twenty years. China has grown at an alarming pace and is a 
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rising power that can challenge the United States. The growth of China 
both economically and militarily brings to light this sleeping giant that is 
quickly awakening. China has also developed a soft power presence and 
has begun to make deals with many states that have a disdain for the 
United States. China has developed military and economic partnerships 
or trade with Venezuela, Iran, and Syria, all of which would like nothing 
other than the see the relative power and influence of the United States 
decrease. Another consideration in China's growth is how to feed that 
growth. China's growth has also had an impact on its consumption of 
natural resources. China will need to fuel its billions of people; its 
consumption of oil and other natural resources will also limit what is 
available for other states, namely the United States. There is now and will 
continue to be competition for these scarce resources. China and the 
United States do not have a completely polarized view of each other. 
There are some commonalities between the two states where there is 
agreement on some grounds. Both states do believe in the fight against 
terrorism as a start. 
Chapter V will identify the relationship between China and the 
United States and look at both sides to identify both the positives and 
negatives of this relationship. This effort will also gather the demographic 
data that can be obtained on each state, along with its military capacity 
and economic information. In this portion of the research, there will also 
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be an effort to identify military alliances and economic and political 
relationships that have formed either for China or the United States. 
The last chapters will present the analysis of the evidence in 
Chapter VI and a set of conclusions in Chapter VII. Analysis of the data 
will be to identify if the actions of China had any influence on the formation 
of any alliance that may have formed or strengthened and that China has 
increased its power relative to that of the United States. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This dissertation is written from the perspective of the realist theory 
of international relations. Realist theories have developed and evolved 
over the years so it is important to understand the roots of realism and its 
transformation to modern political science. This chapter will discuss the 
concepts of both realism and neo-realism. The works of many, including 
E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Inis Claude, supports the theory of 
realism. Neo-realism, too, has many advocates, including, most notably, 
Kenneth Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. More 
specifically, it will focus on the international systems and alliance theories, 
which are central to the arguments, put forward in the dissertation. As 
China continues its growth, the economic, political, and security 
relationships it has developed with other states will contribute to the 
development of a balance of power between China and the United 
States. 
Carr (1946) begins with his initial development in his discussion on 
physical Science and political science outlining the differences where 
physical sciences are fact based. Carr (1946) comes to the conclusion 
that political science is different, and finds: 
In the political sciences, which are concerned with human behavior, 
there are no such facts. The investigator is inspired by the desire 
to cure some ill of the body of politic. Among the causes of the 
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trouble, he diagnoses the fact that human beings normally react to 
certain conditions in a certain way. But this is not a fact 
comparable with the fact that human bodies react in a certain way 
to certain drugs. It is a fact which may be changed by the desire to 
change it; and this desire, already present in the mind of the 
investigator, may be extended, as the result of his investigation to a 
sufficient number of other human beings to make it effective. ... In 
both physical and political sciences, the point is soon reached 
where the initial stage of wishing must be succeeded by a stage of 
hard and ruthless analysis. The difference is that political sciences 
can never wholly emancipate themselves from utopianism, and that 
political scientist is apt to linger for a longer initial period than the 
physical scientist in the Utopian stage of development (p. 9). 
It is widely regarded that Carr and Morgenthau took the lead in the 
establishment of modern realism. Burchill (Burchill, 1996) states, "the 
work of E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, widely regarded as the founding 
fathers of modern or 'traditional' realism"(p. 7). E.H. Carr's The Twenty 
Years Crisis (1939) is not a textbook of international theory, but a critique 
of the prevailing wisdom of its day. Published on the eve of the Second 
World War, it was a devastating attack on liberal 'utopianism' which had 
inspired the post great war political arrangements in Europe, most 
particularly the idea of collective security as it was enshrined in the 
institution of the League of Nations (Burchill, 1996). 
Carr's posit of realism in his day was in counter to utopianism and 
the concerns that power had been ignored in understanding political 
decisions. What Burchill finds is that Carr believed that realism was 'a 
necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism' which had ignored 
the central element of power in its consideration of international politics 
(Burchill, 1996). 
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Looking at the works of Morgenthau (1948), he finds that six 
principles of political realism. First, Morgenthau notes, "Political realism 
believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws 
that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first 
necessary to understand the laws by which society lives" (p. 4). Second, 
"The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in 
terms of power" (p. 5). Third, "Realism assumes that its key concept of 
interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally 
valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once 
and for all"(p. 10). Fourth, "Political realism is aware of the moral 
significance of political action" (p. 12). Fifth, "Political realism refuses to 
identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with moral laws that 
govern the universe" (p. 13). Sixth, "The difference, then, between political 
realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound" (p. 13). 
Morgenthau, as with Carr, also brings in the need for facts in 
relationship to realist theory. He states: "For realism, theory consists of 
ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason" (1966, p. 4). 
Carr also finds the need for facts and states: "In the field of thought it 
places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their 
causes and consequences" (1946, p. 10). 
Though this dissertation is written from the realist perspective, it is 
important to understand liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism as well. 
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Burchill (1996) states on liberalism "It has championed limited government 
and scientific rationality, believing individuals should be free from arbitrary 
state power, persecution and superstition, also it has advocated political 
freedom, democracy and constitutionally guaranteed rights, and privileged 
the liberty of the individual and equality before the law" (p. 29). Burchill 
(1996) also finds that liberalism promotes 'competition in civil society' and 
'market capitalism' is the most efficient manner in which scarce resources 
are allocated in a society. Looking at neoliberalism one would find that it 
pertains to economics, specifically that the control of the economy would 
move from the public sector to the private sector. Many of the initial 
aspects of the theory begin with Adam Smith and his theories found in his 
book The Wealth of Nations; though this precedes the theory of 
neoliberalism it does find its roots in the economic theory. 
Discussion on Realism 
"Realism is widely regarded as the most influential theoretical 
tradition in International Relations, even by its harshest critics. Its ancient 
philosophical heritage, its powerful critique of liberal internationalism and 
its influence on the practice of international diplomacy have secured it an 
important, if not dominant position in the discipline. No other theory has 
given as much form and structure to the study of international politics, 
especially to the sub-fields of Security Studies and International Political 
Economy"(Burchill, 1996, p. 70). What Burchill is discussing here is what 
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is considered 'classical realism,' which is found in the works of 
Morgenthau, Carr, Wright, and Claude. Their works have set the 
foundation for much of political thought for many past generations and 
even future generations to come. 
Realism for the most part is just what it implies and that is 
explaining decisions in politics as they are. Burchill provides a good 
explanation of realism in a simple statement and that is, 
As its name implies, realism seeks to describe and explain the 
world of international politics as it is, rather than how we might like 
it to be. Accordingly, the world is revealed to realists as a 
dangerous and insecure place, where violence is regrettable but 
endemic. In their account of the conflict nature of international 
politics, realists give high priority to the centrality of the nation-state 
in their considerations, acknowledging it as the supreme political 
authority in the world (1996, p. 70). 
As one can see, Burchill brings into play a few other thoughts on 
realism that are central to the theory of realism and that is the centrality of 
the state. This is an important concept, as states will ultimately make the 
decisions within the political system. This concept is a basic premise of 
realism. Supporting this concept Lansford states, "Realism emphasizes 
the primacy of the state as the main actor in global affairs and the 
presence of anarchy in the international system" (2002, p. 22). States will 
ultimately make the decisions that affect the affairs of the state at all levels 
from local issues to global issues that could be inclusive of its allies. 
There are four assumptions that realism is based on. First, states 
are the principal actors within the system. States represent the unit that 
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measurement or analysis is based on. There are non-state actors that 
play a role within the international system, but they are secondary. These 
non-state actors include international organizations and corporations or 
even terrorist organizations that do play a role but from the realist 
perspective the state is the primary actor most important in the system. 
Second, states are unitary actors. That is to say that the state will resolve 
any differences within the state and has the authority to do so. The state 
will make the decisions for the whole. Third, the state is a rational actor 
and states will maximize the utility or costs associated with the decisions 
that will be made on behalf of the state. Fourth, national security is the 
most important issue of the state (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). 
Carr also suggests that this simple explanation of realism and the 
ability to deduce what is real as opposed to what should be and how 
equilibrium will never be reached in reality, noting that, 
The antithesis of utopia and reality - a balance always swinging 
towards and away from equilibrium and never completely attaining 
it - is a fundamental antithesis revealing itself in many forms of 
thought. The two methods of approach - the inclination to ignore 
what was and what is in contemplation of what should be, and the 
inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is -
determine opposite attitudes towards every political problem(1946, 
P- 11)--
Along with the concept that the state is central to the realist theory 
is the contention that security is the first order of business for the state and 
that the decisions states will make will be for the security of the state. 
Jackson and Sorenson state, "The normative core of realism is national 
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security and state survival: these are the values that drive realist doctrine 
and realist foreign policy" (2003, p. 69). 
Supporting the concept of the centrality of the state and the 
decisions states make on behalf of ensuring security, Gilpin states, 
the essence of social reality is the group ...in a world of scarce 
resources and conflict over distribution of those resources and 
conflict over the distribution of those resources, human beings 
confront one another ultimately as members of groups, and not as 
isolated individuals (1986, p. 305). 
A central assumption found in realist theory is that human nature is 
pessimistic, that there is ultimately war between states, that the ultimate 
goal of the state is security and that it is doubtful that political systems can 
be effective. Jackson and Sorenson find that, 
Basic realist ideas and assumptions are: (1) a pessimistic view of 
human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations are 
necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately 
resolved by war; (3) a high regard for the values of national security 
sand state survival; (4) a basic skepticism that there can be 
progress in international politics that is comparable to that in 
domestic political life (2003, p. 68). 
This view of human nature is the long-standing pillar in realist 
theory and that is a key driver of how or why decisions are made within 
political systems. To further support this pessimistic view of realism, 
Burchill finds, 
Realists are unified in their pessimism about the extent to which the 
international political system can be made more peaceful and just. 
The international realm is characterized by conflict, suspicion and 
competition between nation-states, a logic which thwarts the 
realization of alternative world orders. Realism is a pessimistic 
theoretical tradition. Fundamental changes to the structure of the 
international system are unlikely, even if they are needed. The 
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apparent immutability of the international system means that it will 
not come to resemble domestic liberal orders, however desirable 
the analogue may be. For realists, international politics is a world 
of recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change (1996, p. 
70). 
What Morgenthau states on the theory of realism is that the world is 
imperfect from a rational point of view, that to improve the world one must 
work with the forces of human nature and not against them. Morgenthau 
also suggests that we live in a world of opposing interests, that there is 
conflict among those interests and that moral interests can never be fully 
realized and must be approximated in an effort to continually balance the 
world order (Morgenthau, 1948). 
There are assumptions that are held to be true in realism. Three of 
them are that states are rational actors with goals in mind. If states are to 
be the central actors in the political system, there must be a strategy to 
achieve these goals. The second assumption is that states have 
autonomy and that they will make decisions for the whole and in the best 
interest of the whole. The third assumption is that states have the 
capacity to act and when they do act it is for the whole state. Grieco 
states these three assumptions about states are interrelated. Within this 
cluster, Grieco finds that states are rational actors that are goal oriented, 
with strategies designed to achieve these goals and secondly, that these 
goals are consistent within the state and that there is a preferred outcome 
over another. Another aspect of this component of the cluster is that 
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states are 'cost sensitive' and will observe any success or failures of other 
states in order to attain the goals set forth. 
The second component of the cluster of realist assumptions is that 
states are autonomous and can make decisions for the whole of the state 
no matter the group. What is observed is that there are many groups 
within the whole of the state that are powerful and that decisions and 
strategies must be made for the whole and not just the powerful groups 
within the community. 
The third and last component of the realist cluster of assumptions 
is that a state must have the ability to call for a unity of action when 
dealing with other states. It is important that one understand the 
importance here, because if powerful entities within a state go outside the 
decisions made on behalf of the whole, there could be concerns that run 
counter to the strategy set forth be the decision makers on behalf of the 
whole, and that there must be a centrality as to the decisions made 
(Grieco, 1997). 
One of the main themes of realism is that of security. To ensure 
that a state is secure, it must maintain both hard power and soft power. 
States must be able ensure their survival through their decisions and 
actions; therefore, states maintain authority to make the decisions they will 
have to make. From the very beginnings of realist thought, one finds this 
concept of power in all aspects a state's pursuit of interests. 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbs, and indeed all classical realists ... 
They believe that the goal of power, the means of power, and the 
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use of power, are a central preoccupation of political activity. 
International politics is thus portrayed as - above all else - 'power 
polities': an arena of rivalry, conflict, and war between states in 
which the same basic problems of defending the national interest 
and ensuring the continued survival of the state repeat themselves 
over and over again (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 68). 
One of the thoughts around realism and adding factual findings 
along with an understanding of human behavior is the ability to predict 
political events. Burchill finds that, 
the early realists recognized the need for international political 
reform and were not blind to alternative forms of political 
organization. For them, the nation-state was not necessarily the 
ultimate expression of political community. And though their 
accounts seem unscientific and lacking in intellectual precision, 
many early realist believed that they could uncover the patterns and 
laws of international politics through a more sophisticated 
understanding of human nature. The most important of these early 
realists are E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau (1996, p. 71). 
Carr was concerned with the liberal thought of the day with the 
League of Nations and a collective security structure. Carr's concern with 
this thinking was that "Secret diplomacy would be abolished and replaced 
by public consent in the conduct of foreign policy. The balance of power 
principle would give way to a system of collective security, where 
individual acts of aggression would be met by the collective force of world 
opinion and military power" (Burchill, 1996, p. 71). 
Carr felt that the best way to have a stable international system was 
through a balance of power. If there were a balance in the international 
system there would be peace. "Far from being a cause of international 
conflict as the liberals had argued, the balance of power system 
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resembled the laws of nature: it was the normal expression of international 
power and the best guarantee of peace. Collective security, the liberal 
alternative, was little more than a method of placing predominant power in 
the hands of the victorious states, thus institutionalizing the status quo" 
(Burchill, 1996, p. 72). 
Mearsheimer discusses his theory on realism and provides his 
theory of offensive realism and describes neo-realism or structural realism 
as defensive realism. 
Defensive realism, which is frequently referred to as "structural 
realism" came on the scene in the late 1970s with the appearance 
of Waltz's Theory of International Politics. Unlike Morgenthau, 
Waltz does not assume that great powers are inherently aggressive 
because they are infused with a will to power; instead he starts by 
assuming that states merely aim to survive. Above all else, they 
seek security. Nevertheless, he maintains that the structure of the 
international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to 
the balance of power. In particular, anarchy forces security-seeking 
states to compete with each other for power, because power is the 
best means to survival (2001, p. 19). 
Mearsheimer defines his theory of offensive realism in the following 
manner: 
My theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory of 
international politics. As with defensive realism, my theory sees 
great powers as concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive 
in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each 
other; they quickly realize that power is the key to their survival. 
Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the 
question of how much power states want. For defensive realists, 
the international structure provides states with little incentive to 
seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to 
maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather 
than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on 
the other hand believe that status quo powers are rarely found in 
world politics, because the international system creates powerful 
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incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the 
expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when 
the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the 
hegemon in the system (2001, p. 21). 
Discussion on Neo- Realism 
Kenneth Waltz promulgated neo-realism in the 1979 book, Theory 
of International Politics. Burchill states that neo-realism is a modern 
variant of realism and that "the neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz which 
emerged in the 1980s as arguably the dominant theory of international 
relations" (1996, p. 87). 
What Kenneth Waltz has done for realism is that he has brought 
structure to the theory and made it more scientific. Waltz has suggested 
that international systems are like economic markets are formed by the 
'coaction of self-regarding units'. Waltz suggests is that 'city states, 
empires, or nations' form International structures. These are the units that 
are used to measure within the international system (Waltz, 1979). 
To further this support neo-realism as the leading theory of the last 
few decades George finds that, 
The dominant academic theory of international politics - variously 
referred to as structural realism or sometimes neo-realism - deals 
only with basic structural features of the international system: the 
"anarchical" nature of the system, the relative distribution of power, 
and the importance of the balance of power. This theory draws on 
the tradition of political realism, which has ancient roots in the 
writing of Thucydides, and attempts to transform classical realism 
into a scientific-deductive theory that focuses on the structure of the 
international system (2005, p. 108). 
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Where neo-realism differs from realism is that it relies on the 
structure of the system; that there are forces that influence decisions 
within the international system. Waltz wanted to also further the theory of 
realism into a more scientific theory. George states: "Waltz attempted to 
convert it into a scientifically respectable deductive theory, one that relies 
on structural attribute of the international system to generate predictions 
and provide a basis for explaining outcomes of international politics" 
(2005, p. 109). 
Waltz also disregards human nature and what diplomats do to 
influence decisions in the international system. Jackson and Sorensen 
find that "Unlike Morgenthau (1985), [Waltz] gives no account of human 
nature and he ignores the ethics of statecraft" (2003, p. 84). 
What neo-realism focuses on is that there are external forces, units, 
and structures found in the international system and those externalities 
are what cause decisions to be made. 
In Waltz's view the best IR theory is a neo-realist system theory 
that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its 
interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the 
system. In classical realism, state leaders and their subjective 
valuations of international relations are at the center of attention. In 
neo-realism, by contrast, the structure of the system, in particular 
the relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. 
Actors are less important because structures compel them to act in 
certain ways. Structures more or less determine actions. (Jackson 
& Sorensen, 2003, p. 85) 
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One of the reasons that neo-realism does not focus on the 
centrality of the state is that basically most states are the same, that their 
only real difference is in their capabilities. 
According to Waltz's neo-realist theory, a basic feature of 
international relations is the decentralized structure of anarchy 
between states. States are alike in all basic functional respects -
i.e. in spite of all their different cultures or ideologies or 
constitutions or personnel they all perform the same basic tasks. 
All states have to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, etc. States 
differ significantly only in regard to their greatly varying capabilities 
(Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 85). 
To further support the concept that states are basically the same in 
all aspects other than capability, Burchill finds, 
Neo-realism provides a convincing account of why the foreign 
policies of nation-states are so familiar, despite their very diverse 
internal natures. It also provides a more sophisticated explanation 
from the persistence of the international system. However, it 
exaggerates the autonomy states enjoy from their domestic 
conditions, overstates the importance of structure and 
underestimates the potential for states to transform the international 
system. Neo-realism implies that, in its present form, the nation-
state is a seemingly perennial fixture in the international system 
and that the aspects for alternative expressions of political 
community are limited (1996, p. 99). 
One of the concepts that Waltz feels supports his theory is the 
difference in social systems and natural systems is that within social 
systems there is structure, that there are external forces that influence 
decisions within the international system. "Waltz insists that social 
systems are very different from natural systems and require a different 
methodology to understand them. He sees social systems as possessing 
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a structure that constrains the behavior of the constituent units" (Buzan & 
Little, 2000, p. 39). Buzan and Little also find that, 
Waltz argues that there are only two possible ways that political 
systems can be structured: one structure is characterized by 
hierarchy and the other by anarchy. In a hierarchy, the units 
perform different functions, which means that they are structurally 
dependent upon each other. The mode of organization amongst 
the units reflects subordinate - superordinate relationships, with the 
overall distribution of power giving the resulting hierarchy a 
distinctive shape. In an anarchy, by contrast, the units relate to 
each other as independent agents, and so must be functionally 
autonomous in order to avoid structural dependency (2000, p. 40). 
Waltz has brought to the theory of neo-realism the scientific 
oversight that is needed to truly test theories, especially in the social 
sciences. What Waltz posits of the theory is that theories are different 
than laws, that laws identify the probable associations and theories show 
why those associations exist (Waltz, 1979). 
Discussion on Liberalism 
What Burchill finds is there are two variations of liberalism: 
"between the market view of human beings as consumers maximizing 
their utilities and the ethical view of humans striving to release their 
potential" (1996, p. 29). The end of the Cold War is what Fukuyama 
considers the "ideal state" where the political and economic forms cannot 
be improved on, that there cannot be any more progress in the 
development of 'underlying principals and institutions' of the international 
system (Fukuyama, 1992). 
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From a true liberal perspective, liberal views find a positive view of 
human nature and that there can be "rational principals can be applied to 
international affairs" (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 106). 
What Morgenthau writes of liberalism is, 
One believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from 
universally valid abstract principals, can be achieved here and now. 
It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of 
human nature, and blames the failure of the social order to 
measure up to the rational standards on lack of knowledge and 
understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or depravity of 
certain isolated individuals or groups. It trusts in education, reform, 
and the sporadic use of force to remedy these defects 
(Morgenthau, 1966, p. 3). 
Running opposite the realist views as to human nature, the liberal 
perspective places high value on the goodness of human nature to drive 
individuals and the states they lead to do the right thing for the good of all 
mankind. The realist perspective is not as optimistic, given its advocates' 
belief that at some point human nature will fail and war will be the eventual 
outcome. 
Viotti and Kauppi (1999) discuss pluralism, which in this case is 
synonymous with liberalism, also with four assumptions. First, non-state 
actors cannot be ignored; that they play an important role in international 
relations. This concept runs counter to that of realism. Second, the state 
is not a unitary actor. The state is composed with many bureaucracies 
within the system and that state cannot act alone given the extent of 
competition within the system. Third, liberalism challenges the realist 
assumption that states are rational actors as there is negotiation and 
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compromise within the system of the state. Fourth, the agenda for 
international politics is extensive and security cannot be the primary issue 
within the system. 
Burchill (1996) continues with the theories of liberalism and finds 
that, 
The foundations of contemporary liberal internationalism were laid 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by liberals proposing 
preconditions for a peaceful world order. In broad summary they 
concluded that the prospects for the elimination of war lay with a 
preference for democracy over aristocracy, free trade over autarky, 
and collective security over the balance of power system (p. 32). 
Where this differs from the realist perspective is that the struggle for 
power will eventually win out. As states struggle to retain resources for its 
growth and prosperity, states will ultimately choose to go to war in an 
effort to gain power over other states and their resources. 
The main component of liberalism is that of economy. Liberals feel 
that free trade is a more peaceful manner in which to achieve wealth. 
Moving away from the theory of "comparative advantage" states are better 
off as this is the best way to expand economies especially if one were to 
take away artificial barriers in order to expand the markets to a global 
perspective (Burchill, 1996). 
Another aspect of liberalism is that of collective security. As states 
come together in an effort to ensure security to the whole that international 
relations does not have to be a zero-sum game, as many states feel 
secure enough to maximize their own gains regardless of what accrues to 
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other states (Burchill, 1996). One of the larger perspectives of liberalism 
is how balance of power results from collusion of powers that can 
influence international interests and that international relations are 
"arranged" in an effort to suit those in power. Burchill continues, 
Liberal critics of the balance of power claim the concept is vague 
and unintelligible and the method by which great powers pursue 
their commercial and strategic interests at the expense of small 
powers, often in violation of international law. Realist defenders of 
the concept, on the other hand, argue that liberals have missed the 
point of the system. The principle function of the balance of power 
is not to preserve peace, but to preserve the system of states 
(1996, pp. 45-46). 
The early liberal thinkers had a focus on freedom, cooperation, and 
progress and included the likes of John Locke whose theories included the 
constitutionality of states and toleration. Other early liberal thinkers were 
Jeremy Bentham, who worked for International law and reciprocity 
between states and Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, whose 
theories posit progress and perpetual peace. 
Discussion on Neo-Liberalism 
Neo-liberalism has come into play through the globalization of the 
world economies and a renaissance of liberal thinking (Burchill, 1996). 
Burchill finds that especially in Britain and the United States this new 
emergence of liberal thought was, 
was achieved at the expense of Keynesianism, the first coherent 
philosophy of state intervention in economic life. According to the 
Keynesian formula, the state intervened in the economy to smooth 
out the business cycle, provide a degree of social equity and 
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security, and maintain full employment. Neo-liberals, who had 
always favored the free play of 'market forces' and a minimal role 
for the state in economic life, wanted to 'roll back' the welfare state, 
in the process challenging the social-democratic consensus 
established in most Western states during the post-war period 
(1996, p. 55). 
Neoliberals, like neorealists, view the structure of the interstate 
system as anarchic, yet they believe that this constant feature of the 
system still permits a variety of patterns of interaction among states. 
Neoliberals are thus more optimistic that enduring cooperation among 
states is possible (Thies, 2004). Most significantly, neo-liberals believe 
that institutions can temper the extent of the anarchy within the 
international system and facilitate cooperation between states. Thies also 
finds that neoliberalism and neorealism are 'twins' or 'opposites' and that 
there is no 'Waltz' associated with neoliberalism, causing a number of 
problems that Thies finds, which is, 
This has created a number of problems for establishing 
neoliberalism as a theory in its own right. First, neoliberalism is 
often defined solely in relation to neorealism, either as its virtual 
twin or as its opposite. Second, neoliberals themselves have called 
for a synthesis of their approach with neorealism. Lastly, such a 
synthesis calls into question the essential nature of both neoliberal 
and neorealist approaches to world politics that derives from a 
misunderstanding about the relationship between process and 
structure (2004, p. 162). 
The basic primary concept of neoliberal thought is based around 
commercial trade on that of a global perspective. Neoliberal thought is 
that there should be little to know constraints against global trade and with 
no 'artificial protection and subsidies' to enhance one state over another. 
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There should be open borders when it comes to trade of goods and 
services between states and that this will generate the most efficient 
means to the use of 'resources, people, and capital' for all states on a 
global basis (Burchill, 1996). 
One other concept of neoliberal thought is that Thies finds is; 
"neoliberalism places emphasis on absolute gains that can accrue to each 
state from international cooperation, while neorealists believe that states 
are concerned primarily with relative gains" (2004, p. 162). Here, the 
concept that with an emphasis on absolute gains, each state will have 
gained at an equal basis when compared to relative gains. 
One of the concepts the Keohane (1986) suggests one of the 
problems with realism, at least from the liberal perspective, is that of 
human nature. If human nature was consistent and the behavior traits for 
conflict or interaction were consistent and provided a consistent outcome, 
why is it that the variations of warfare cannot not be predicted as to the 
outcome of a given conflict as the realist theory would suggest. Keohane 
also suggests of the concept of balance of power and Morgenthau's 
concept the universality of balance of power is also inconsistent. The 
reason for this is that there is no universally accepted concept of power. 
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane also suggest problems with the 
realist theory and the lack of a consistent definition for power. Nye and 
Keohane also argue that one of the problems with realist thought is the 
inability to calculate the power of others. The ability of states has become 
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more deceptive and difficult to estimate or analyze the power of states that 
may or may not be an ally in an ever-changing international system 
(1999). 
Discussion on International Systems 
There are three types of international systems, unipolar, bipolar, 
and multipolar. Within a unipolar system, there is one power that can 
influence other states, either through hard power or soft power. In a 
bipolar system, there are two powers that balance each other. An 
example of a bipolar system that one could visualize in recent history was 
that between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the point when 
the Soviet Union fell, the international system transitioned into a unipolar 
one. As Mastanduno states, "The end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union as one pole in a bipolar system clearly represent 
significant changes in the international environment" (1997, p. 53). 
Mastanduno also finds: "many commentators and theorists have 
concluded that the current structure is unipolar" (1997, p. 53). 
If one were to look at the end of the Cold War, one day there were 
two superpowers holding a balance in the international system and the 
next there was only one, the United States, creating a unipolar 
international system. "The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the 
international system from bipolarity to unipolarity" (Layne, 1993, p. 5). 
34 
One of the concepts of Waltz on multipolar systems is concerned 
with the number of powers within an international system. That if there 
are multiple powers and no true or formal alliance between the powers, 
then there is no true security in knowing that if a conflict were to arise what 
power would align with what other state. In a bipolar system states are 
fully aware of their allies. Although they could switch alliances depending 
on the circumstance, the system is basically more stable than a multipolar 
one. Waltz states, 
In multipolar systems there are too many powers to permit any of 
them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries 
and too few to keep the effects of defection low. With three or more 
powers flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and 
enmity fluid and makes everyone's estimate of the present and 
future relation of forces uncertain. So long as the system is one of 
fairly small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the 
security of the others (1979, p168). 
When there is a bipolar international system there are historically 
two superpowers with states aligned with each power. In the Cold war era 
the Soviet Union and the United States held those two positions. Because 
of the economic and military power of each of these states, the bulk of the 
support came from internal sources. As Waltz explains, 
In a bipolar world, military interdependence declines even more 
sharply than economic interdependence. Russia and America 
depend militarily mainly on themselves. They balance each other 
by "internal" instead of "external" means, relying on their own 
capabilities of allies. Internal balancing is more reliable and precise 
than external balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their 
relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and 
reliability of opposing coalitions (1979, p. 168). 
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Waltz goes on to discuss states reliability on other states and finds, 
"Militarily, interdependence is low in a bipolar world and high in a 
multipolar one. Great powers in a multipolar world depend on one another 
for political and military support in crisis and war. To assure oneself of 
steadfast support is vital. This cannot be the case in a bipolar world, for 
third parties are not able to tilt the balance of power by withdrawing from 
one alliance and joining the other" (Waltz, 1979, p. 169). 
Within the international system there are alliances between states. 
These alliances are found in all types of international systems and each of 
the states contributes to the alliance. Granted, the greater power will 
contribute the most to the alliance as it also has the most to give in all 
aspects of the alliance. Decisions on strategy of the leaders though are 
not made by the whole. Waltz finds that "In bipolar as in multipolar worlds, 
alliance leaders may try to elicit maximum contributions from their 
associates. The contributions are useful even in a bipolar world, but they 
are not indispensable. Because they are not, the policies and strategies 
of alliance leaders are ultimately made according to their own calculations 
and interests (Waltz, 1979). 
One of the concerns with multipolar systems that Waltz finds is that 
states will have to look for common interests that will satisfy all parties in 
the alliance. Because of the need to satisfy all and that ultimately the 
decision may not be the best one for a state that may have made a 
different decision if other states were not involved. Waltz finds, 
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In a multipolar world, states often pool their resources in order to 
serve their interests. Roughly equal parties engaged in cooperative 
endeavors must look for a common denominator of their policies. 
They risk finding the lowest one and easily end up in the worst of all 
possible worlds. In a bipolar world, alliance leaders make their. 
strategies mainly according to their own calculations of interests. 
Strategies can be designed more to cope with the main adversary 
and less to satisfy one's allies (1979, p. 171). 
Waltz also discusses the competition between powers in a bipolar 
system. Many can remember the race to the moon between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Though the Soviets put a man in space first, 
the United States put a man on the moon first. Other competitions 
between the two superpowers were security based. The arms race and 
the buildup of nuclear armaments grew at an alarming pace while each 
party was concerned with the possibility of being attacked by the other. 
Bipolarity extends the geographic scope of both powers' concern. 
It also broadens the range of factors included in the competition 
between them. Because allies add relatively little to superpowers' 
capabilities, they concentrate their attention on their own 
dispositions. In a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom is 
often unclear; the incentive to regard all disequilibrating changes 
with concern and respond to them with whatever effort may be 
required is consequently weakened. In a bipolar world changes 
may affect each of the two powers differently, and this means all 
the more that few changes in the world at large or within each 
other's national realm are likely to be thought irrelevant (1979, p. 
171). 
Within the international system there will be a balance of power. 
The balance of power depicts not the polarity of the states but how they 
are aligned. A good example of this in a bipolar system would be that of 
the Cold War era and the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet Union with its allies 
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and that of North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the Untied States with its 
allies. On the configuration of the balance of power and the international 
system Claude states, 
The versatility of three words, balance of power, is further exhibited 
in their capacity to denote systems of international politics. 
Perhaps the most common use of the phrase makes balance of 
power mean not a certain type of power configuration, or certain 
precept of policy, but a certain kind of arrangement for the 
operation of international relations in a world of many states (1962, 
p. 20). 
In a bipolar international system each power is certain of its enemy. 
When there was a bipolar system with the United States and the Soviet, 
each state knew who its enemy was. "In great power politics of bipolar 
worlds, who is in danger is never in doubt. This is the first big difference 
between politics of power in the two systems"(Waltz, 1979, p. 170). 
After the fall of the Soviet Union the United States held the position 
as the only global superpower with the capability to reach any region of 
the world from many perspectives. The United States has the most 
powerful military in the word, one that far exceeds the capabilities at the 
disposal of any other power. There is also great economic power and 
political influence that run counter to that of some rising powers. China is 
growing its economic, military and political power and will challenge the 
United States as it continues its journey toward greatness. China 
continues to influence and align with states that are in direct contention 
with the United States. States like Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Syria 
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have continued to make oil deals, military deals, and political deals with 
China that will affect the security of the United States and its allies. 
Overview of Alliance Theories 
This literature review will examine the various theories as to why 
alliances form and will identify the factors that influence alliances. 
Throughout history alliances have formed mostly for protection against a 
state that threatens the sovereignty of another nation, its welfare, and its 
resources. One can look back through history and identify States such as 
Germany led by Adolph Hitler attacking in an effort to expand its territory. 
In more recent years, one can identify then President Saddam Hussein 
and Iraq trying to expand into Kuwait. In both these examples the 
threatened state had to align with other states, either through formal 
military alliance or by coalition in order to defend itself. Stephen Walt 
discusses in his book The Origins of Alliances (1987) the many reasons or 
factors that cause alliances to form. Basically, Walt suggests that states 
align to balance against a threat and that threats are basically a function of 
power. When Kuwait was attacked by Iraq in August 1990, Kuwait could 
not protect itself and therefore the United States had to come to its 
defense. What Walt is suggesting is that function of power whereby Iraq 
was trying to increase its power through expanding its territory and its 
resources by gaining control of Kuwait's oil. To balance against this 
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power increase or threat, Kuwait had to turn to the United States to 
maintain its control and ultimately its sovereignty as an independent state. 
Balance of Power/Against Threat 
By far, balance of power is the most prominent theory as to why 
alliances form. Classical realists like Hans J. Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, 
Edward Gulick, and Inis Claude or Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz, 
Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer and Glenn Snyder all suggest this 
theory as to why alliances form. In all of the articles and books referenced 
on alliance theories, balance of power is used as a point of departure. 
The most helpful books found in this research are Morgenthau's Politics 
Among Nations (1993), Claude's Power and International Relations 
(1962), Walt's The Origins of Alliances (1987), Gulick's Europe's Classical 
Balance of Power (1955), Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis (1939), Waltz's 
Theory of International Politics (1979) and Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics (2001). These books alone provide a wealth of 
information on balance of power and balance of threat theories, with 
balance of threat being Walt's theory, which he considers to include 
balance of power theory. Balance of Power theory purports to explain the 
result of such methods that produce. "If there is any distinctively political 
theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it" (Waltz, 1979, 
p. 117). There are many scholars who have professed the balance of 
power theory but the most referenced include Waltz, Morgenthau, Martin 
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Wight, and Ernst Haas. Haas and Wight have articulated eight and nine 
meanings of the term balance of power, respectively (Waltz, 1979). All of 
these references or meanings were found through their own research 
back through history. 
Balance of power is thought by some to run with the laws of nature 
and by others as an outrage (Waltz, 1979). This varying of interpretations 
is due to the many views of balance of power within international relations. 
Theories such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, and neo-liberal 
institutionalism are the most followed in balance of power theory, which 
are explained through differing aspects as to why balance of power comes 
to play in the international system and why states act in the manner they 
do. Chiu (2003) finds that traditional alliance literature such as Waltz 
(1979) and Morgenthau (1985) indicates that alliances are formed to 
balance power in international systems. Schweller (2006) finds that the 
idea of balance of power in international politics stemmed from other fields 
of the day, at least from the classical realist perspective, such as ethics, 
science, law, economics, and philosophy and that balancing happened as 
a law of nature. Waltz states that "most of the confusion with balance of 
power theory, if properly stated begins with assumptions about states: 
They are unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their own preservation 
and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination" (1979, p. 118). With 
balance of power theory, there need to be at least three actors where the 
two weaker states would align to balance the power of the third, or 
41 
stronger, of the three. If less than three, there is no one to come to the 
help of the less superior party; therefore, there must be at least three. 
Walt advances the balance of power theory and moves to suggest 
that it is a balance of threat theory. He suggests that states balance or 
ally to oppose a threat rather than against power. Walt does suggest that 
balance or distribution of power is important but that the alliance against 
threat is more likely and that geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, 
and perceived intentions are more important. Walt basically studies three 
types of behavior: balancing, which is the alignment against a threat; 
bandwagoning, which is alignment with the dominant power; and detente, 
which is the voluntary development of a peaceful relations to reduce the 
tension (Gangale, 2003). Detente is a form of soft power as opposed to 
the hard power tactics mentioned above. A more substantial discussion of 
the distinctions between hard power and soft power follows later in this 
chapter. 
In Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Gulick, 1955), Gulick 
suggests a set of assumptions that one must understand in order to 
explain balance of power. Gulick, states that, 
When writers have viewed the balance of power, they have 
unconsciously and habitually made (and often ignored) numerous 
assumptions. They have assumed, for example, the initial 
existence of the state, a unit of power, based upon land and 
people, which was capable of exerting influence beyond its own 
borders; they have assumed also that power existed; that it could 
be measured by men; that men, having measured it, could balance 
it; that their balancing policies could affect the lives of states and 
the movement of history; and that the state system could be; and 
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would be perpetuated through human analysis, direction, and 
action (1955, p. 3). 
From this Gulick finds it important to focus on four distinct and 
important assumptions. One, that there is a state system. "Balance of 
power theorists assumed, first of all, the existence of a state system" 
(1955, p. 4). Gulick identifies a state system from the work of Friedrich 
von Gentz in Fragments on the Balance of Power, 1806 where Gentz 
suggests that a group of independent states are a group of neighboring 
states that are interconnected in some fashion and that they are of relative 
equal power (1955). The suggestion that there is a state system and that 
they have a common cultural cohesiveness from past history had bound 
them together. Gulick goes on to write, "This assumption of a state 
system is basic to any theory of political and military equilibrium among 
states. Just as one person does not make a crowd, one state cannot 
make a state system; and without a state system, one can have no 
balance of power among states" (1955, pp. 4-5). 
The second assumption Gulick identifies is that there must be a 
framework "that is, a generally recognized size of the system and 
therefore a limited number of entities to be balanced" (1955, pp. 8-9). 
What Gulick is stating is that there must be a defined territory with stated 
bounds that do not fluctuate. What Gulick goes on to state about balance 
of power and the number of states is: 
Logically, one may say there is a precise minimum-that is, two 
states with relatively equal power could theoretically comprise a 
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balance-of-power system. The fact that neither possessed an 
overwhelming preponderance of power would act as a check on 
their actions. But while it might seem possible for the state system 
to consist of no more than two powers in order to permit the 
existence of a balance of power, thisnumber should properly be 
regarded as improbable, unusual, and even dangerous for the 
continuance of the equilibrium (1955, p. 9). 
The third assumption Gulick finds is that of relative homogeneity. 
That is "Europe was an in-group of states which excluded non-European 
countries and which displayed a high degree of homogeneity within itself, 
as shown. Relative homogeneity was a demonstrable fact; it existed and 
it bestowed certain benefits upon the European balance of power" (1955, 
p. 20). What Gulick is suggesting that there was a group conscious effort 
between the states that kept the balance in check to ensure the 
preservation of the balance of power. Gulick continues stating that "In 
addition, homogeneity meant a kind of advantageous group-
consciousness for the members of the state system; it meant a uniformity 
of assumptions which in turn facilitated the perpetuation of a balance of 
power" (1955, p. 23). 
The fourth assumption Gulick discusses is a rational system of 
estimating power. What Gulick finds from Theodore H. Von Laue's History 
of Balance of Power, 1494-1914 is: "The power of individual states was 
conceived to be susceptible of measurement by certain well-defined 
factors: Their populations, their territories, their finances, - i.e. 'the balance 
of trade'-and by the state of their armies and navies" (1955, p. 25). One 
can also find this concept in Walt's work suggesting that a threat is 
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measured by geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities along with 
perceived intentions of the threat. This concept would hold true as if the 
threat was perceived to be greater than the capability of the threatened 
state than they would surly need to align with another state for its 
protection. Though Gulick provides many examples of this assumption in 
this book, one can find more modern examples. In Asia, and especially 
where China and the United States are concerned one would only have to 
look at Taiwan and the problems and concerns in that region. Where 
Taiwan would like to remain a sovereign state, China would like to pull it 
back into the fold. 
Discussion on Balancing, Bandwagoning, Free Riders and Buck-Passing 
There are basically two methods to balancing (or bandwagoning) 
and they are defined: "Balancing is defined as allying with others against 
the prevailing threat or power and bandwagoning refers to alignment with 
the source of danger" (Walt, 1987, p. 17). Whether alliances are formed 
by means of bandwagoning or balancing will determine the balance of 
power and the number of superpowers will determine bipolarity (two 
powers) or multi-polarity (more than two powers offsetting each other). As 
an example, if one looks back at the Cold War there were basically two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, creating a bipolar 
balance of power. 
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Free riding is where states within an alliance consume more than 
their share of what they add to the alliance or coalition. One can look at 
institutions such as the United Nations or and could make more than one 
case on this concept of free riding. One could also look at the example of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where the Untied Sates provides 
most of the resources, both militarily and economically from a security 
perspective, along with the United Kingdom, where many of the newer 
states do not have the ability to contribute. 
A good example of this principle would be during operation 
Enduring Freedom and the number of allies that contributed to the effort, 
though all gained through security and stability in the region, only a few 
actually participated in the war. 
Buck-passing is one state's actions to pass the cost and support to 
another state in its defense or security. A good example outlined by 
Mearsheimer (2001) is: "British policy makers tried to minimize the amount 
of fighting their troops did on the western front and instead get their 
alliance partners, France and Russia, to assume the costly burden of 
wearing down the German army" (2001, p. 159). 
Walt finds that, 
Excessive confidence in allied support will encourage weak states 
to free-ride, relying on the efforts of others to provide security. 
Free-riding is the optimal policy for a weak state, because its efforts 
will contribute little in any case. Among the great powers, the belief 
that allies are readily available encourages buck-passing; states 
that are threatened strive to pass to others the burdens of standing 
up to the aggressor. Neither response is a form of bandwagoning, 
but both suggest that the effective balancing behavior is more likely 
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to occur when members of an alliance are not convinced that 
partners are unconditionally loyal (1987, p. 31). 
One of Walt's hypotheses is that "The greater the probability of 
allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. When adequate allied 
support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck passing 
increases'^ 987, p. 33). 
Another theory of buck-passing is that of under-reaction by a state 
to threats when trying to free ride on other states. Schweller suggests 
that, 
Another strand of realist literature focuses on buck-passing, a form 
of underreaction to threats by which states attempt to ride free on 
the balancing efforts of others. The strategy of buck-passing 
exhibits several distinctive characteristics. Threatened status quo 
states: (1) form very loose alliances with vague commitments or 
avoid alliances altogether, (2) convene few, if any, joint meetings of 
their General Staffs to coordinate war plans and the establish a 
coherent Allied grand strategy, (3) spend a disproportionately low 
percentage of their gross national product on defense in relation to 
that of the aggressor state(s), (4) adopt purely defensive strategies 
with little or no capability to project military power (2006, p. 7). 
When it comes to who pays for the ride the general measure is that 
of GNP of a state. "According to the free-riding model, the larger country 
in an alliance (as measured by size of GNP) has a larger defense burden 
than the smaller country does" (Lee & Heo, 2001, p. 822). We see this in 
institutions or alliances like NATO and the United Nations both of which 
follow this model. 
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Discussion on Hard and Soft Power 
When discussing power one must understand that there are 
different types of power. In state politics there are basically two types of 
power that are observed and those are hard power and soft power. From 
one of Joseph Nye's definitions of power, one sees that "At the most 
general level, power means that ability to get the outcomes one wants" 
(2004, p. 1). Nye also finds that "power means having the capabilities to 
affect the behavior of others to make those things happen. So, more 
specifically, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get 
the outcomes one wants. You can coerce them with threats; you can 
induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want 
what you want" (2004, pp. 1-2). So basically what Nye is saying is that 
one can use hard power or 'coerce with threats or induce them with 
payments' or one could use soft power and 'co-opt them to want what you 
want' which is where China has made the greatest strides if its buildup of 
power. We can see this with the many agreements that China has made 
with other States and in its more commanding assertions at the United 
Nations and its voting power. This newly found power is discussed later in 
Chapter V of this dissertation, China's Rise to Superpower Status. 
As China has become a global presence, it has taken steps to wield 
its soft influence responsibility, joining multilateral institutions, 
supporting peacekeeping, powering economic growth in Latin 
America and Africa, fighting drug and human trafficking. China 
even has begun to mediate other nation's conflicts and apply 
pressure on dangerous countries, a step from the recent past, 
when China avoided any involvement in other states' domestic 
politics (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. xij. 
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China has used its newly found soft power as it has advanced its 
growth globally. China has made inroads with many states, especially 
with those having vast natural resources. China has courted many 
leaders in Latin America and Africa that have views that run counter to 
those of the United States. China has also invested large sums of money 
into these states through foreign direct investment or through funding 
exploration efforts for oil and other natural resources. By doing so, China 
has won or bought the support of these states, as it has become the new 
provider and supporter especially in areas of human rights and state 
sovereignty. China's influence in Asia has also increased as relationships 
have formed with many states throughout the region. For example, 70 
percent of Thailand's population now considers China its closest friend 
(Kurlantzick, 2007). 
The larger view of China's use of soft power is in the United 
Nations Security Council. On US important votes in the since 2000, there 
have been eighty-five votes cast. Of those eighty-five votes China has 
voted with the United States only five times ("China: Voting coincidence 
percentages. (2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000)." 2006, 2005, 
2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 #223). 
Hard power is the ability to influence through military means or 
economic means or as Nye states above through threats or payments. 
Campbell and O'Hanlon suggest concerns that the United States has is 
that over China's increase in its military and economic power. 
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The UNITED STATES will confront two overriding national-security 
challenges for at least the next generation. First, Americans must 
effectively wage a long twilight struggle against violent Islamic 
fundamentalists. Second, we must simultaneously cope with 
China's almost certain rise to great-power status (2006, p. 185). 
Campbell and O'Hanlon go on to state, 
China's economic successes over the past two decades have 
helped stimulate global commerce and improved the lives of 
millions of Chinese citizens. Unfortunately, they also have caused 
disturbing implications for the global balance of political and military 
power. As China's economy expands, so do the resources 
available to its leaders for pursuing diplomatic and military policies 
that will frequently conflict with American preferences (2006, p. 
190) 
Economic Theory 
Economic theories not only suggest that an ally within an alliance 
does such for purely economic gains but are more focused on what each 
state can provide in an alliance and how production decisions will be 
made depending on what an ally can provide to the alliance and what it 
might consume. 
There is an 'equilibrium' reached when there is a balance of power 
and that alliances are built economically and that there will be a 'marginal 
utility' of joining an alliance and basing decisions on rewards versus costs 
(Chiu, 2003). 
Sandler (1975) discusses two models of an economic theory of 
alliances. One constant to the two models is that defense goods are 
public good and private goods. The further explanation of a public good 
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within the two models is either from a pure public good or an impure public 
good. The author's note, 
a good that exhibits properties of nonappropriability of benefits and 
the indivisibility with respect to consumption opportunities is a 
public good. At one extreme is a pure public good which is 
completely indivisible among consumers in the sense that once the 
good is provided one man's consumption does not detract from 
another's. Hence, all individuals must consume the same quantity 
of the pure public good once it is produced. A second 
characteristic of the pure public good concerns the complete 
inability on the behalf of the provider to appropriate the benefits 
derived from the good. Therefore, excluding others from the good's 
benefit cannot be exercised by the provider of the pure public good 
even though a user refuses to reveal a preference for the good in 
the form of user fees. The nonappropriability characteristic of the 
pure public good is especially problematic inasmuch as most 
people fail to pay for the good in anticipation of a 'free ride. ... On 
the opposite end of the spectrum is the private good. A private 
good's benefits are completely divisable and appropriable. One 
individual's consumption of a piece of cake fully detracts from all 
others' consumption of that piece. In addition, the owner of the 
private good can fully exclude others from its benefits (Sandler, 
1975, pp. 331-332). 
In the development of an alliance the economic ability of each state 
will come into play in how each state will make its production decisions for 
that alliance. What Sandler state's is "the formation of an alliance permits 
benefits from defense expenditures to cross political boundaries, each 
country's production decision with respect to both the defense and 
nondefense good can be shown to be influenced by the production 
decision of the ally" (Sandler, 1975, p. 338). 
From the perspective of absolute economic gain, Powell states, 
"Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes that states focus primarily on their 
individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. 
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Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not vary important 
to a state in neoliberal institutionalism so long as it brings n absolute gain" 
(Powell, 1993, p. 209). Though, because of this desire for absolute 
economic gain states are willing to give up some sovereignty, not only 
because of the need for absolute gain but also the component of 
globalization in neoliberal thinking. 
Cultural Theory 
Huntington (1993) suggests that alliances are formed on the basis 
of cultural identity. Culture or civilization, which in this case is inclusive of 
religion, will be the bond that will keep people in alliances and other 
economic, political and security relationships, as articulated in "The Clash 
of Civilizations?" (1993). Huntington describes seven or eight cultures or 
civilizations that will be the dividing lines between alliances (Huntington, 
1993). From the Huntington's article (1993) came Huntington's book The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order in 1996. 
Huntington expands on his article in more detail in respect to his original 
hypothesis and that is: 
the concept of civilizations; the questions of a universal civilization; 
the relation between power and culture; the shifting balance of 
power among civilizations; cultural indigenization in non-Western 
societies; the political structure of civilizations; conflicts generated 
by Western universalism, Muslim militancy, and Chinese assertion; 
balancing and bandwagoning responses to the rise of Chinese 
power; the causes of dynamics of fault line wars; and the future of 
the West and of a world of civilizations (1996, p. 13). 
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As Huntington describes the various civilizations, he identifies the 
Sinic civilization, which pertains specifically to China and a few other 
regional states such as Vietnam and Korea. Huntington states," 
Labeled this civilization Confucian. It is more accurate, however, to 
use the term Sinic. While Confucianism is a major component of 
Chinese civilization, Chinese civilization is more than Confucianism 
and also transcends China as a political entity. The term "Sinic," 
which has been used by many scholars, appropriately describes 
the common culture of China and the Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere outside of China as well as the 
related cultures of Vietnam and Korea (1996, p. 45) 
Ideology Theory 
The general thought on ideology theories is that the more similar a 
state's ideology the more likely a state is to align with a state that follows 
that same ideology (Walt, 1987). Walt (1987) also finds that the more 
collective a states ideology the more fragile it will be. If a state perceives 
that it is secure there is a greater likelihood that a state will align from an 
ideological perspective. 
Gangale (2003) finds that in Schweller's view both Walt and Waltz 
assume that states act to preserve what they already possess, that all 
states have a compulsion to maximize their power. If all states were 
satisfied with what they had, what would be the motivation for aggression 
and war? Waltz claims that the primary cause of war is uncertainty and 
miscalculation, but in Schweller's view, it is clear that some states are 
revisionist (1994, p. 5). 
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Kevin Sweeny and Paul Fritz suggest an interest based 
bandwagoning theory as opposed to balancing and that actors chose to 
bandwagon more often than balance (Sweeney, 2004). Again, these 
authors cite the works of Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1967) and two 
others, Gulick (1955) and Claude (1962) as the classic writers of balance 
of power and that great powers join the weaker side to keep the balance 
the power of international relations (Sweeney, 2004). 
Coalitions 
Coalitions are informal agreements between actors and are usually 
short lived and for a single purpose. As illustrated by the conduct of 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq in the spring of 2003, the United States 
and others countries have formed coalitions in an effort to deter and stop 
terrorism. The difference between a coalition and that of an alliance is 
that of a formal treaty that is entered into by two or more states outlining 
the goals and considerations of such an alliance. These separate 
operations both are good examples of how coalitions are formed and how 
they operate. In general, coalitions are formed for a short-lived, though 
not always so short, but specific need. Pauly and Lansford find that "The 
US has used formal and informal multilateral configurations in order to 
pursue its specific national interests " (2005, p. 83). 
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Alliance Theory Review 
In reviewing the various alliance theories, balance of power is 
without a doubt the most prominent of the theories. Again, balance of 
power posits that alliances are formed in the event that international 
systems have gone out of a balance of power as one state has developed 
into a state that could overtake another state. From a realist perspective 
this "out of balance" scenario is where weaker states join to form an 
alliance to counter the power and bring the international system back to a 
balance of power. Carr, Morgenthau, and Gulick would suggest this 
theory. Another perspective would come from the neo-realists Walt, 
Waltz, Schweller, and Keohane. What the neo-realists would add is how 
external powers in the international system effects the decisions states 
make as to why alliances form. 
The second theory discussed above is that of a balance against 
threat proposed by Walt, which he suggests is really why alliances form. 
Walt has suggested that states as described in the scenario above really 
balance against a threat and that the two weaker states join to form an 
alliance to balance against the threat of the stronger state. 
The final three theories discussed above (economic, ideological 
and cultural) also describe various reasons that alliances will form. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, balance of power theory and Walt's 
balance against threat theory will be the driving theory used in discerning 
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alliance formation and the balance of power with the remaining three 
theories supporting a balance of power. 
Within this literature review discussions of international relations 
theories and international systems have been presented. At the onset of 
this chapter, the theory of realism is the perspective that is taken in the 
writing of this dissertation. This dissertation intends to outline the growth 
of China in the areas of politics, security, and economics, providing the 
perspective that China has made the decisions it has made from the 
realist notion that security, in all forms, are at the mainstay of those 
decisions. China has provided for its people and has provided the 
resources needed to sustain that growth and that ability to secure those 
needed resources are within the theory of realism. 
What this dissertation should add to the existing literature is the 
additional support to the theory of realism and neo-realism by providing 
additional evidence that the actions of China support the fundamental 
notion that the realist precept of security. As will be depicted throughout 
this dissertation the predominate concept of security in all facets is what 
China has followed, and that the growth of China supports the realist 
theories providing China's sustained growth to a superpower. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Discussion on Historical Research 
The primary methodological approach this dissertation will utilize is 
historical research, which it will employ in analyzing the data submitted. A 
case study approach will be utilized to compliment the historical research 
approach. The historical research used will identify the increase in 
China's power relative to that of the United States since the end of the 
Cold War in 1989 through 2007. This research will support the hypothesis 
that China has made gains in the areas of its economic growth, military 
power and political influence in comparison with America's capacities in 
each of those areas. 
The use of qualitative methods is not new, especially in the social 
sciences. "For several decades, political scientists have debated the 
merits of case studies versus statistical studies, area studies versus 
comparative studies, and 'scientific' studies of politics using quantitative 
methods versus 'historical' investigations relying on rich textual and 
contextual understanding." (King et al., 1994, p. 12) A qualitative 
approach will be useful in providing a comparative analysis on the growth 
of China's economic, military and political power and influence relative to 
that of the United States since the end of the Cold War through historical 
research of primary data and secondary sources. 
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Historiography originated with the ancient Greek writers and 
dominated historical writing. The earliest of these writers is Herodotus 
who wrote an account of the Persian Wars in the 5th Century BC. The 
next would be that of Thucydides who wrote about the accounts of the 
Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta. Both of these accounts 
concentrated on war, history and politics of the day. After the Greek 
writing was Roman historiography, which followed the Greek language 
until Cato the Elder finally wrote his account on Roman history in Latin. 
This work provided psychological insights on ethics, political analysis and 
human motivation. Following Cato the Elder was that of Cicero, who 
wrote of moral standards as they applied to public life. 
The next line of historical writing was the early Christians. Prior to 
this time all writers were Pagan except for Josephus. When Constantine 
the Great was converted to Christianity the Roman Empire was introduced 
to new thoughts on history. Eusebius and Caesarea wrote an 
ecclesiastical history following the growth of the Christian church, which 
described people of no political importance or thought on the hierarchy but 
instead they focused on the thought of human existence. 
The Middle Ages followed the early Christians. During this time 
most of the writing was left to clergy, most of who were in monasteries, 
where vast libraries of historical writing were maintained! During this time 
there was a rise in intellectual thought, which is found in the works by 
mostly Monks during this period. 
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Following the Middle Ages was the Renaissance, which brought 
back a study of Greek and Roman literature that instilled a more realistic 
view of political history and current life. Bruni wrote about Florence while 
reflecting on how it mirrored Rome and the 16th Century Machiavelli began 
to write about political history with respect to human laws and ambitions in 
his works The Prince. 
The period oh historical writing that followed the Middle Ages may 
by on of the most important changes in basic historical research. The 
period that is called the Antiquarian and Enlightenment period is from the 
16th century onward. This period brought forth a more systematic 
approach to collecting the sources on historical writing. Where the 
classical writings maintained a literary skill, this period began an 
examination of historical religious publication and writing. This period 
produced such writers and researchers that created and defined the 
'major fields of critical research'. In the 18th century, Voltaire added a 
rationalism that ignored the classical writings on the many aspects of 
civilization that included great detail as to historical research and writing. 
The most notable work that came from this period is that of Edward 
Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-
88). 
In the 19th century the academic discipline of history had it's own 
critical method and approach that required academically rigorous 
preparation in the research of history Leopold von Ranke had influenced 
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and advanced 'the criticism of sources' that has allowed historiography to 
come into its own as a meaningful academic discipline. There had to be a 
neutral approach to the research of history with a break in the literary arts 
of the past and align it with scientific research (Partner, 2002). 
The history of historical research has a long and varied past. There 
are many opinions and thoughts as to how history happens. The 
important point of historical research though, is to understand through 
history how 'things' happened. With this understanding of how things 
have happened it is possible to posit a theory as to 'why', from the 'why' 
things (history) has happened, then it is possible to develop an 
understanding as to current events happening in the world. The varying 
thoughts as to 'why' things have happened in the past follow various 
theories. 
The qualitative method of historical research does have its critics. 
The most notable one is that it lacks scientific rigor, as science would be 
the highest form of knowing. From an historical perspective though, it is 
important to note that history is history and if historical research is based 
on historical fact then there should be bias free reporting. The other 
critique against qualitative research is that there is a possibility of the 
research being influenced by the researcher's political values. In respect 
to that concern, the output of qualitative research allows the researcher to 
study phenomena that is not available in any other method. What 
historical research allows for is the ability to measure a period in time with 
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the ability to make comparative analysis as to the correlations between 
independent and dependent variables. 
Another concern with historical research is that with reliability 
because qualitative research is based on descriptive narratives rather than 
statistical tables and when events are categorized there could be bias in 
that activity. Validity is another concern with qualitative research as there 
are concerns over attempts to explain or deal with contrary cases. 
In developing this dissertation, information will be gathered as it 
relates to three issue areas: China's economic growth, the growth in its 
political influence and the increase in its military power since the end of 
the Cold War. The information will be gathered through research of 
journals, Internet searches, database searches, and books. It will draw on 
primary sources for data on China's and the United States' GDP numbers 
for the years 1989 through 2007, including the US State Department, 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. Primary sources for political data will be the United 
Nations' databases. Primary data on military spending as a percentage of 
GDP will include United Nations databases, the US Department of State 
database, the International Monetary Fund, and the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. Data gathered on China's voting record within the 
United Nations was gathered from: China: Voting coincidence 
percentages for the years 2000 through 2006 were retrieved 01/28/2008, 
2008, from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82644.pdf and 
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the subsequent years related to this data point. Data gathered on the 
GDP and the military budget of the United States was gathered from: 
Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government (2005). 
Retrieved Jan 12, 2008, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf. Data 
gathered on China's GDP and military budgets were gathered from 
China's National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2006) Retrieved Jan 12, 
2008, from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/. 
Secondary sources will include journal articles and books on the above 
topics. 
The use of the historical research and comparative analysis will be 
a study of China since the end of the Cold War to the present to 
understand China's rapid growth relative to that of the United States to 
support the research question and hypothesis that China has made 
advances in the void that was left by the Soviet Union. That research will 
focus on case studies of the growth of China's economy, expansion of its 
military capabilities and increases in its political influence. 
Historical research with comparative analysis is a method that fits 
the research for this dissertation as it relates to the subject of China as a 
whole and the study of the growth China has made relative to that of the 
United States. Qualitative research will help to uncover the many aspects 
of the international relations theories and China's growth of China. As a 
component of this dissertation, knowledge of international relations 
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theories to include realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism are 
important as it is the driving factor as to how and why decisions will be 
made in order for a State to advance its ideology, maintain its sovereignty, 
or expand globalism by relaxing laws and allowing access to cross 
boarders, greater free trade, and economic expansion, possibly giving up 
some of a states sovereignty. From the perspective of the relationships 
between states in the international system, it is critical to understanding 
how bipolar, multipolar, and even unipolar systems are formed and 
governed. For the purposes of this dissertation, the central theory is that 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world entered into a unipolar 
international system with the United States leading the way. Since the 
end of the Cold War, China has begun to fill that void and has grown in 
terms of its economic and militarily power and political influence relative to 
that of the United States and now balances the power of the United States 
as the international system moves toward bipolarity. Lastly, alliance 
theories are important to this dissertation as they provide the rationale for 
states to align with or against China, as China continues its growth as a 
superpower. 
In searching the various repositories of data, one can find new 
questions as discovery of new insights are found. Social scientists have 
the ability to look for new approaches to hidden information and 
discoveries that could be missed in other methods of research. 
Social science research at its best is a creative process of insight 
and discovery taking place within a well-established structure of 
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scientific inquiry. The first-rate social scientist does not regard a 
research design as a blueprint for a mechanical process of data-
gathering and evaluation. To the contrary, the scholar must have 
the flexibility of mind to overturn old ways of looking at the world, to 
ask new questions, to revise research designs appropriately, and 
then to collect more data of a different type than originally intended 
(Kingetal., 1994, p. 12). 
The use of historical research and analysis will provide the 
identification and analysis of the primary and secondary historical data on 
China's growth from 1989-2007. "A history is an account of some past 
event or combination of events. Historical analysis is, therefore, a method 
of discovering, from records and accounts, what happened in the past" 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 123). Historical research is really about 
the relationships and issues and not just the facts found in the period 
being researched and that the present is influenced by what has 
happened in the past (Glass, 1989). The historical data identified for this 
dissertation will help support the hypothesis, as it will identify the baseline 
of where China was in 1987 and where China is now in 2007. Berg (2004) 
states, "Historical research, then, involves a process that examines events 
or combinations of events in order to uncover accounts of what happened 
in the past"(p. 234). The data gathered through historical research will be 
primary data on China's growth, most of which will be numerical. With this 
numerical data graphs can be produced that will indicate China's growth 
when compared to that of the United States. 
There are five parts to historical research (Pavlic, 2005). 
1. Find a problem 
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2. Form a hypothesis 
3. Conduct research 
a. External research (is it genuine) 
b. Internal research (Is it reliable) 
4. Make your argument 
5. Share your knowledge 
The problem outlined in this dissertation is outlined in the research 
question, which states: What factors have driven China to increase its 
power relative to that of the United States through the development of 
economic, political and security relationships with other states in the 
international system since the end of the Cold War? 
The hypothesis posited in this dissertation states: As a result of its 
growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy and 
military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, 
political and security relationships with other states in the international 
system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United 
States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these 
objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising 
powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-
realism. 
Part three identified by Pavlic (2005) is conducting the research. 
Chapters IV and V will provide the data found in the research found to be 
genuine and reliable through the use of primary data found within state 
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published data of the governments of China and the United States and 
databases of the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund. 
Consistency will be maintained through the use of data that is current and 
from the same databases throughout this dissertation. 
Part four will be produced in Chapter VI and VII of this dissertation 
providing and analysis and a conclusion to the data presented. 
Part five will be shared through the publication of dissertation. 
The dissertation will leverage the use of the historical research 
method will be conducted through four phases utilized in the development 
and writing of this dissertation. Those four phases are: 
1) Chapter II will be a literature review of international relations theories, 
international systems theories, and alliance theories mainly from the 
realist and neo-realist perspective as this dissertation emphasizes those 
perspectives in explaining the balance of power and the phenomena of 
why states align economically, politically, and militarily. 
2) Chapter IV will be an examination of the growth of China's economy, its 
military power and its political influence since the end of the Cold War, 
identifying evidence of the gains that China has made in these three. 
Chapter V will compare China's growth relative to the United States in 
those three areas during the same period, indicating an increase in 
China's ability to balance American power in the international system. 
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3) Chapter VI will analyze the data presented in Chapters IV and V on the 
gains China has made relative to the United States since the end of the 
Cold War. 
4) Chapter VII will provide the conclusions of this dissertation and the 
analysis presented with consideration for future studies on this subject. 
Phase 1 
The literature review of this dissertation will provide the basis of this 
dissertation as it is written and researched from the Realist theories of 
International Relations and the move from a unipolar system, which 
developed after the fall of the Soviet Union, to that of a bipolar balance of 
power between China and the United States as China has filled that void 
as it has grown into the next superpower. The literature review will also 
include a review of alliance theories, as it is important to understand why 
states align which in turn support the balance of power between China 
and the United States as states will align with or against China and the 
United States. As China continues its growth China will need to align 
itself, economically, militarily and politically, to ensure that it can supply 
the resources needed to support the economic expansion and 
infrastructure growth, secure its borders and maintain its sovereignty. 
The literature review will be conducted through books, journal 
articles, bibliographies, and database and Internet searches. 
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Phase 2 
Chapters IV and V will focus on the advances that China has made 
relative to the United States since the end of the Cold War. This 
dissertation will look at GDP numbers, military expenditures, and political 
decisions and observations of China and the United States since the end 
of the Cold War found within the research. Specifically, Chapter IV will 
focus on China's rise to becoming a superpower. This dissertation will 
present observations of China's growth since the end of the Cold War 
from the perspective of economic, political, and military views. The 
research will be conducted through reviews of books, journals, databases, 
and Internet searches. Chapter V will focus on the relationships between 
China and the United States on one hand and between those two powers 
and other states on the other, presenting evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that China has made significant gains against the United 
States in the areas of economic growth, political relationships, and military 
growth since the end of the Cold War. Specific data on China's GDP and 
military spending as a percentage of GDP will support the hypothesis 
along with observations of China's new 'soft power' in the world of politics. 
The strength of this dissertation lies with the primary data gathered to 
analyze China's growth relative to the United States. The primary data is 
actual GDP numbers for China and the United States. Therefore the 
analysis of this data is straightforward. One of the weaknesses in 
analyzing the primary data used for this dissertation will be in converting 
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Chinese Yen to its equivalent purchasing power parity. The number used 
is the 2006 International Monetary Funds equivalent factor of seven with 
all dollar calculations using 2007 values. 
Phase 3 
Chapter VI will provide the analysis of the data presented in 
Chapter IV and Chapter V by examining the gains that China has made 
relative to the United States since the end of the Cold War. By comparing 
the economic gains of China against that of the United States, the political 
ties that China has made supporting its ideology and culture, and China's 
military build up and expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the evidence 
will support the hypothesis that China has made significant gains relative 
to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. 
Phase 4 
Chapter VII will provide the conclusions of the dissertation 
expanding on the research question and hypothesis presenting additional 
ideas on future studies, assumptions and possible alliances that could 
form as China continues to grow as a superpower balancing the power of 
the United States. 
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Data Collection 
For development of the hypothesis, data will be gathered during the 
literature review, identifying factors that influence states to align, 
international relations theories, and international systems with an 
examination of China's growth, economically militarily and politically since 
the end of the Cold War. Research for this dissertation will be conducted 
through searches on the Internet, academic databases, journals, books, 
and bibliographies. In reviewing the literature, specifically balance of 
power theory, factors that suggest that alliances will form economically, 
politically, and militarily can be identified and used to support the inference 
that the current actions of China, its economic growth, political growth and 
military growth support balance of power theory that alliances will form 
economically, politically, and militarily supporting a balance of power 
between the United States and China. The data collected will also support 
the hypothesis that China has made significant gains economically, 
politically, and militarily relative to the United States. 
Data collection for GDP numbers that are used to determine 
China's economic growth will be obtained through Internet searches of 
databases to include the US State Department, the United Nations, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Secondary sources will 
be conducted utilizing bibliographies, journals, and books that pertain to 
the subject of economics and China's growth since the end of the Cold 
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War. There have been a number of works written as they pertain to 
China's growth and the perceived direction and intentions of China. 
From the political perspective the primary measure of China's 
political growth will be that of China's inclusion of International 
Governmental Organizations (IGO) and coincidence of voting with or 
against the United States within the United Nations. Primary will be 
collected from the United Nations database on voting records and 
secondary data on China's inclusion into IGO's found in the Yearbook of 
International Organizations since the end of the Cold War. 
Data collection pertaining to China's military growth will be 
measured by determining China's military budget as a percentage of its 
GDP. Data for GDP numbers will be obtained from databases to include 
the US State Department, International Monetary Fund, and the World 
Bank. China's military budget will be obtained from US State Department 
figures and the Bureau of Statistics of China. Secondary data will be 
found through research of journal articles and books pertaining to the 
specific subject of China's military growth and possible intentions from a 
military perspective. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHINA'S RISE TO SUPERPOWER STATUS 
China's rise to a superpower has arrived at an alarming pace. 
China has increased its economic, military, and political influence 
considerably between the years of 1989 and 2007, basically since the end 
of the Cold War. This chapter will identify China's economic growth on the 
basis of its GDP, which has grown at a pace that has caught the eye of 
many states, including the United States. China's military growth has also 
advanced considerably. China's military budget as a percentage of GDP 
has grown at a pace greater than that of the United States during the 
same period. China has also managed to advance its military capabilities 
through improvements in technology and training of its security forces. 
Lastly, China has increased its political influence at both the regional and 
global levels. China has moved from its borders and has increased its 
memberships presence in international organizations from a mere 10% of 
those of the United States to 80% of those of the United States in the 20 
years since the end of the Cold War. 
Examination of China's Economic Growth 
In the past two decades China has begun to develop at a pace that 
is astonishing. Growth was at over eight percent each year between 1989 
and 2007. Fishman (2005) notes that there are more than 220 million 
surplus workers in China's central and western regions, which is 
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considerably more than the number of people working in the United States 
in total. 
China's relationships continue to evolve on the global level. In the 
past China has kept to itself on regional and global economic issues, 
which seem to be changing. In the past seventeen years China has 
developed a more aggressive role on the world stage as it has grown its 
economy at a rate that has been unmatched in recent history. China's 
population provides cheap labor for the along with a market for goods that 
have become commonplace in China's larger cities. Jain (2004) indicates 
that emerging trends show that "China can remain highly competitive in 
global and regional trade and the economic domain, and would continue 
to compete for status and influence in the Asian region in general, and in 
South Asia in particular" (p. 253). 
Scobell suggests that the economic reforms launched by Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have fueled an uninterrupted growth that 
has lasted for over 25 years, sustaining economic growth and prosperity in 
China (Scobell, 2005). Justin Yifu Lin, Director of the China Center for 
Economic Research at Peking University, asserts that this trend of nine 
percent growth could continue for the next 20 years (Zwieg & Jianhai, 
2005). 
Keith (2001) suggests that "The optimistic view contended that 
China's economic reform would lead to democracy and the rule of law 
whereas the pessimistic view argued that China's economic modernization 
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would provide the means by which to transform China's military power into 
a threat to regional security and peace" (p. 4). 
China also has advanced its economic capabilities by advancing its 
technological capacity. Foreign direct investment and transfers of 
technology from other States in the region have also helped to stem 
China's economic rise. This advancement of new technologies and many 
of the manufactures have taken advantage, as they have understood the 
importance of technology in the production of manufactured goods 
(Ohashi, 2005). Changes in technology and new discoveries along with 
globalization of economies have helped to create a new industrial 
revolution that has advanced the growth of a knowledge based economy 
in China (Suttmeier, 2004). One of the areas such technological 
innovation is evident is in the private owned sector. As China moves to a 
new market economy there is growth that twenty years ago would not 
have happened. Suttmeier (2004) also finds that technological progress in 
the last twenty years has generally been emphasized in the non-state 
sectors especially where foreign direct investment has been the model 
with new firms being formed outside the normal model for Chinese firms 
that have been government owned previously. 
As China continues its economic growth there are signs that the 
political situation in the Asia Pacific region is also changing. As noted by 
Kusuma Snitwongse (2003), "there are also signs of a changing power 
configuration in the Asia-Pacific region - a factor that must be taken into 
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consideration in addressing the question of international order" (p. 37). It 
is evident that China is becoming the dominant power in the region, with 
the capability and capacity to affect the world both economically and 
militarily, indicating China's rise to superpower status or at least a regional 
hegemony. Snitwongse also states that "[T]he status of Taiwan in relation 
to China is another issue of contention, particularly between the US and 
China" (p. 37). The need for skilled labor is of utmost importance to 
China's economic growth. Companies are knocking at China's door and 
making deals that will open the door to the billion plus people who will 
need or provide the skills necessary to continue this growth. China is also 
viewed as an endless supply of labor that is becoming more skilled more 
educated and available to support China's economic growth (Snitwongse, 
2003). There are concerns however, on this rapid growth. Snitwongse 
suggests that concerns over security and stability in the area could be 
hindered or compromised depending on how China uses its newfound 
power. 
Another factor that China is continuing is the foreign direct 
investment that is now being directed to China. In an article in the South 
China Morning Post the numbers are evident on investors directing 
investments to China at a rate that has changed 180 degrees. The article 
states that in the past Southeast Asia had received 61% investment into 
developing countries and China only receiving 18%. The numbers are 
now reversed, with 61% going to China and 17% to the rest of the 
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Southeast Asian countries in just ten years (Glosserman & Fritschi, 2002). 
Other indicators are that the ASEAN states are loosing market share as a 
percentage of the export market. As China's share continues to grow the 
regional states are loosing its share. ASEAN states have to compete with 
a labor force supporting the manufacturing and export of Chinese firms. 
As China has educated and grown its labor force China has filled the voids 
in the supply chain, providing the capital goods needed to fuel its growth 
(Cheng, 2004). 
Looking at the various economic sectors within China, there has 
basically been sustained growth in all areas with areas in the United 
States losing in many of the same sectors as jobs move to China. These 
manufacturing losses in textiles, footwear, and computers have all moved 
overseas, where China has grown in these areas. What is most 
significant here is that as China's economy has grown the trade deficit of 
the United States increased to an average $18.9 billion per month in the 
first quarter of 2007 (Fuller, 2008). 
The expected benefit of the China - ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) with over 1.7 billion customers will produce a GDP of $2 trillion 
dollars with the total trade estimated to be $1.23 trillion. The agreement 
will be of great benefit to all ASEAN countries, but it is an even greater 
benefit to China, as exports to China from ASEAN nations would equal 
48% with exports from China to ASEAN nations at 55% (Wong & Chan, 
2003). 
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Wong and Chan (2003) also note, "For the past two decades, 
Chinese exports have increased at a hefty annual rate of 15% (or more 
than twice the world's average), from $13.7 billion in 1979 to $325.6 billion 
in 2002, catapulting China to the rank of the world's fifth-largest exporting 
nation" (p. 512). 
Chapter V will provide greater detail on China's economic numbers 
providing data on China's actual growth numbers as it pertains to GDP 
and export and import as a percentage of GDP with Chapter VI providing 
an analysis of China's economic growth since the end of the Cold War. 
China's Growing Need for Natural Resources 
Between 1987 and 2007, China's growth has influenced the 
aligning of states to have formal agreements for trade that have increased, 
especially when it is in need of resources and most specifically when it 
comes to oil. This is quite evident by the economic and political 
agreements that China has made with countries in Latin America, Africa, 
and the Middle East. China has grown its need for natural resources to 
capacities that are almost on par with the United States. China's growth 
and formation of a middle class has become a considerable movement 
into the world of 'globalization'. China's economy and growth has been at 
an alarming pace with people moving to the cities for work that pays 
enough to begin the development of a middle class. China's 1.3 billion 
plus people will need the technologies that continue this development and 
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if it can be sustained the economy will continue to grow at this alarming 
pace. 
This need for natural resources of all types will continue to grow, as 
China will continue to increase its infrastructure to support the labor force 
that has moved into the industrial centers in order to fill the void that is 
needed to manufacture goods at the levels support China's growth. 
China's ideas on foreign policy have began to take shape as there 
is more need for trade to fuel its growth and development of a middle 
class and market economy. Keith (2004) states that, "Chinese foreign 
policy has espoused a new 'idealist' view on multilateralism and 
multipolarity while at the same time demonstrating a cautious approach to 
the realities of the balance of power. It sees globalization, particularly 
economic globalization as inevitable, yet and still pits the equality of state 
sovereignty, against 'hegemony', unipolarity and unilateralism" (p. 507). 
Examination of China's Security and Military Buildup 
By looking at history, one can understand the era of the Cold War 
where the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a bipolar 
balance of power, with alliances formed around each of these states. 
China does, however, accept that 'sovereign' countries are entitled to form 
alliances (Harris & Cooper, 2000). Scobell (2005) has indicated that 
China's military has become a more modern force that is better educated, 
equipped with a more dynamic capability and mindset that focuses not on 
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what was the 'people's war' but now on warfare that is aimed at peaceful 
means by better technology. McDevitt (2004) also suggests that China is 
modernizing its military. McDevitt states that "Over the course of that 
decade of the 1990s the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been putting 
into motion a reform and modernization program that is based on a very 
careful analysis of the changing nature of modern warfare-the so called 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)-and an equally careful assessment of 
the most likely future contingencies it might face" (p. 418). 
Another factor that is faced by China's growth and buildup in the 
region and possible the global perspective is the battle over Taiwan and 
security in the region. The August 2002 Annual Report to the President 
and to Congress (ADR) states, "Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will 
be both a critical and formidable task. The possibility exists that a military 
competitor with a substantial resource base will emerge in the 
region"(Rumsfeld, 2002). McDevitt states that "some throughout the 
government worry about a potentially antagonistic China that would be 
economically and militarily strong in the 2020-2030 time frame, China 
could become a regional peer competitor" (p. 414). 
China is a rich and powerful nation. It has the capability to reach 
global targets and upset regional, if not global, economies and markets. 
The Chinese are also beginning to produce technologies that mimic those 
of the United States sometimes on their own and sometimes from stolen 
plans or technologies. In his book, China: The Gathering Threat, Menges 
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writes, "The Chinese Communist Party took power on the battlefield. Mao 
said, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun,' and the party has 
always been serious about issues of war and military strength. China 
fought against the United States in Korea and, by preventing the defeat of 
North Korea, believes that it won the war" (Menges, 2005, p. 311). 
Menges also discusses China's missile buildup from ballistic to nuclear 
with global potential. He writes, 
in the 1980's China developed six new types of ballistic missiles. 
Some of these were able to survive attack by either the Soviet 
Union or the United States because they would be solid - fueled 
and mobile, rather than being launched from fixed silos or deep -
tunnel areas that might become known and therefore targeted in 
advance. As these missiles were moving from design to early 
development in the 1980s, China also used espionage and its own 
skilled personnel to begin developing the smaller, lighter nuclear 
warheads that those missiles would deliver to their targets. During 
the 1990s, China tested the newly manufactured nuclear warheads 
and moved the new ballistic missiles from development to testing 
and in the production phase (2005, p. 312). 
By 2004, China had grown its ballistic missile stockpile to over 800 
missiles with the capability of striking targets on a global basis and as a 
preemptive one. These missiles have nuclear, biological, and 
conventional configurations (Menges, 2005). 
One concept that Menges has is that China could strike first. 
Menges states, "The combination of China's strategic objectives and its 
assessment of the implications of advanced technologies for warfare have 
resulted in a number of fundamental shifts in military approach. In 
broadest terms, China ended its emphasis on 'protracted, large scale land 
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warfare' and began to focus on 'regional conflicts along China's periphery 
officially called peoples war under modern conditions' but also described 
as 'local warfare under high technology conditions" (2005, p. 322). 
Menges goes on to state that, "Another aspect of China's new military 
strategy is given the name 'active defense' but what it means, as the 
Chinese describe it, is 'gaining initiative by striking first'" (2005, p. 322). 
China's growth in military capability concurrent with its economic 
growth over the past 20 years suggests that as China grows economically 
it will grow militarily to protect those interests. China does continue to 
state that it is a peaceful nation and will only defend itself if attacked. 
However, China has the capacity and ability to strike first and as it 
continues into modernization policies could change. If China continues to 
develop power the United States should be concerned with the notion that 
power corrupts. Once China develops its middle class, its citizens will 
want more. That is evident every day in the United States and around the 
world. American policymakers should be concerned. China has the 
capacity to have a need for it all. Resources could become scarce or 
demand for resources may drive prices up as we see in current oil prices. 
Keith (2001) suggests that "The optimistic view contended that 
China's economic reform would lead to democracy and the rule of law 
whereas the pessimistic view argued that China's economic modernization 
would provide the means by which to transform China's military power into 
a threat to regional security and peace" (p. 4). Keith goes on to state, "the 
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new Bush administration pushed the envelope when it announced on April 
24 a six billion dollar sale of arms to Taiwan, which Beijing immediately 
denounced as 'offensive' in its strategic implications" (p. 5). 
One argument that Menges puts forward is that China could strike 
first. Menges states, "The combination of China's strategic objectives and 
its assessment of the implications of advanced technologies for warfare 
have resulted in a number of fundamental shifts in military approach. In 
broadest terms, China ended its emphasis on 'protracted, large scale land 
warfare' and began to focus on 'regional conflicts along China's periphery 
officially called peoples war under modern conditions' but also described 
as 'local warfare under high technology conditions" (Menges, 2005, p. 
322). Menges goes on to state that, "Another aspect of China's new 
military strategy is given the name 'active defense' but what it means, as 
the Chinese describe it, is 'gaining initiative by striking first'" (2005, p. 
322). 
China has argued that the form of military alliances is not what it 
would like to see in an international system that has moved away from the 
Cold War mentality. McDevitt finds that China continues to undermine 
U.S. security strategy in Asia by touting its 'New Concept of Security,' one 
that is less dependent upon bilateral alliances (McDevitt, 2004). Yahuda 
finds that, 
Beijing's version of multi-polarity calls for coexistence between 
states with different systems, religions and so on, leading to a 
'democratic' stable order devoid of confrontation. Interdependence 
should not undermine the 'economic security of sovereign states', 
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nor should there be discrimination in international trade, nor 
attempts to use 'currency and financial levers' to impose political 
and economic conditions which violate the legitimate national 
interests of any particular country (2003, p. 201). 
China's new concept of security is what China calls 'cooperative 
security'. China has articulated this position since the early 1990s as 
traditional security systems such as bilateral alliances are outdated post-
Cold War ideas, though the first time that then President Jiang Zemin 
described this cooperative security was at the Shanghai Corporation 
Organization in June 2001 (Yahuda, 2003). China has also influenced the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) agenda as it pertained 
to cooperative security, which, unlike traditional alliance based systems of 
security, is an approach that is applicable to all states (Yahuda, 2003). 
Yahuda goes on to explain, "cooperative security is concerned with the 
process of building trust and mutual confidence in the expectation that by 
continually extending the practice of multilateral cooperation the prospect 
for armed conflict will disappear in due course" (2003, p. 192). China's 
actions since 1987 are indicative of a cooperative strategy with states in 
the region or along its border. Russia and China have forged an ongoing 
relationship along with three other states to form the Shanghai Five. In 
1992 China and Russia began to ease the strain of their relationship with 
a visit to Beijing from Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President. This initial visit 
has led to greater cooperation between Russia and China, including the 
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formation of the Shanghai Five, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and 
Tajikistan, in 1996. 
China and the United States have had and continue to have 
working relationships that have held up for many years and cooperation 
continues to be the norm. Pablo-Baviera (2003) states that "Military 
relations between the two sides have encompassed technology and 
weapons transfer projects; high level exchanges of joint chiefs-of-staff, 
service chiefs and between defense universities; working level exchanges 
of experts in logistics, management, maintenance and military medicine as 
well as sharing of intelligence" (p. 340). Pablo-Baviera also suggests that 
once the Soviet Union had imploded in 1990-91, providing an absence of 
a common threat to China and the U.S. differences between the two have 
been highlighted as well as creating a potential for competition, though 
China is still far behind America. Beijing has begun its rise with the 
development of its military and economic growth and regional influence. 
Yahuda (2003) suggests that "The American alliance system has 
been the principal factor in preserving the status quo in Northeast Asia 
that has so far served Chinese interests well in the post Cold War era" (p. 
200). Yahuda goes on to state that U.S. alliances with Japan "will 
encourage Japan to emerge as an active regional military partner of the 
U.S. with consequences that Japan would once again re-emerge as a 
military power" (2003, p. 200). Murata (2003) also supports this argument, 
stating "The cracks that are appearing in the alliance between the U.S. 
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and Korea, in the NATO alliance, and various others will serve to further 
increase the importance of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan" (p. 
56). 
China also continues to increase its military capabilities at an 
alarming pace. One of the most identifiable characteristics of a 
'superpower' is its military might and ability to reach global targets. China 
currently has the world's largest Army with over 2.5 million soldiers and 
the world's largest Air Force with 4,000 fighters, 400 ground-attack 
aircraft, and 120 bombers. China is now building what is destined to 
become the world's largest Navy, building large fleets of ships capable of 
navigating the globe though its current arsenal consists of 64 major 
surface combat ships, 55 attack submarines, and more than 40 medium 
and heavy amphibious lift vessels ("Annual Report to Congress: Military 
Power of the People's Republic of China", 2007). Keith (2004) states, 
China's military diplomacy and its 'new security concept' are based 
upon a new application of apparently established principles in a 
new world confronted by the changing requirements of 
globalization. When it comes to the economic relations between 
states, Chinese policy has stressed the opportunities for 'common 
prosperity' and 'common development'. The same underlying 
themes relating to reciprocity and mutuality between states that are 
equally sovereign is stressed in security terms. In particular the US 
quest for 'absolute security' is contrasted with the need for a 
security community, based upon sovereign equality (p. 516). 
Keith also states, "The Chinese are attempting to blunt the 
potentially destabilizing aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
particularly as the power relations between states are affected by 
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unevenness in the military technological capacity of states to participate in 
high-tech weapons development" (p. 516). 
One of the most important relationships that China has formed with 
other states is that with Russia. China and Russia have held joint military 
exercises in recent years. China and Russia have also held China -
Russia summits beginning in 1992 when then Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin visited Beijing. This China-Russia relationship also has helped 
China to advance its military as China has benefited as has Russia from 
the sale of military armament to China as Russia needed the influx of 
currency during this period after Russia's fall. The continuation of this 
relationship that China and Russia have forged resulted in the 
development of the Shanghai Five. The inclusion of the Central Asian 
states from China's perspective was a much needed alliance for China as 
these states were rich in many of the natural resources that China needs 
to sustain its growth and the inclusion of Russia helped to ease any 
suspicions by Russia as to the formation of this alliance (Menges, 2005). 
Examination of Increase in the Extent of China's Political Influence 
In addition to its economic growth and increased military 
capabilities, China has increased its regional and global prestige and 
political influence. Keith writes, 
The People's Republic of China is the first developing state to 
become a world power. Within a relatively short time frame, China 
has had to carve out a new role for itself and define its 
responsibilities as an influential state both at the regional and 
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international levels. Within this time frame, however, China has 
also had to cope with the liabilities and opportunities of 
'globalization'. In meeting this challenge, the Chinese have 
demonstrated a new penchant for multilateralism, even as they 
have adopted to the realities of the balance of power (2004, p. 
507). 
One of the key areas where China is gaining political strength is in 
its own region. Through associations created for trade and interchange 
such as ASEAN, China has gained support of its regional partners. 
Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng (2004) states, 
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in undoubtedly an outstanding 
achievement of this approach; but ASEAN has been trying to keep 
its options open. On the other hand, China has been concerned 
with the danger of deterioration in Sino-American relations and the 
increasing distrust between Tokyo and Beijing. Improvement of 
China-ASEAN relations therefore assumes increasing significance 
in China's regional policy; and enhancing mutual interests and 
interdependence is the best way to erode the ASEAN states' 
perception of the 'China threat'. But China must not neglect the 
interests of Japan and South Korea or underestimate ASEAN's 
resistance to exclusion of the US and its desire to maintain a 
balance of power in the region (p. 257). 
Another indicator that China has advanced is its admission to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Ronald Keith indicates this was done 
through policy debates and the thought that China has become or is now a 
'normalized'state. Keith states that, 
The PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
accompanied by domestic foreign policy debates on China as 
becoming a 'normal country' (zhengchangole guojia). The debate 
was filliped by Jiang's July 1, 2001 speech commemorating the 80th 
anniversary of Chinese Communist Party. The speech was widely 
interpreted as a key gloss on the history of the struggles of the 
Chinese people as it relates to the contemporary need for China to 
put the history of national humiliation truly in the past so that China 
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can properly achieve its rightful status as a new world power (2004, 
p. 509). 
China's past reluctance to play an influential role in regional and 
global political matters has decreased significantly as China is now playing 
a more powerful role in global politics (Fishman, 2005). There is within the 
region a thought of China's emergence as an economic power with its size 
and exceptional growth of possibly being positive to the region. 
Snitwongse states, 
Within Southeast Asia, China is increasingly being viewed as an 
engine of growth, a distinction which previously belonged to Japan. 
China's agreement with ASEAN to set up a free trade area by 
2010, accompanied by the offer of an 'early harvest,' is seen as 
another benevolent act - one that is intended to calm ASEAN 
countries' concerns about the economic challenge that China 
poses; the 'China factor' is increasingly being seen more as an 
opportunity than a cause for concern (2003, p. 39). 
Concerns over resources could also create tense situations. 
"Given the White House's current penchant for unilateral intervention and 
the loud voices in Congress calling China a military threat, Beijing might 
reasonably begin to fear that the United States will try to block its 
purchases on natural resources to destabilize it" (Zwieg & Jianhai, 2005, 
p. 27). Zwieg and Jianhai (2005) also indicate that there is tension 
between China and Japan over natural gas reserves in the East China 
Sea. 
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Other aspects of China's move to a state with thoughts on 
globalization and its growth is how China is taking advantage of its 
technical advantage by changing foreign policies. Keith states, 
the PRC has adjusted the underlying rationality of its foreign policy 
so as to take advantage of the new global opportunities of trade, 
investment and technological cooperation while seeking to 
influence the rules of international organization and regimes so as 
to insure their qualification in relation to the priorities of China's own 
national economic development"(Keith, 2004). Keith also suggests 
that China is still at times reluctant to undertake responsibilities in 
international affairs often times abstaining rather than voting on 
resolutions within the United Nations (2004, p. 509). 
China and the United States have had and continue to have 
working political relationships that have held up for many years and 
cooperation continues to be the norm. Pablo-Baviera states that "Military 
relations between the two sides have encompassed technology and 
weapons transfer projects; high level exchanges of joint chiefs-of-staff, 
service chiefs and between defense universities; working level exchanges 
of experts in logistics, management, maintenance and military medicine as 
well as sharing of intelligence" (2003, p. 340). Pablo-Baviera (2003) also 
suggests that once the Soviet Union had dismantled providing an absence 
of a common threat to China and the U.S. differences between the two 
have been highlighted as well, as creating a potential for competition. 
Although China is far behind with the U.S. as the world's only superpower 
at the moment, China has begun its rise with the development of its 
military and economic growth and regional influence. Snitwongse also 
identifies concerns with China's military growth. Snitwongse states, 
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Another dimension of the 'rising China' is its military power. As 
reported on October 2002, China is fast reshaping its bloated and 
outdated armed forces into a modern, integrated fighting force that 
is emerging as a regional power. The main objective for now 
appears to pose a credible threat towards Taiwan rather than the 
US, and China now denies that it views itself as a natural leading 
power in the Asia-Pacific region (2003, p. 39). 
The reality today is that China is a major threat to the United 
States, and a growing one. China's rulers - from its presidents to its 
general in charge of the all-powerful Central Military Commission - remain 
communists, and the fifty years of communist rule are replete with brutal 
repression, mass murder, and border wars with China's neighbors. But 
communism seeks to change not only external political conditions but also 
the internal nature of human beings - hence its emphasis on mass 
indoctrination and its hatred for anything that might offer a contrary view of 
man (Gertz, 2000). Gertz continues, 
In a December 1998 speech, Jiang Zemin affirmed that 'without 
Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership, there would not be a new 
China; and without Comrade Deng Xiaoping's leadership, there 
would not be the path of building socialism 'with Chinese 
characteristics' means a communism that fulfills China's sense of 
its own superiority. China considers its culture to be the oldest in 
the world. It refers itself as the Middle Kingdom - the place 
between heaven and earth. And to restore its former grandeur 
through modernizing communism, it will pay any human price" 
(2000, p. 11). 
One of the many concerns with the United States and its global 
partners is that China continues to state that it is a peaceful nation that will 
never attack or interfere with international affairs of other nations though it 
continues to grow the military and its economy and a considerable pace. 
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Bernstein and Munro discuss the notion of hegemony and the Chinese 
beginning the chapter with, 
A slogan that has been a consistent since the heyday of Chairman 
Mao is 'we will never seek hegemony'. Indeed, that slogan, a 
statement of China's peaceable intent in its foreign relations, is one 
of the few that has remained in use in China as the country has 
passed through its various political stages, from radical Maoism to 
the era of Deng Xiaoping. All along, China's official position has 
been that it seeks to develop a world class economy, to maintain 
military force only for defense, and to refrain from interfering in the 
internal affairs of other countries (1998, p. 51). 
Bernstein and Munro continue, noting, "for three decades, China 
has promised never to attack another country first - only to counterattack 
if another country attacks it. It has vowed never to be the first to use 
nuclear weapons. It proclaims itself to be a struggling Third World country 
with no superpower capabilities or ambitions" (1998, p. 51). One of the 
concerning ideas with this statement is that China considers itself a 
'struggling Third World country'. How can a state with such power make 
this comment? How does a country with a GDP growing at 10% yearly, 
trade agreements, and possibly the largest military with a blue water navy 
that is growing at a massive pace make such a statement? How does a 
country with the capability to reach global targets and upset regional 
economies make such a statement? It cannot. This is a sleeping giant 
following the strategies of Sun Tzu and ideals of deception and denial 
against its enemies. Bernstein and Munro give us three good reasons not 
to believe these comments: 
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One is that China is now beginning the passage into a new phase 
of its history, what might be called an era of restored national 
greatness. Two, China is so big and so naturally powerful that it 
will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as 
a matter of national policy. Three, and most important, China has 
pursued initiatives and framed strategic goals that belie its claims of 
modest Third World status. In sum, China's historic sense of itself, 
its basic material and human conditions, and its own assessment of 
its national interest combine to make a Chinese move toward Asian 
hegemony virtually inevitable (1998, p. 53). 
This greater aggressiveness should be what concerns the region 
and the world. If China continues its sentiments as peaceful nation with 
no concerns as to the affairs of others and no want to control the world 
China's growth could be a good thing. But we need to watch this sleeping 
giant. Trade with China will need to level off if the US would like to 
continue with its way of life. If America is not careful, jobs will disappear 
with China in the lead. 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has begun to utilize its power 
and influence in the international system. It has voted with and against 
the United States in United Nations Security Council votes and has 
expressed its belief in state sovereignty, especially when it comes to 
human rights issues. China is filling the void that was left by the Soviet 
Union at the end of the Cold War as it is working to achieve the level of 
international influence and prestige Moscow once had. 
Yahuda suggests that China has faced a century of shame and 
humiliation and is still in the process of establishing its identity in the 
modern world. Further, Yahuda contends that China has made many of 
the changes, as a means to resume what it deems is its rightful historical 
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role at the apex of world power. China is beginning to search for the 
means to attain wealth and power that would enable China to recapture 
that 'rightful' role (Yahuda, 2003). 
China can be very explicit in its sovereignty and expects that there 
should be no external push from other states to intervene in Beijing's 
domestic affairs. Zhou Enlai, premier of the State Administrative Council, 
in 1949 stated that "No country may interfere in China's internal affairs" 
(Keith, 2001). China wants to control its own destiny. Keith states, 
The PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
accompanied by domestic foreign policy debates on China as 
becoming a 'normal country' (zhengchangole guojia). The debate 
was flipped by then Chinese President Jiang Zemin's July 1, 2001 
speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of the establishment 
of the Chinese Communist Party. The speech was widely 
interpreted as a key gloss on the history of the struggles of the 
Chinese people as it relates to the contemporary need for China to 
put the history of national humiliation truly in the past so that China 
can properly achieve its rightful status as a new world power (2004, 
p. 509). 
China is a rich and powerful nation. It has the capability to reach 
global targets and upset regional, if not global, economies and markets. 
China is amassing the largest military around the globe. The Chinese are 
also beginning to produce technologies that mimic those of the U.S., 
sometimes on their own and sometimes from stolen plans or technologies. 
In his book China: The Gathering Threat, Menges (2005) writes "The 
Chinese Communist Party took power on the battlefield. Mao said, 
'Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun,' and the party has 
always been serious about issues of war and military strength. China 
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fought against the United States in Korea and, by preventing the defeat of 
North Korea, believes that it won the war" (p. 311). Menges also 
discusses China's missile buildup from ballistic to nuclear with global 
potential. He writes, 
in the 1980's China developed six new types of ballistic missiles. 
Some of these were able to survive attack by either the Soviet 
Union or the United States because they would be solid - fueled 
and mobile, rather than being launched from fixed silos or deep -
tunnel areas that might become known and therefore targeted in 
advance. As these missiles were moving from design to early 
development in the 1980's, China also used espionage and its own 
skilled personnel to begin developing the smaller, lighter nuclear 
warheads that those missiles would deliver to their targets. During 
the 1990's, China tested the newly manufactured nuclear warheads 
and moved the new ballistic missiles from development to testing 
and in the production phase" By 2004, China had grown its ballistic 
missile stockpile to over 800 missiles with the capability of striking 
targets on a global basis and as a preemptive one. These missiles 
have nuclear, biological, and conventional configurations (2005, p. 
312). 
Pablo-Baviera goes on to state, "Beijing and Washington 
themselves had had very close security cooperation on a wide range of 
activities until the June 1989 events at Tiananmen" (2003, p. 340). The 
events that occurred between April 15, 1989 and June 4, 1989 caused 
great concern as to how China treated its people. There were 
demonstrations held in China's most sacred landmarks and martial law 
was declared on May 20th. Though martial law was in effect the protests 
did not let up. Beijing made a decision to clear the square and the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved in to stop the demonstrations and 
clear the square. In the aftermath from the time the PLA entered the 
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square many Chinese citizens were killed. This show of force by China 
against its own people raised attention to more than the U.S. that had 
raised apprehension as to how relations with China should proceed or if 
reparations should be levied against China. Ideals on how governments 
should "manage" its people have long been at the forefront of many a 
dialog between diplomats. 
China's leaders continue to suggest that there should be a 
multipolar leadership in the international system, creating a more 
conducive balance between states. Pablo-Baviera (2003) states that "A 
multipolar order, it is argued, would be more consistent with recent global 
trends such as the greater salience of economic over military power, 
increased interdependence, the different nature of security threats and 
challenges since the 1990's, and the U.S.'s own inability to take action in 
response to such challenges to international security without relying on 
coalitions with other states" (pp. 342-343). 
Yahuda (2003) states that "Communist ideology has eroded and 
continued engagement with the outside world undermines it still further" 
(p. 199). As China continues its march to a market economy the old 
ideology will continue to erode, communist ideals will go by the wayside 
and China will continue its economic and military growth as a superpower. 
Since the end of the Cold War China has grown its political 
influence in various ways. One of the most obvious has been China's 
involvement in international organizations. At the end of the Cold War, 
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China's involvement in international organizations was at 20% of that of 
the United States. China has grown this involvement to 80% in 2006. 
China is also a permanent member of the Security Council, which lends 
itself China's ability to counter actions by the United States. In Chapter V, 
data is provided identifying yearly important votes. Of those 85 total votes 
China has only voted with the United States five times. This platform and 
the platform of other international organizations provide China the ability to 
sound its ideology on topics that affect the United States and its ideology 
as to a states action. Areas around human rights and security are at the 
forefront of the challenges between China and the United States. China 
has developed relationships with states in Africa, Latin America, and the 
Middle East that at a minimum support China's ideology and government 
of its people. 
Conclusions 
China has grown its need for natural resources from very little just 
10 years ago to capacities that are almost on par with the United States. 
China's growth and formation of a middle class has become a 
considerable movement into the world of 'globalization'. China's economy 
and growth has been at an alarming pace with people moving to the cities 
for work that pays enough to begin the development of a middle class. 
China's 1.3 billion plus people (Political handbook of the world 2005 -
2006, 2006) will need the technologies that continue this development and 
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if it can be sustained the economy will continue to grow at this alarming 
pace. Just reading Fishman's book China, inc., will open one's eyes to 
the capacity that China has to control its destiny. 
The masses of people should be cause for alarm to all. The ability 
for a need of resources, labor, and other goods will advance China to 
superpower status, as they will have the ability to direct and control 
economies and prices. As foreign investment continues China is making 
the rules, granted those investors are making profit but China is managing 
that profit. China is a regional superpower and will soon be a global 
superpower. China has economic controls and we bow to them for access 
to the billion plus labor and buying force. Americans can see that in the 
U.S. trade deficit has increased considerably with the Chinese. 
China also has the ability to reach global targets and strike at will. 
There military is becoming more advanced with new technologies and the 
building of a large blue water fleet of navy ships with the ability to 
transverse the globe. China is a superpower and continues to grow at an 
alarming pace through economic growth, military growth, and its 
diplomatic growth and it appears that China will continue this path. 
The last half century in short saw China acquiring the conditions for 
renewed greatness. First came the elimination of foreign 
exploitation and invasion. The great contribution of the communist 
revolution to Chinese history was that it completed the tasks of 
national consolidation and domestic stability. Communism also 
restored a great deal of Chinese national pride, since, under it, 
China was able for the first time in more than a century to defend 
itself against foreign interference. But it was only when Deng 
Xiaoping jettisoned orthodox Marxist economies that China was 
able to begin realizing its potential. And that potential is vast, given 
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the country's basic elements. Indeed, they are the same elements 
of size, population, and economic resources that ensured it 
superpower status in the past and will ensure superpower status in 
the future (Bernstein & Munro, 1998, p. 57). 
98 
CHAPTER V 
RISING CHINESE POWER AND SINO-AMERICAN REALTIONS 
An Introduction to the Relationship between China and the United States 
China and the United States have had both adversarial and 
cooperative relationships with each other in the past and continue to do so 
currently. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China has filled the void as 
the principal balancing power to the United States. China's longing for 
recovering its greatness has finally arisen with the end of the Cold War 
and China has stepped up to take advantage of that opportunity. 
China and the United States have had fairly good relations since 
the time President Richard Nixon initiated talks with China back in 1972. 
Since then the United States has had some reservations on China's 
behavior, mostly due to human rights concerns and the protection of 
Taiwan. 
The U.S. - China relationship was frozen for more than twenty 
years after the Chinese Communists came to power on the 
mainland in 1949. The turning point came when President Richard 
M. Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong recognized they had a 
common adversary in the Soviet Union. Nixon's historic trip to 
China in 1972 led to a period of euphoria and goodwill, allowing the 
two sides to achieve even a degree of accommodation on the 
difficult question of Taiwan's status (Suettinger, 2003, p. ix). 
China did support the United States after Al Qaeda's attacks 
against the United States on September 11, 2001 and has worked to 
support the cause against terrorism to some extent, though China still 
sells arms to states characterized by the Department of State as sponsors 
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of terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States China has 
been at the forefront in support against the war on terror. On 9/11 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin sent a message to President George W. 
Bush and condemned the terrorist stacks. In a later phone conversation 
with President Bush, the Chinese ruler promised the corporate with the 
United States to combat terrorism. Within the United Nations Security 
Council, China also voted for Resolution 1368 to combat terrorism (Kan, 
2005). As this dissertation will identify, China has been developing its 
relationships in an effort to extend its political reach, economic growth, 
and security to advance its interests, regionally and globally as a result of 
its growing demand for natural resources and enhanced international 
prestige. China has had concerns over the United States and its formal 
military alliances, but has also taken advantage of those relationships. 
During the last quarter-century of the Cold War when China supported the 
United States in its efforts against the Soviet Union, China basically put up 
with the alliances that America formed to keep pace with the Soviet Union 
(Pablo-Baviera, 2003). 
With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union China 
has filled the void, making its way back to its former greatness. 
The absence of a common threat helped highlight differences as 
well as the potential for competition between the two, primarily 
because, just as the United States emerged as the world's sole 
superpower, China has itself began to rise in economic importance, 
military strength, and regional influence (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 
340). 
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The extent of political relationships between China and the United 
States dropped considerably in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 
Union, especially with China's poor record on human rights and China's 
continued support of terrorist states through the sale of military goods. In 
particular, the United States is concerned over political, economic, and 
security aspects of China's expansion. 
Despite the more benign security environment in the 1990's, 
without the Soviet threat underlying strategic cooperation Sino-US 
relations deteriorated, especially in the last few years before 11/9. 
From the US perspective, China's poor record of human rights and 
democracy, ambitious military modernization program, increasing 
nationalism and assertiveness, weapons sales to countries 
perceived as hostile to the United States, provision of missile 
technology to some developing countries, and irredentist claims 
over Taiwan and the South China Sea led to perceptions that it was 
basically a dissatisfied or revisionist power and therefore a potential 
destabliliser (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, pp. 340-341). 
China has increased its power considerably in all three areas this 
dissertation posits, which are economically, politically, and from the 
security perspective. Depending on the issue area and circumstances 
involved, China can be considered a threat or an ally in this world of 
globalization. Some would consider China's growth just that, growth as it 
advances to a more modern state as its economy advances at a double-
digit rate. "The issue of a 'China threat' has indeed thrown up two 
competing American assumptions, the one that Chinese economic 
modernization will underwrite an aggressive foreign and defense policy 
and the other that Chinese economic modernization is consistent with 
regional and international peace and security" (Keith, 2001, p. 6). 
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Since the end of the Cold War there have been a few cases in 
which China and the United States have had a contentious relationship. 
Consider, for example, China's continued missile tests where China has 
tested long and short-range missiles, firing them over Taiwan into the 
South China Sea, and in 2007, Beijing's successful firing of an anti 
satellite missile destroying a weather satellite, which illustrate its 
advancement in missile technology and guidance systems. Though there 
have been protests from the United States, Taiwan, and other regional 
States, China continues to advance this technology. There have also 
been accidental bombings of China's embassy in Kosovo and an US EP-3 
aircraft making an emergency landing after a mid air collision with a 
Chinese aircraft that have also led to some deterioration of the China -
United States relationship. 
Conflict between Washington and Beijing was aggravated during 
the Taiwan Straits tensions in 1996 when the United States 
deployed aircraft carriers from bases in Japan in response to 
missile tests conducted by China; again during the May 1998 
bombing (accidental or otherwise) of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade by US fighter planes at the height of Kosovo operations; 
and then again during the April 2001 US EP-3 spy plane incident 
over Hainan (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 341). 
There has also been positive communication between China and 
the United States in the past years as well. China and the United States 
have worked together in a few areas especially on combating terrorism. 
After Al Qaeda's September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, China provided its support of the United States in the war against 
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terror and on September 12, 2001 China voted for UN Security Council 
Resolution 1693 supporting the combat of terror. This support has 
continued through multiple round tables on the combating of terror 
between China and the United States. As of March 8, 2008 there have 
been six such meetings. Though there are still concerns on both sides 
though both states work together when necessary. 
On the positive side, there was cooperation between Beijing and 
Washington on bilateral economic issues, managing a soft landing 
for North Korea, global non-proliferation and environmental 
regimes, the campaign against narcotics, and other areas of 
functional cooperation. Yet, with the US becoming more powerful 
now than any other country at any time in history, and China 
perceived as a rising and dissatisfied power, the possibility of China 
becoming a new target of US containment strategy, and therefore 
of alliance action, loomed large. In this context China started to 
become more critical of US alliances toward the end of the 1990's 
(Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 341). 
As China continues its growth economically, militarily, and politically 
the United States will have to continue to advance its abilities as well. The 
United States will need to stay ahead of China's developments as the 
threats to America and its allies increase. As Keith write about the realist 
notion of peace; 
The Western concept of 'threat' has often tended to focus on the 
changing capabilities of states and hence the enduring realist 
notion, si vis pacem, para bellum, (if you want peace, prepare for 
war). Putting aside the issue as to whether the world's only 
superpower enjoys an extraordinary power advantage over China 
as a developing state, this classical realist rational for an arms race 
suggests that increases in capability are prima facie evidence of 
'threat' and require appropriate levels of a military buildup in order 
to re-assert a balance of power (2001, p. 7). 
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In the 1990s many of China's leaders were against the direction 
China was heading and worked to change the direction to one exerting 
more pressure on the United States, asking for an end to some of the 
current policies of China. Many of the senior officers had forged a letter to 
Deng Zhao Ping and Secretary General Jiang Zemin on the concerns of 
China's tolerance for the United States and stating other concerns over 
the sale of military fighter jets to Taiwan and hints of espionage by 
journalists and academics and stating that the United States was its 
enemy. After the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 China 
campaigned hard to get its most favored nation status renewed during the 
Clinton presidency. Chinese and U.S. corporate leaders asked that there 
be no conditions on trading and on May 26, 1994 President Clinton 
decided to renew the Most Favored Nation trading status of China with no 
conditions (Menges, 2005). 
One of the major problems between China and the United States is 
the Tiananmen Square events, which lasted for approximately two months 
in 1989 when protests in China's Tiananmen Square led to a government 
crackdown that hindered US-Chinese relations. President George H. W. 
Bush had previously expressed intentions of strengthening America's 
relationship with China (Suettinger, 2003). However, the human rights 
atrocities that China's leadership had committed left the Bush presidency 
searching for answers. Thousands were killed is those months during the 
protests and the United States determined that such human rights 
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violations were inexcusable and President Bush revoked the Most 
Favored Nation status of China. Though up until the problems occurred 
China and the US had been working closely on a range of topics 
especially security. Once the problems ensued much of the transfers had 
stopped. Much of the cooperation between the two sides was the 
exchange of high profile exchanges. 
Beijing and Washington themselves had had very close security 
cooperation on a wide range of activities until the June 1989 events 
at Tiananmen. Military relationships between the two sides then 
encompassed technology and weapons transfer projects; high level 
exchanges of joint chiefs-of-staff, service chiefs and between 
defense universities; working level exchanges of experts in 
logistics, management, maintenance and military medicine as well 
as sharing of intelligence (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 340). 
One of the greatest areas where China and the US have worked 
together is after the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the Global War 
on Terrorism. After this period the United States had an opportunity to 
build new alliances and rekindle old ones, which did cause China some 
concern though they never raised issue with the growing relationships 
(Pablo-Baviera, 2003). 
Pablo-Baviera states the advantages and disadvantages to the new 
war on terrorism which have been positive for both the US and China: 
Indeed, there are both advantages and disadvantages for China's 
security. The advantages for China centre around how 
international terrorism has deflected the attention of the United 
States, its allies and the international community as a whole, away 
from the 'China threat'. It has led to the diversion of US military 
resources to other parts and problems of the world. These in turn 
will allow Beijing breathing space for the new 'forth generation' 
leadership to consolidate and direct its attention to the many 
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serious internal problems China faces. China also can expect less 
pressure from the West on its human rights record, especially since 
the United States itself has been under criticism for violations of 
rights of suspected terrorists since it opened the detention facilities 
in Guantanamo. Finally, China can expect more sympathy and 
understanding from the West for its own heavy-handed treatment of 
Muslim separatists in Xinjiang province (2003, p. 348). 
Another area of contention is with the island of Taiwan. On April 
26, 2006 President Bush made the comment that the United States would 
'do whatever it takes' to support Taiwan if there was a conflict with China. 
China sees this as a direct conflict with its policy toward Taiwan. The 
United States had also just signed an arms deal with the Taiwanese, 
supplying them with military hardware and support just a few days earlier. 
What Keith discerns from this remark is that the United States is leaving 
no question as to what Washington will do if the event were to ever occur 
(Keith, 2001). According to Keith, "In Beijing, the comment prompted 
debate as to the substance of Sino-US 'strategic rivalry' and whether Bush 
was actually abandoning 'strategic ambiguity' as the basis for dealing with 
the Taiwan question" (2001, p. 1). This confrontation over Taiwan will 
continue until the leadership comes to an agreement to bring Taiwan back 
under the 'One China' fold. 
China's Economic Relationships and Their Impact on the United States 
Within the last few decades China's economy has grown 
considerably. One of the needs for China's growth has been the 
accelerated consumption of natural resources, especially oil, natural gas 
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and heavy metals to support this growth. China has had to import most of 
its energy needs by developing relationships with other states around the 
globe. In doing so, China has had to make many deals, forming new 
relationships along the way. The continued need is an important strategic 
component of the relationships China has formed along the way in 
sustaining this growth. To satisfy its continuing needs, China will have to 
continue to make these economic deals if it intends to sustain this growth. 
(Bergstenetal., 2006) 
In many cases what we see is that China is focusing on developing 
countries. What Kurlantzick (2007) finds is: 
China's strategy also includes focusing on developing nations 
whose bilateral relationships with other major powers are faltering. 
Often, these countries are either authoritarian states or nations 
whose leaders display some autocratic traits, and thus could be 
sympathetic to Chinese influence; many also have significant 
energy resources (p. 53). 
China has truly moved into Latin America and has formed many 
relationships with states therein. Supporting this evidence Luft, suggests 
that in the Western Hemisphere China concluded oil and gas deals with 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, though its main country of interest is 
Venezuela, which is the forth largest supplier of oil for he United States 
(Luft, 2003). Also supporting this contention, Campbell and O'Hanlon 
(2006) state that, 
Finally China has made inroads into Latin America, long considered 
'Americas backyard' because of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. In April 
2001, then president Jiang Zemin spent almost two weeks in the 
region, visiting Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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In November 2004, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, signing business deals worth billions of 
dollars. With half of China's FDI flowing to Latin America, Chinese 
officials predict that their FDI in that region could amount to $100 
billion by the end of the decade (p. 198). 
China's dependence on oil and other natural resources to support 
its basic needs will continue and one can only expect it to grow. For the 
ten years between 1995 and 2005 "China's energy consumption rose 80 
percent, even as domestic oil production growth slowed. Consequently, 
China now relies on imports to meet almost half its petroleum demands" 
(Bergsten et al., 2006, p. 33). 
One of the most significant examples of China sustaining this 
growth through engagement with Latin American countries came during 
the 2004 Asia-Pacific Cooperation Summit in Chile, where China 
committed to invest over $100 billion with Latin American countries, 
including with deals Venezuela for oil and with Cuba for nickel ($500 
million). Bush and O'Hanlon have concerns over some of the deals that 
China has made citing "economic issues that create foreign policy 
problems," stating, 
There are other economic issues that create foreign policy 
problems. One is China's investment in companies around the 
world, particularly those that produce oil and other natural 
resources. President Hu Jintao used his November 2004 visit to 
South America at the time of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Chile to sign a whopping $100 
Billion in investment commitments to Latin America (2007, p. 48). 
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Other evidence of China's growing development of relationships 
and economic alliances can be seen in the following economic 
agreements. China has developed relations with Bolivia, which have 
grown as socialist Bolivian President Evo Morales has asked China to 
help it develop its natural gas reserves, stating that China is Bolivia's 
'ideological ally' as both countries continue to develop (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
In addition to China's investment in Cuba's nickel industry, both 
communist nations have agreed to form closer relationships on all fronts 
("China, Cuba agree to business deals ", 2004). To further the 
commitment both countries also agreed to expand the relationship 
politically (Huanxin, 2004). 
China is also working with Venezuela, which has been very critical 
of the policies of the United States. In an article by the BBC in 2004 one 
can see the beginnings of the Chinese-Venezuelan relationship that is 
taking place. The Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, has offered China 
access to much of the country's oil reserves in a trade deal between China 
and Venezuela which will allow China to operate oil fields in Venezuela 
and invest in new refineries ("Venezuela and China sign oil deal", 2004). 
To further the relationships in early 2005, China and Venezuela have 
signed nineteen agreements around oil, agriculture, and technology 
(Wagner, 2005). Wagner also notes China's needs, especially around oil 
and natural resources and notes that China has been strengthening 
economic relations with energy supplying countries as there is an 
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abudencance in raw materials and resources (Wagner, 2005). During the 
visit where the deals were signed Chavez commented on the relationship 
with China stating that the conditions are better than ever and that 
continued relations would ensue between the two countries (Wagner, 
2005). 
China's new relationships are not only in Latin America but have 
reached into Central Asia as well, where China has also forged large 
deals with Kazakhstan in a pipeline agreement which is worth US$3.5 
billion (Afrasiabi, 2004). 
Even with the preceding deals mentioned above, China's biggest 
deals are with states situated in the Middle East. China and Iran have 
signed a mega deal worth upwards of $200 billion. According to Kavah 
Afrasiabi, 
A clue to the fact that such anticipation may have totally 
understated the case was last week's signing of a mega-gas deal 
between Beijing and Tehran worth $100 billion. Billed as the "deal 
of the century" by various commentators, this agreement is likely to 
increase by another $50 to $100 billion, bringing the total close to 
$200 billion, when a similar oil agreement, currently being 
negotiated, is inked not too far from now. The gas deal entails the 
annual export of some 10 million tons of Iranian liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) for a 25-year period, as well as the participation, by 
China's state oil company, in such projects as exploration and 
drilling, petrochemical and gas industries, pipelines, services and 
the like. The export of LNG requires special cargo ships, however, 
and Iran is currently investing several billion dollars adding to its 
small LNG-equipped fleet (2004, p. 1). 
China has also ventured into Africa. One of the deals it has made 
is with Somalia. This area is very unstable and provides the evidence that 
China is willing to undertake significant risks in order to fulfill its need for 
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resources as the area that China will be developing is hindered with 
political strife managed by warlords as battles are waged for power in the 
area. China's oil giant, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
has won the right to look for and develop its search for natural resources 
(Jopson, 2007). 
These economic relationships further the notion that China will be 
able to continue its growth as it inks new deals with states that as they 
gain access more natural resources that China will need to sustain its 
growth. China has invested in these states and continues its 
developments of relationships across the globe, as its need is great. If 
China is to provide security, economic stability, and political growth and 
development, it will need these deals and more. 
As further evidence of China's economic growth, the tables below 
will provide some insight to China's growth relative to that of the United 
States and its growing relationships around its imports of oil. As seen in 
Table 1: Yearly GDP Stats on China and the United States, China's GDP 
growth outperforms the United States considerably. This growth is 
expected to continue and as such China will continue to make 
considerable gains. The statistics have been consolidated from three 
sites, which are referenced in the source information and, bibliography. 
Each of the three sites is a government or public sector site providing data 
that is published by the represented governments of each state. The data 
utilized is such that any repetition of the methodology used would produce 
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consistent results in the data. The sites were used as the data could be 
found easily and without bias. 
Table 1: Yearly GDP Stats on China and the United States 
Yearly GDP Stal 
YEAR 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
CHINA 
11.47% 
8.98% 
14.30% 
19.10% 
23.80% 
26.69% 
20.72% 
14.59% 
9.87% 
6.43% 
5.88% 
9.61% 
9.52% 
8.87% 
11.40% 
15.05% 
12.68% 
10.50% 
10.40% 
ts on China and the United States 
U.S. 
3.50% 
1.90% 
-2.00% 
3.30% 
2.70% 
4.00% 
2.50% 
3.70% 
4.50% 
4.20% 
4.50% 
3.70% 
0.80% 
1.60% 
2.50% 
3.60% 
3.10% 
2.90% 
4.90% 
Relative 
Increase 
7.97% 
7.08% 
16.30% 
15.80% 
21.10% 
22.69% 
18.22% 
10.89% 
5.37% 
2.23% 
1.38% 
5.91% 
8.72% 
7.27% 
8.90% 
11.45% 
9.58% 
7.60% 
5.50% 
Source: Data collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
The United States State Department, and The Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute at the following sites: 
http://www/stats, gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_china_milex_01.pdf 
The 2007 numbers are estimates. 
Table 2 below depicts the percentage of oil China imports from 
various regions around the globe. As one can see China's moves into 
Africa are providing much of its needed oil as imports from the Asia Pacific 
declines. One of the more important aspects regarding oil imports by 
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China over the past decade imports have increased considerable and is 
continuing that growth. The data collected below is from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), which is an organization that works with 
governments in a cooperative effort with its twenty-eight member nations 
as an energy advisor to ensure that there is reliable energy that is clean 
and affordable to its people. The data provided is readily available to 
provide consistent information in order to ensure transparency if recreation 
of this data were needed in order to limit any bias that may be induced 
through the methodology used in this dissertation. 
Table 2: China's Oil Imports by Region (% percentage) 
Region 
Asia Pacific 
Middle East 
Africa 
Other (Europe, 
Americas) 
1990 
60.6 
39.4 
0 
0 
1997 
26.2 
47.5 
16.7 
9.6 
2001 
14 
56 
23 
7 
2004 
11.5 
45.4 
28.7 
14.3 
Source: International Energy Agency, China's Worldwide Quest for Energy 
Security, 2000, 50. (Bergsten et al., 2006) 
Table 3 below depicts the number of exports that have made their 
way to China. From 1990 through 2005, exports have increased with the 
greatest change coming from the region. This data was chosen in order to 
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provide insight into the trade that China is making in the region. The 
source is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China is a database that 
is readily available, easily accessible, and provides statistics of many 
Chinese sectors, products, and GDP. Yearly data for the past twenty 
years is available and would be consistent and available to perform any 
future research that may be produced. 
Table 3: Exports of Selected Economies to China 
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Table 4 below depicts China's source of imports from 1990 through 
2005. As depicted here the greatest numbers of imports are also from the 
region. This data was chosen in order to provide insight into the trade that 
China is making in the region. The source is from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China is a database that is readily available, easily accessible, 
and provides statistics of many Chinese sectors, products, and GDP. 
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Yearly data for the past twenty years is available and would be consistent 
and available to perform any future research that may be produced. 
Table 4: China's Source of Imports as a Percentage of Total Imports 
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Source: (Abramowitz & Bosworth, 2006) 2005 numbers estimated 
China's Political Relationships and Their Impact on the United States 
On the political front China has made great strides. China has 
developed its soft power political relationships on all fronts and is 
considered by some to now play the role of the balancer as this 
dissertation suggests. Pablo-Baviera finds that, "There are also some 
who may envisage China as itself playing a role as a balancer, whether of 
Western US influence (e.g., on human rights issues, multilateral trade, and 
other developing country interests), or of Japanese economic power, or-
perhaps in the case of Myanmar-of future Indian power" (Pablo-Baviera, 
2003, p. 347). This soft power that China has developed is also serving to 
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increase its presence in the international community, increasing its 
prestige on both regional and global levels as China has worked diligently 
to grow its power to a level that it had held in the past many centuries 
earlier. 
From the political perspective of China, there have also been 
changes facilitated by new leadership in the upper echelons of 
government in China. From the old guard that held the strict military hold 
to what is the 'Fourth Generation' of new leaders that have a better 
understanding for China's growth in broader aspects. "Most recently, 
since 2002, China has witnessed a sweeping turnover of party, state, and 
military elites: first at the 16th CCP Congress in November 2002, and then 
at the 10th National Peoples Congress in March 2003. A new generation 
of Chinese leaders has come to the fore - the "Fourth Generation" 
(Scobell, 2005, p. 227). To further expand on the new generation of 
leaders, Miller (2003) states, 
The changes in the top posts of the PRC state hierarchy made at 
the 10th NPC, held in 
Beijing March 5-18, 2003, confirmed widely held expectations. As 
could be inferred from party rankings, Hu Jintao replaced Jiang 
Zemin as PRC president, Wu Bangguo succeeded Li Peng as NPC 
chairman, and Wen Jiabao replaced Zhu Rongji as State Council 
premier. Jiang Zemin's reappointment as chairman of the party 
Central Military Commission in fall 2002 was replicated by his 
reappointment to the parallel chairmanship of the state Central 
Military Commission at the NPC. In the only appointment marked 
by real suspense, Zeng Qinghong was appointed PRC vice 
president, capping his spectacular ascent over the past year. 
Taken together with the changes made at the 16th Party Congress 
in November 2002, the NPC appointments complete a sweeping 
turnover of leaders. The CCP has a new general secretary and a 
new chairman of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. The 
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PRC has a new president, vice president, NPC chairman, and State 
Council premier. Only the party and state Central Military 
Commissions' top leader—Jiang Zemin—retained his post. 
Beneath this top level of the leadership, the party congress and 
NPC brought about turnover of comparable sweep. As of the 
closing of the NPC on March 18: 
• Sixteen of 25 members of the party Politburo are new to that body. 
• On the Politburo Standing Committee—the party's core decision-
making group—eight of nine members are new. 
• Seven of eight members of the party Secretariat, which coordinates 
and oversees implementation of Politburo decisions, are new. 
• Most of the heads of the party Central Committee are new. 
• In the State Council, four of four vice premiers and five of five state 
councillors are new to those posts. 
• Only three of eight members of the Central Military Commissions 
(their respective memberships are normally identical) are new as a 
consequence of the people's congress, but that statistic obscures 
the promotion of three men as successors to retiring members 
ahead of the congress. 
• Eighteen of 28 State Council ministers are new as a result of the 
NPC. 
• In the provinces, thanks to the rounds of provincial party and 
provincial people's congresses held over the past year, 11 of 31 
province party secretaries and 15 of 31 governors are new to their 
posts" (2003, p. 1). 
There has also been a change in how China is perceived in other 
parts of the world. Along with Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and Syria, one 
finds that states in Africa and Latin America have a more positive attitude 
towards China than of the United States. Kurlantzick has found support of 
this change in attitude: "Polls show that people in Africa and Latin America 
now have more positive feelings toward China than toward the United 
States" (2007, p. 9). In a British Broadcasting Cooperation poll held in 
2005, of the twenty-two nations polled, almost all of the people felt that 
China played a more favorable roll than the United States does on a 
global perspective (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
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Table 5 below identifies many of the newer relationships that China 
has formed in the last ten to fifteen years. China has forged ahead 
considerably as it has a need mostly for natural resources but also for 
political backing. As a member of the United Nations Security Council, 
China has the ability to act in a manner contrary to that of the United 
States and its allies as it continues its advance to the level greatness once 
held by China. This also gives China the balancing power to that of the 
United States where China has a differing opinion as to that of the United 
States. Many of the states listed in Table 5 also have considerable 
relationships with the United States and even one of the relationships is 
with Washington. As this chapter continues it will identify many of the 
deals that China has made politically, economically, and from a security 
perspective. 
Table 5: China's Bilateral Partnerships 
Date Partner Name 
Nov-93 Brazil Long-Term Strategic Partnership 
Mar-96 Russia Strategic Cooperative Partnership 
Constructive Partnership of Cooperation 
Nov-96 India Oriented towards the 21st Century 
All-around Cooperation Partnership Oriented 
Dec-96 Pakistan Towards the 21st Century 
Good-Neighborly and Friendly Partnership 
Dec-96 Nepal Oriented towards the 21st Century 
Long-Term Comprehensive Cooperation 
Partnership 
Building Towards a Constructive Partnership 
Cross-Century Comprehensive Partnership 
Cross-centaury Partnership of All-round 
Cooperation 
Good-Neighborly Partnership of Mutual Trust 
May-97 
Oct-97 
Nov-97 
Dec-97 
Dec-97 
France 
United States 
Canada 
Mexico 
ASEAN 
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Long-term and stable constructive 
Apr-98 European Union partnership 
Oct-98 United Kingdom Enhanced Comprehensive Partnership 
Nov-98 Republic of Korea Cooperative Partnership 
Nov-98 Japan Friendly Cooperative Partnership 
21st Century-oriented Strategic Cooperative 
Apr-99 Egypt Relationship 
Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Oct-03 ASEAN Prosperity 
Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Peace 
Jun-05 India and Prosperity 
Source: (Gill, 2005) 
One of the political relationships that China has forged is with Iran. 
Currently there is no recent bilateral agreement but China and Iran have 
maintained diplomatic relations since 1971. China and Iran continue to 
work with each other through economic agreements, through which China 
provides military goods and technology to Iran and Iran provides some of 
the oil that China needs to continue fueling its growth. Kurlantzick feels 
Iran may be the best example, noting that, 
Iran is probably the most obvious example of China's cultivation of 
isolated autocrats. Though clearly uncomfortable with Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strident anti-American and anti-
Israeli rhetoric, the Chinese government invited him to address the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a leading summit of Chinese, 
Russian, and Central Asian leaders, held in China in June 2006. 
There the Iranian president delivered a major address on Chinese 
state television and touted Tehran's and Beijing's "identical" views 
on world issues (2007, p. 54). 
China has also formed a relationship with the Philippines, while the 
relationship between the United States and the Philippines has declined. 
Filipino troops were pulled from Iraq in 2004 to free a Filipino hostage and, 
once this happened, the United States decreased the assistance given to 
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the Philippines in an effort to sway the Philippine^ government to 
reconsider though this had little effect on the decision that had been made 
and within a year U.S. assistance was restored to. After this action, China 
invited Pilipino President Macapagal-Arroyo for a state visit offering 
cooperation and aid to the island (Kurlantzick, 2007). The decreased aid 
to the Philippines has not had any significant impact as China has 
provided support that was lost from the United States while in recent years 
much of the Philippine - United States relationship has recovered. 
Another relationship that China has forged is with Sudan. China 
has developed this relationship as China's need for oil has grown. The 
relationship with Sudan provides China access to the vast quantities of oil 
that will keep China's growth on the pace of continued double-digit growth. 
As Kurlantzick notes, 
In Sudan, as western nations isolated the Khartoum government for 
its human rights abuses and supposed links to terrorism, China 
stepped up its support. While the United States slapped sanctions 
on Khartoum, top Chinese politicians cultivated the Sudanese 
dictatorship, reportedly speeding up Chinese mega projects in 
Sudan in time for the tenth anniversary of the dictator Omar 
Bashir's coup, to bring him more prestige (2007, p. 54). 
Goodman also supports what Kurlantzick finds and states, "China's 
relationship with Sudan has become particularly deep, demonstrating that 
China's commercial relations are intensifying human rights concerns 
outside its borders, while beginning to clash with U.S. policies and 
interests. Sudan is China's largest overseas oil project" (Goodman, 2003, 
p. 1). The relationship with Sudan will continue to develop as China's oil 
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projects expand in Sudan and as each of the states continue to support 
each other from the political perspective, especially on human rights 
issues. 
Another political relationship that China has continued to develop is 
that with Thailand, which at one time was an ally of the United States. 
Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has stated that 
China is one of Thailand's most important allies pertaining to diplomacy 
and its global relationships. In the days of China's Chairman Mao 
Zedong, Thai insurgents would do battle with the Chinese supporters 
causing disdain with the government. A complete change of direction has 
changed with the Thai people and its government as indicated by the 
actions of the Thai government in the early 2001 against the Falun Gong 
by denying the group's request hold an international meeting in Bangkok 
and cracking down on any demonstrations by the group. When the Thai 
government was asked why the Falun Gong was denied, the answer from 
the police minister was that the Thai government would like to keep good 
relations with China. Another area that has created a dislike for the United 
States among the Thais is in 1997 when Thailand's economy imploded. 
At the time in the early 1990s Thailand was advancing economically, but 
when the Thai currency was devalued in 1997, creating a downturn for the 
nation as a whole. During this crisis one of the beliefs by the Thai 
government and people was that the United States would bail them out. 
When this did not happen China refused to devalue the currency stating 
121 
that it would help stabilize the country and the region. China had become 
Thailand's ally and the people of Thailand felt that only China had helped 
them in the crisis (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
Another relationship China has established is with Uzbekistan. 
This is also based on the human rights perspective where the United 
States had criticized Tashkent after the killing of hundreds of Uzbeks in 
May 2005 by what the United States called a machine gunning of civilians 
though Uzbekistan states that is was eliminating a group of dangerous 
Islamic extremists, after which China expressed its support of Tashkent 
(Kurlantzick, 2007). 
One of the most significant relationships that China has cultivated is 
with Venezuela. Since the rise of President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has 
had a very aggressive stance toward the United States. China has 
stepped in and courted Chavez, increasing its ties between the two 
nations with invitations of state visits to China. China has also supported 
Venezuela's bid for seat on the United Nations Security Council. This 
new relationship has included reductions in oil flow to the United States 
and considerable increases to China where Chavez has discussed 
reorienting its oil industry towards China (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
Table 6 below identifies important votes held in the United Nations 
from 2000 through 2006. As indicated by the data within the table it is 
clear that China does not vote with the United States. On the few 
occasions that China has voted with the United States the vote is around 
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removing all nuclear weapons, the transfer of arms, eliminating religious 
intolerance, strengthening the role of the UN in elections, and the IAEA 
report. All of these votes, five of eighty-five with the United States, provide 
greater benefit to China and its ideology as to human rights, and removal 
of nuclear weapons that could give China greater power in a nuclear free 
world. Looking further into the votes raised, many are related to human 
rights considerations, as indicated by China's voting record, China has 
voted against any of the votes that have come up or have abstained from 
such vote where the United States has voted for such considerations. 
Other votes that China has voted against would be the promotion of 
democracy, or even 'honor crimes' against women. Further analysis of 
the data is contained in Chapter VI. 
Table 6: United Nations Important Votes 2000 - 2006 
UN Important Votes Years 2000 - 2006 
xDiff Important Vote 
2006 
I. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
2. Human Rights in 
Uzbekistan 
3. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People 
4. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 
5. Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
6. Towards an Arms Trade Treaty 
7. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices 
US 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
China 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
8. Combating Defamation of Religions N Y Y 
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9. Human Rights in North Korea 
10. Human Rights in Belarus 
11. Human Rights in Iran 
12. International Trade and Development 
13. Human Rights in Burma 
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
2005 
2. Human Rights in Sudan 
3. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
4. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat N 
5. Compliance with Non-Proliferation Agreements Y 
6. Follow-up to Nuclear Disarmament Obligations N 
N 
7. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices 
8. Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in 
Elections 
9. Human Rights in Iran 
10. International Trade and Development 
1 I. Unilateral Economic Measures 
2004 
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
2. Human Rights in Sudan 
3. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
4. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat N 
5. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty N 
6. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices N 
7. Elimination of all Forms of Religious 
Intolerance Y 
8. Enhancing the Role of Organizations to Promote 
Democracy Y 
9. Human Riehts in Iran Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
X 
A 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
10. International Trade and Development N Y Y 
2003 
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
2. International Convention Against Reproductive 
Cloning 
3. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat N 
4. Illegal Israeli Actions in the Occupied Territories N 
5. Confidence Building Measures 
6. Transparency in Armaments 
7. Assistance to Palestine Refugees and Support for 
UNRWA 
8. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices 
9. Rights of the Child 
10. Strengthening the Role of the United Nations 
11. Globalization and Human Rights 
12. Human Rights in Turkmenistan 
13. Human Rights in Iran 
14. Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
15. Committee 2 Provisional Program of Work 
2002 
N 
N 
 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
A 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
N 
N 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
1. IAEA Report 
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
3. National Legislation on Transfer of Arms 
4. Nuclear Disarmament 
5. Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle 
East 
6. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices 
7. Future Operations of INSTRAW 
8. Rights of the Child 
9. Elimination of Racism and Racial 
Discrimination 
10. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
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11. Globalization and Human Rights 
12. Human Rights in Sudan 
13. Human Rights in Iraq 
14. Human Rights in the Congo 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
3. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
4. Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty 
2001 
1. Israeli Actions in Occupied Territories N 
2. Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine N 
N 
N 
5. Nuclear Disarmament N 
6. Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East N 
N 
8. Human Rights and Coercive Measures 
9. Globalization and Human Rights 
7. Effects of the Use of Depleted Uranium in 
Armaments 
10. Human Rights in Iran 
11. Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
2000 
1. Israeli Actions in Occupied Territories 
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
3. Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
4. New Agenda for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Y 
5. Reducing Nuclear Danger N 
6. Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East N 
7. "Honor Crimes" Against Women Y 
8. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy Y 
9. Globalization and Human Rights N 
10. Human Rights in Iran Y 
1 1. Human Rights in Iraq Y 
Y 
N 
A 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
Y 
N 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
A 
A 
Y 
N 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
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Source: ("China: Voting coincidence percentages. (2006, 2005, 2004, 
2003, 2002, 2001, 2000)." 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 
2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 #223) 
China's Security Relationships and their Impact on the United States 
From a security perspective, China has increased the power of its 
military considerably, along with developing relationships with other 
nations. Though China continues to state that it does not believe in formal 
military alliances, it does at times gain from those between the United 
States and Washington's allies. As the United States develops relations 
with states that run counter to that of China and other states, new 
relationships between China and those states also develop. 
When Ecuador refused to exempt U.S. military personnel from 
prosecution in 2003, Washington threatened to stop military assistance to 
Ecuador. During this event China invited Ecuadorian officials to Beijing 
and offered assistance countering that of the United States (Kurlantzick, 
2007). This relationship has continued as China has entered into Latin 
America from all aspects of the international system. 
North Korea is one of the bigger players in the China relationship 
with the United States, especially from the security perspective. Given the 
border the two states share, China feels correctly that North Korea is an 
avenue for migrants to enter China. China has sold weapons and 
technology to North Korea and the further assertion is that North Korea in 
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turn sells those weapons and technology to other states. Gertz finds that 
China has: 
• Provided fiber-optic gyroscopes to North Korea; 
• Sold specialty steel for North Korean missiles; 
• Shared space technology with North Korea that U.S. intelligence agencies 
believe was a cover for missile technology sharing; and 
• Supplied accelerometers and special high-tech machinery to North Korean 
missile manufacturers (Gertz, 2000, p. 111). 
In the region Japan provides the checkpoint for the United States. 
Japan and the United States have had a long relationship that for the most 
part has been successful. Japan continues to host U.S. bases as North 
Korea is considered Tokyo's principal threat in the region, which is the 
main justification for the U.S.-Japan alliance (Pablo-Baviera, 2003). 
Pablo-Baviera also notes, 
But the China factor nevertheless places great pressure on Japan's 
security thinking, raising questions about the long term consequences 
of continuing its ODA and economic assistance to China, pushing the 
discourse on how Japan should become a 'normal state', and forcing 
Japan to seek clear assurances from the United States on the latter's 
defense obligations" (2003, p. 345). 
To further the support of the U.S.-Japan relationship, Cha finds that, 
"The US-Japanese alliance has reached an unprecedented level of 
intimacy. Beginning in his first term, President Bush chose to reinvest in 
Japan as the United States' key ally in Asia and to overhaul its military 
posture there. This base realignment - the most significant in 30 years -
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includes moving 7,000 - 10,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam" 
(Cha, 2007, p. 102). 
Russia is also in the sights of China. The Chinese-Russian 
relationship has grown considerably tighter since 2003. Russia and China 
have both protested against radar and missile sites along the border of 
past Russian states that the United States has proposed. Russia has 
become one of China's biggest suppliers of energy and defense platforms. 
China and Russia have also started joint military exercises in 2005 that 
had scenarios of what one could consider against Taiwan (Bergsten et al., 
2006). 
Bush and O'Hanlon also find that the relationship between China 
and Russia has increased, stating: 
Regarding post-Communist Russia, China developed a very 
friendly relationship after decades of hostility with the Communist 
Soviet Union. Russian presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin 
have held frequent summits with Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and 
Hu Jintao. Russia is China's main source for advanced weapons 
systems and an outside source of energy. The two often line up 
against the United States on key foreign policy issues - Iran's 
nuclear program, for example (2007, p. 28). 
Another important relationship that China has cultivated is that with 
Saudi Arabia. This is a key component of China's strategy to guarantee 
access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it has cultivated with 
Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China 
sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Since then, the 
relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi 
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Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit, during 
which he pronounced a 'strategic oil partnership' between the two 
countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (Luft, 2003). 
From a military perspective, Table 7 below depicts China and the 
United States and the spending that is budgeted. Looking at the Table it 
is easy to see that China continues to increase it spending along with that 
of the United States. Taking purchasing power parity into perspective, 
there are arguments that China spends dollar for dollar what the United 
States spends. What should also be identified is the yearly increase in the 
spending of China; it is increasing at a double-digit pace with only three of 
the last seventeen years in the single digit range. Another item to keep in 
mind is that the numbers pertaining to China's expenditure do not include 
any purchases of weapons systems or military expenditures. The data 
collected is from two sources that are easily accessible providing 
information that can be recreated in order to support the methodology 
utilized in this dissertation in an effort to minimize any bias that may be 
induced unintentionally. 
Table 7: China and the United States GDP and Military Budgets 
YEAR CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA Est 
EST 
Military Military % 
GDP Y Budget Budget Change % GDP % GDP 
1989 ¥1,699.23 ¥27.44 ¥54.88 1.61% 3.22% 
1990 ¥1,866.78 ¥32.07 ¥64.14 14.44% 1.72% 3.44% 
1991 ¥2,178.15 ¥32.50 ¥65.00 1.33% 1.49% 2.98% 
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1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
¥2,692.35 
¥3,533.39 
¥4,819.79 
¥6,079.37 
¥7,117.66 
¥7,897.30 
¥8,440.23 
¥8,967.71 
¥9,921.46 
¥10,965.52 
¥12,033.27 
¥13,582.28 
¥15,987.83 
¥18,308.48 
¥20,940.00 
¥23,117.00 
¥37.00 
¥42.70 
¥55.00 
¥63.00 
¥80.80 
¥92.16 
¥93.47 
¥107.67 
¥121.29 
¥141.04 
¥166.00 
¥185.00 
¥200.00 
¥247.70 
¥297.93 
¥350.92 
¥74.00 
¥85.40 
¥110.00 
¥126.00 
¥161.60 
¥184.31 
¥186.94 
¥215.34 
¥242.58 
¥282.08 
¥332.00 
¥370.00 
¥400.00 
¥495.40 
¥595.86 
¥701.84 
12.16% 
13.35% 
22.36% 
12.70% 
22.03% 
12.32% 
1.40% 
13.19% 
11.23% 
14.00% 
15.04% 
10.27% 
7.50% 
19.26% 
16.86% 
15.10% 
1.37% 
1.21% 
1.14% 
1.04% 
1.14% 
1.17% 
1.11% 
1.20% 
1.22% 
1.29% 
1.38% 
1.56% 
1.25% 
1.35% 
1.42% 
1.52% 
2.74% 
2.42% 
2.28% 
2.08% 
2.28% 
2.34% 
2.22% 
2.40% 
2.44% 
2.58% 
2.76% 
3.12% 
2.50% 
2.70% 
2.84% 
3.04% 
US US US US VARIENCE VARIENCE 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
GDP$ 
$5,401.00 
$5,737.00 
$5,934.00 
$6,240.00 
$6,578.00 
$6,964.00 
$7,325.00 
$7,697.00 
$8,186.00 
$8,626.00 
$9,127.00 
$9,708.00 
$10,040.00 
$10,373.00 
$10,828.00 
$11,466.00 
$12,042.00 
$12,641.00 
$13,279.00 
Military 
Budget 
$302.46 
$298.32 
$272.96 
$299.52 
$289.43 
$278.56 
$271.03 
$269.40 
$270.14 
$267.41 
$273.81 
$291.24 
$301.20 
$352.68 
$400.64 
$458.64 
$445.55 
$442.44 
$451.49 
% 
Change 
-1.39% 
-9.29% 
8.87% 
-3.49% 
-3.90% 
-2.78% 
-0.61% 
0.28% 
-1.02% 
2.34% 
5.98% 
3.31% 
14.60% 
11.97% 
12.65% 
-2.94% 
-0.70% 
2.00% 
% GDP 
5.60% 
5.20% 
4.60% 
4.80% 
4.40% 
4.00% 
3.70% 
3.50% 
3.30% 
3.10% 
3.00% 
3.00% 
3.00% 
3.40% 
3.70% 
4.00% 
3.70% 
3.50% 
3.40% 
% Change 
15.82% 
10.62% 
3.30% 
16.83% 
26.27% 
15.48% 
22.63% 
12.05% 
2.43% 
10.85% 
5.24% 
10.70% 
0.44% 
-1.70% 
-5.15% 
22.19% 
17.56% 
13.10% 
% GDP 
-3.99% 
-3.48% 
-3.11% 
-3.43% 
-3.19% 
-2.86% 
-2.66% 
-2.36% 
-2.13% 
-1.99% 
-1.80% 
-1.78% 
-1.71% 
-2.02% 
-2.14% 
-2.75% 
-2.35% 
-2.08% 
-1.88% 
Source: Data was compiled fromfHistorical tables: Budget of the United 
States Government", 2005), ("National Bureau of Statistics of China", 
2006). 
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China has continued its military build-up in all areas. The biggest 
increases are in its Navy though. China is developing a blue water navy 
that not only protects its shore but also is capable of reaching distant 
shores. Looking at Table 7 above it is evident that China's military budget 
increases at a greater rate than that of the United States with twelve of the 
seventeen years at greater than ten percent over than that of the United 
States. The three years post September 11, 2001 are the years where the 
United States spends greater than that of China. One of the items that 
one has to also consider in the published budget of China's outlay is that 
China does not include its entire military spending budget in what it 
publishes. China excludes purchases of military goods from its budget. 
China's advancement in its military capabilities are outlined in the 2007 
Annual Report to Congress which identifies concern with this increase in 
spending. 
China's rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with 
global aspirations is an important element of today's strategic 
environment - one that has significant implications for the region 
and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful 
and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as a 
responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share 
of responsibility for the health and success of the global system. 
However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China's 
leaders will set for their country, including in the area of China's 
expanding military power and how that power might be used 
(CONGRESS, 2007). 
What China has gained from its increased expenditures in its 
military budget is more hardware, greater technology, and better training 
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for its military personnel. Much of the investment that China has made is 
analyzed within the 2007 Annual Report to Congress: 
The pace and scope of China's military transformation has 
increased in recent years, fueled by continued high rates of 
investment in its domestic defense and science and technology 
industries, acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, and far 
reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military 
capabilities of China's armed forces are a major factor in changing 
East Asian military balances; improvements in China's strategic 
capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia Pacific region. 
China's strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike 
capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31 intercontinental range 
ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. 
China's counter space program - punctuated by the January 2007 
successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon - poses 
dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the assets of all 
space faring nations. China's continued pursuit of area denial and 
anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, 
and sea dimensions of the modern battlefield to include space and 
cyber-space (CONGRESS, 2007). 
One of the concerns that the United States admits is that in its 
current configuration, its military is strained. With the war on terror, the 
Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan, the United States would find it difficult 
to take on another fight. 
Though the United States military is spread thin, it still has the most 
technologically advanced military in the world and one of the advantages 
that the United States currently has because of the wars it is involved in is 
the ability to test new technologies real time. The arsenal of the United 
States is vast, with advanced fighter systems that have capabilities that no 
other country has. The ability the United States has with the ability to hit 
multiple targets on a single strike has been advanced along with the ability 
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for precision strikes at targets provides the United States with great ability 
to provide the security that the United States must maintain. 
Conclusions 
Many of the growth elements and relationships that have developed 
economically, politically, and militarily are viable reasons that it will take 
time for China to 'fully' develop. One of the things that is driving this 
growth and development of relationships is that China is in need of natural 
resources. China is developing at a very rapid pace, well over eight 
percent yearly for the last 25 years and for China to be able to provide the 
resources needed to ensure this growth continues will be a primary focus. 
China had made political and economic deal between The China National 
Petroleum Corporation and the Russian oil giant Yukos in order to provide 
a pipeline to route the vast oil supplies to China for use though this deal as 
fallen through and Russia has dismantled Yukos. China is trying to now 
route the oil through Kazakhstan, but this has been rather slow. China 
currently has to remain dependent on the shipping channels to supply the 
quantities of oil needed to continue its growth. China is developing 
alliances or at least making deals to help resolve the shortages such as 
with Venezuela, Africa and the Middle East for much of its oil needs. 
China also continues to consume resources other than oil at a very quick 
pace. China's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore has 
doubled within only 10 years from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000 
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which has now reached 20 percent of the worlds supply and is likely to 
double again by 2010 (Zwieg & Jianhai, 2005). 
Concerns over resources could also create tense situations. China 
could presume a threat from the United States fearing that there will be a 
block of natural resources or at least try to destabilize any efforts of China 
to purchase at the increasing rates that it has. China will need to continue 
its search for natural resources through the increase of both political and 
economic deals that could come at the expense of the United States. As 
China's need increases the supply could decrease causing an increase in 
costs for the needed resources, which in turn could change trade deficits 
and prices for those natural resources that the two states will continue to 
bid for the limited supply thus causing increasing tension between China 
and the United States. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This chapter puts forward a detailed analysis of the data presented 
in Chapter's IV and V, focusing on the growth of China's economy, the 
extent of its regional and global political influence, and its military 
capabilities as opposed to those of the United States since the end of the 
Cold War. China has improved its position in these three areas at a very 
rapid pace relative to the position of the United States during that period. 
The comparison will support the hypothesis of this dissertation, which 
states: As a result of its growing demand for natural resources to fuel its 
expanding economy and military capabilities, China has used the 
development of economic, political and security relationships with other 
states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative 
to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts 
to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the behavioral 
tendencies of rising powers in the international system under the tenets of 
realism and neo-realism. Through its actions in these areas, China has 
made significant gains in power relative to the United States, helping to 
balance American power. The dependent variable in the hypothesis is 
China's acquisition of the natural resources necessary to expand its 
economy and military power, and its related global standing relative to that 
of the United States. This dependent variable is driven by the growth of 
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the independent variables, which are the relationships that China has 
developed with other states economically, politically, and militarily. The 
data presented in Chapters IV and V demonstrate that China has acquired 
the natural resources it needs from external sources through the 
economic, political, and security relationships it has built with other states 
and international organizations since the end of the Cold War in 1989-90. 
The balance of the chapter will assess the extent to which those 
relationships has met China's demand for natural resources and the 
resultant growth of its economy and military capabilities. It will do so in 
the contexts of sections comparing China's and America's power and 
influence in terms of demographics, economics, politics and security. In 
each case, it will demonstrate that China's behavior is in line with the 
tenets of realism and neo-realism, both of which were explained in detail 
in the literature review. 
Demographics 
Considering the most basic characteristics of China and the United 
States, one could first compare the demographics of each state. Looking 
at China first, one would find that China is the most populated countries in 
the world and since 1949 has been divided by two governments. There is 
a Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and the anti-Communist 
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (Nationalist China). From 
a geographic perspective, China is 3,692,213 square miles, excluding 
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Taiwan, and has a population of 1,311,281,000 people, excluding Taiwan 
(Political Handbook of the World 2005 - 2006, 2006). 
In comparison, the United States is number one in the world when 
looking at economic production and productivity and is third in population. 
The land area of the United States is 3,732,396 square miles and America 
has a population of 291,968,000 from 2004 census estimate (Political 
Handbook of the World 2005 - 2006, 2006). 
Comparing the two, both are very similar in land area, though China 
has about four times the population of the United States. One similarity 
between China and the United States is its major cities. Both countries 
have large metropolitan areas with vast populations, financial centers, and 
cultural centers. The change in China's population from 1978 to 2006 is 
quite dramatic. Most recent data shows that in 1978 China's rural 
population was 82.08% of the population with 17.92% residing in the 
urban areas. In 2006 the rural population was at 56.10% and the urban 
population 43.90%, a considerable change. ("National bureau of statistics 
of china", 2006) The latest census data for the United States was in the 
year 2000. That data indicates that 79.22% of the population of the United 
States lived in urban areas and only 20.78% resided in rural areas ("USDA 
economic research service", 2007). Though both are very similar, China 
is just now fully developing its middle class. As the population of China 
has had access to the outside world its middle class has developed a want 
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for a life full of the things that the people in the United States and other 
developed countries have attained. 
The people of China have had a taste of what the United States 
has and now many are moving to the cities for a piece of the good life, 
though it is not always that good. Just as the cities of the United States 
are crowded with pockets of poor and homeless, the cities of China are 
even more crowded, polluted, and congested. As represented by the 
number of Chinese moving from rural to urban centers, approximately 
30% of the population has migrated to urban centers since 1978. The 
influx of western nightclubs, with Porsches lined up to park, along with 
crowds of young people talking on cell phones and listening to rap music, 
is ever growing, looking for a part of the 'good life' (Fishman, 2005). This 
can be the move that many hope to use as the leap forward into what the 
people of China see in the United States. Before 1989 one of the 
differences between China and the United States is that the vast majority 
of the population of China lived in the rural countryside, just the opposite 
of the United States during the same period. Over the past seventeen , 
years there has been a shift of the population. This move of China's 
population from the rural countryside into the urban areas of China's major 
cities as identified in this dissertation has been one of the driving factors 
that have facilitated the need for the additional resources that China has to 
secure in order to sustain the growth that has occurred over the past 
seventeen years. For China to support such a population shift it has 
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needed to secure a greater supply of natural resources in order to 
continue this shift from outside China's borders, as China does not 
possess the quantity needed to support its growth. If China cannot supply 
the needed resources to support its growth, the moves could not continue 
as the population could not continue to grow, as there would not be 
enough resources to sustain the increase. 
The data presented in this dissertation will support the argument 
that China has increased its ability to acquire the needed resources 
through the increase of economic, political and security relationships with 
other states around the globe. The data will also support that China's 
efforts to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the tendencies 
of a rising power in the international system under the tenants of realism 
and neo-realism. 
Economics 
From an economic perspective, China has made great strides, 
growing its GDP nearly 10 percent yearly for the last nineteen years. 
Granted, the United States still maintains its position as the world leader, 
but China is closing the gap and continues to do so. Much of this growth 
has been in Asia, the region where China has expanded its trade 
considerably. In examining China's recent trade activity outlined in 
Chapter's IV and V, it is clear that China has developed a good trade 
relationship with the Asian region. In 2003 China increased its trade with 
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the Asian region by 36.5% over 2002, stimulated by imports from the 
Asian region, which were up over 42%. It is important to note that China's 
trade practices in the region are relatively balanced, basically the opposite 
of its trade with the West. 
This growth in China's trade is the result of the development and 
expansion of its relationships with other states. Those trade relationships, 
in turn, have helped to satisfy China's demand for natural resources as a 
means to fuel its vibrant economic growth. Looking back at Table 1 in 
Chapter V, one sees China's sustained GDP growth for the last nineteen 
years. This growth was considerable, particularly when compared to that 
of the United States during the same period. The table shows China's 
GDP growth in the double digits in most of those years. From 1993-95, 
that growth was phenomenal, exceeding 20 percent during those years. 
The only slowdown came between the years 1997 and 2002, where the 
growth rates were just below 10 percent, though these rates still exceeded 
the growth rates of the United States during the same period. The biggest 
gains against the United States in GDP growth occurred from 1992-1995, 
with gains in the range of 20 percent. 
In examining China's focus on its economic relationships, one finds 
that China has been focusing on 'failing' states, states where the political 
stability of the central government is weak or ineffective and many times is 
run by regional warlords or tribal chiefs as in the Sudan, who have 
considerable control of the region of a state, along with the control of 
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natural resources in the area. China has also developed relationships 
with states whose political ideology is similar to that of China, especially 
when it comes to countering the influence of the United States. One of the 
best examples is China's relationship with Latin American states, 
especially Venezuela. Under the administration of Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez, criticism against the United States has increased 
considerably. In 2005 oil supplies from Venezuela decreased to the 
United States after an oil strike in Venezuela and remained constant to 
China. At the time this alone drove the price of a barrel of oil to a 21- year 
high of $54 a barrel. Kurlantzick (2007) has also suggested that if 
Venezuela shifts it oil exports to China and away from the United States it 
could cause major economic problems for the United States. China has 
invested over $2 billion in Venezuela and has entered into a joint venture 
with Venezuela's state owned oil corporation, Petroleos de Venezuela, 
allowing the Chinese oil company to manage much of the oil fields in its 
control. Not only has China developed deeper relationships with Latin 
American states, it has also made substantial investments in African 
states such as the Sudan, where China has invested over $4 billion in its 
oil industry and Middle Eastern states such as Iran, where China signed a 
deal with Iran to develop one of its largest fields, giving China access to 
possibly the world's largest gas reserves. These deals are needed to 
sustain China's growth through greater access to exterior sources for 
natural resources, especially oil and natural gas where China has moved 
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into second place behind the United States in imports of these resources. 
As seen in Graph 1 below, the increase in the number of exports to China 
of other states economies as a percentage of that countries total number 
of exports is increasing, especially in the Asian region, relative to exports 
from those states to the United States and the member states of the 
European Union. As China has increased its economic growth, it has also 
increased its trade with regional partners, thus helping those economies in 
the process. As one can see in the 1990s, exports of these selected 
economies were consistent across all regions. It is clearly evident exports 
from states in East Asia to China have expanded considerably during this 
period. The data utilized for this graph ran from 1990 through 2005 with 
the 2005 numbers estimated by averaging yearly growth over the last 
twenty years. 
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Graph 1: China's Sources of Exports (as a percentage of total exports 
from other countries' economies as a percentage of GDP of each 
economy) 
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Graph 2 below depicts China's imports from other states as a 
percentage of total imports of China. There is clearly a reduction found in 
the levels of China's imports from the United Kingdom and the United 5 
States relative to those from Taiwan and ASEAN. China will continue to 
expand its economy as Beijing continues to attempt to bring Taiwan back 
into the fold and as China begins to play a bigger role in ASEAN. Another 
aspect of Graph 1 and Graph 2 is that as a percentage, the total number 
of imports is increasing and the total number of exports of regional 
economies is also increasing as a percentage of the respective 
economies. The data utilized for this graph is the latest available data and 
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covers the period from 1990 through 2005 with the 2005 years are 
estimated based on the yearly averages over the last twenty years. 
Graph 2: China's Source of Imports (as a percentage of total imports into 
China) 
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In considering China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, one 
can understand how quickly China's economy has grown since 1990. As 
illustrated in Graph 3 below China's growth is considerable against that of 
the United States, and as the American economy has continued to grow 
steadily, the Chinese economy has done so at a faster rate. Clearly, 
China has made considerable gains from an economic perspective 
relative to those of the United States. China's ability to sustain its 
economic growth over the considerable period is testimony to China's 
increased economic power and ability to grow its economy. 
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Graph 3: China's Gross Domestic Product In Chinese Yuan vs. U.S. 
Dollar 
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Using the 1996 conversion rate for Yuan to Dollars, Graph 4 below 
depicts the growth curve of China vs. that of the United States with 
Chinese Yuan converted to U.S. Dollars. Both rates are steady even at 
the expense of the Yuan converted to the 1996 rate. It is attributable to 
China's growth that the economy of China remains positive to that of the 
dollar and that the continued growth rate remains consistent. The true 
variance is the size of the U.S. economy when compared to that of China. 
China still has some needed growth, and if China can maintain its current 
growth rates, China will eventually catch up to the United States taking 
into account no other variables. 
GDPY 
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Graph 4: China's Gross Domestic Product Converted to U.S. Dollar 
GDP 
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Once purchasing power parity (PPP) is applied to the Yuan, the 
picture compared to that of the United States changes considerably. The 
rate of China's GDP growth outperforms that of the United States 
considerably. Granted, China's economy is not as large as that of the 
United States, and there is no way to predict the future. However, if China 
continues at its current growth rate, it will eventually possess the world's 
largest economy. China's economic advances against those of the United 
States have moved China to the desired level to maintain a balance of 
power against the United States. With the addition of the purchasing 
power parity of Chinese Yuan in China, the real value of the Yuan in China 
is evident. To further the point on purchasing power of the Yuan in China, 
when applied to goods purchased in China the equilibrium that is held 
between the two currencies would be approximately the same in each of 
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the two countries. What purchasing power does for the Yuan in China 
when applied to a fixed definition of goods and services would also 
approximately be equal between the two countries. Therefore, when 
purchasing goods and services within its state, China has a relative 
advantage in the amount of goods and services purchased when 
compared to the United States purchasing the same basket of defined 
goods and services in the United States. China's true ability to purchase 
military goods is an indicator that identifies the real growth of China in all 
aspects relative to that of the United States. 
Graph 5 below further illustrates China's GDP growth and how it 
compares with that of the United States when purchasing power parity is 
applied and illustrates the value of the Yuan in China as compared to the 
Dollar in the United States. 
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Graph 5: China's Gross Domestic Product with Purchasing Power Parity 
Applied 
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The evidence presented on the economic growth of China since 
the end of the Cold War supports the hypothesis presented in this 
dissertation. The advances that China has made relative to the United 
States in economic growth have been sustained over the time period 
measured. When measured against the United States, China has grown 
at a pace that has surpassed the United States when purchasing power is 
applied. 
As China's demand for natural resources has increased, China has 
developed the economic relationships that have been needed to support 
the increased growth that has also increased China's standing in the 
international system as a superpower that has the ability to balance the 
power of the United States. With the movement of approximately 30% of 
China's population from rural areas to cities, China's demand for the 
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needed resources to grow its economy and sustain the population has 
increased markedly. In keeping with the tenets of realism and neo-
realism, China is acting in a manner that is consistent with the need to 
provide economic security to the people of China through the development 
of economic deals around the globe as illustrated by the supporting data 
presented in this dissertation. The most important aspect of realism and 
neo-realism is that security is the most important factor, and economic 
security would fall under one of the five security categories. The 
economic sector defines how a State actor gains access to the needed 
resources in order to sustain economic welfare and political power (Buzan 
& Little, 2000). Another important aspect to consider is that China is 
acting as the unitary decision maker in a rational manner that is for the 
good of the people. China's actions are maintained through a consistent 
manner in order to protect the economic security of China and its people. 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has maintained these aspects of 
realism as they relate to the tenants of realism and neo-realism and 
supports the hypothesis this dissertation posits as it pertains to economic 
growth relative to that of the United States. Over the last two decades 
China has managed to court many investors that have redirected much of 
its foreign investment to China and as noted in Chapter IV China now 
receives some 61% of the investments in the region, which has provided 
China with the funds necessary to continue its growth. Along with the 
investments China has received, there has also been considerable 
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Chinese investment in the oil rich nations of Venezuela, Sudan, and 
Russia, which have helped to secure the needed oil, and gas supply that 
facilitates China's growth and supports the growing need for the people of 
China to as the population moves into its growing cities. 
China's accession into the World Trade Organization has also 
helped to bolster its standing in the world. With 1.3 billion people at the 
ready to provide labor needed to continue its economic growth, the 
numbers also provide a source of consumption of the goods that China 
will need to import from other countries, which are ready to make the 
required economic deals. 
Politics 
Two separate Chinese governments were formed in 1949. One, 
the People's Republic of China (PRC), governs the mainland and its 
territories; the other, that of the Republic of China (ROC), governs the 
island of Taiwan. The PCR is a communist government and the ROC is a 
nationalist government. China contends that Taiwan is a territory of 
mainland China and should fall under its 'one China' policy. 
The United States began as 13 British colonies along the Atlantic 
seaboard, the 'United States of America' declared itself an independent on 
July 4, 1776, and gained recognition as a sovereign nation at the close of 
the Revolutionary War in 1783. In 1787, the United States of America 
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adopted a federal constitution that became effective March 4, 1789 
{Political Handbook of the World 2005 - 2006, 2006). 
As China has increased its power, it has made great strides in the 
political arena. China has become more active in its role as a member of 
the United Nations and as a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council. There is a close relationship between the growth in 
China's political influence and its economic growth. China's need for 
natural resources to sustain its growth has also led directly to the 
development of many of China's newest political partnerships. 
China's need for these resources has forced it to develop more 
political allies. China at one time did not focus on how the rest of the 
world governed itself. Since the end of the Cold War, China has had to 
step up and accept many political challenges. For the most part, China is 
at odds with the ways in which the United States and its allies have 
managed the international system with their desire for the development of 
a more democratic world. China has held its ground and has begun to 
secure allies that have a political ideology that is comparable to Beijing's 
and runs counter to that of the United States, especially in Latin America. 
Considering China's voting record on important votes held by the United 
Nations Security Council has been almost completely in opposition to that 
of the United States. As illustrated in Graph 6 below, in the 85 important 
votes held between 2000 and 2006, China has voted with the United 
States only five times and either abstained or voted against the United 
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States on the other votes. Important votes are those votes in the United 
Nations Security Council that are defined as directly affecting American 
interests and that the United States has thus lobbied for. The most 
current examples here is that when the United States voted to adhere to 
human rights considerations in Iran in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 
2006, and also in Iraq in 2000, and 2002, China voted to keep out such 
oversight and as China has continually stated that a state should have the 
sovereignty to dictate how it will govern its people and that external actors, 
whether states, international organizations of non-governmental 
organizations, should stay away. The same vote outcome was also 
identified with North Korea, Burma, and Belarus. In looking at the various 
important votes, one can see that many are concerned with human rights. 
China and the United States have had differing opinions on the subject of 
human rights for a considerable time, well before the events that fell upon 
China over Tiananmen Square. The United States and many of its allies 
had voiced strong opinions on these events and the actions of the 
Chinese government and had voted to keep China out of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) for some time as China had kept its reputation of 
human rights violations and did not voice any statement of future change. 
China holds the belief that each sovereign state has the right to act in the 
manner it deems necessary to govern and that other states should keep 
out of its decisions. 
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The important votes that are with the United States are such that 
would only hold positive results for China. Since the events of 11 
September 2001, China has supported the United States on the subject of 
terrorism. After the events of September 11, 2001 China has been a 
strong ally in its support against terrorism, though China continues to trade 
arms to state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran. China continues to be a 
voice against terrorism. China also votes with the United States on the 
elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, another hypocritical act as 
China continues to quell various religious activities in the state. Overall, 
the incidence of China voting against the United States is the case with 
the theme on human rights or a states sovereignty to do, as it wants within 
its borders. 
China's voting record in the United Nations when human rights are 
concerned has been an astounding zero votes with the United States. 
Two of the states especially concerned with vote are Sudan and Iran. In 
both cases these two states have agreed to large deals pertaining to oil 
and gas reserves that China has needed to continue its growth 
economically. In the political sector outlined by Buzan and Little (2000), 
China's behavior is also consistent with the tenants of realism and neo-
realism where China has developed relationships of authority, governing 
status, and recognition with states that give them legitimacy. Generally 
the states that fall into this category also have similar ideologies. States 
like Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, and Syria fall into this category and as 
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depicted in Chapters IV and V, have made deals with China to provide the 
natural resources like oil and natural gas which are needed to fuel China's 
continued growth. 
Graph 6: China's Voting Record on Important Votes 
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Along with voting records that are generally against that of the 
United States, China has also had a run in joining International 
Governmental Organizations (IGO). China has moved from just over 20 
percent of the memberships that the United States had in 1979, to just at 
80 percent of the United States' memberships by the year 2002, a figure 
that has remained constant since that date. China has begun to play a 
more involved role at the international level rather than retain the insularity 
that once characterized its behavior, jnclusion and acceptance of China in 
these IGOs has given Beijing another avenue to voice its opinion and sell 
its ideology, gaining new political friends and allies along the way. By 
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• Against 
155 
joining these IGOs, China can now work to influence the decisions and 
ideologies of other governments from within the framework of these 
organizations. By working closely with states that have an ideological 
view of the internal system, China has developed closer ties from the 
political perspective. States such as Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, and Russia 
now working with China to determine what influences states should have 
on the sovereignty of other states and how they are governed. As the 
evidence provided in Chapter V supports, China has grown its political 
strength with each new deal its makes, especially when such deals are 
forged with states whose perspectives run counter to those of the United 
States ideologically. China also holds a permanent seat within the United 
Nations Security Council. This provides China with great power as to 
having the ability to interface and influence other states as to the security 
and actions that the United Nations and states that act unilaterally will be 
challenged. 
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Graph 7: China's Memberships in IGOs as a Percentage of US 
Memberships 
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China's behavioral tendencies remain consistent with the tenants of 
realism and neo-realism. China, in an effort to secure the resources it 
needs to continue its growth is acting as the unitary decision maker for the 
good of the state. China's continues to advance its political relationships, 
which have also increased since the end of the Cold War. China has 
managed to develop political and ideological relationships with states that 
have built distrust with that of the United States. The best example to date 
is with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has voiced his opinions 
against the United States and its policies. China has also built political 
relationships with Brazil, Russia, India, and Pakistan, along with its long-
standing relationship with Iran, which has also grown in the last seventeen 
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years. The ideological relationships, or what Buzan and Little (2000) have 
depicted as the societal or socio-cultural sector where the state, China in 
this case, develops and sustains cultural relationships with similar thinking 
states as supported in this dissertation. 
The data presented in this dissertation regarding the growth in 
China's political influence has also supported the hypothesis. In 
particular, at the end of the Cold War, China belonged to only twenty 
percent of the number of organizations as the United States. Since the 
end of the Cold War, China has increased its memberships to eighty 
percent of that of the United States, giving it greater voice at the global 
level and helping it renew past and develop new relationships with states 
and organizations that have increased its access to the natural resources 
needed to expand its economy and military capabilities. 
Security 
Security is another area where China has made marked advances. 
China has increased its spending as a percentage of GDP since 1989 and 
has also worked hard to develop a more modern defense that can provide 
the security a superpower must have. China is the third strongest 
economy in the world and moving to second very quickly. This growth has 
helped to fuel the modernization of China's military services. Keith (2001) 
identifies that China's military modernization is not just something going 
unnoticed, but that China was growing its military through increased 
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spending and hiding that additional spending through creative accounting 
practices. 
In looking at China's military, from an air superiority perspective, 
China's forces are vast. There are two aspects to China's air forces in 
both the Air Force and the Navy Air Force. Referring back to Menges 
(2005), the combined military forces of the Chinese Air Force and the 
Chinese Naval Air Force has over 426,000 personnel. Tactical fighters 
number at over 1,360 active aircraft. There are also 228 bombers with 
776 close air support aircraft. According to Menges, military analysts feel 
that the numbers could increase considerably by 2005. 
China's Navy is also very large in numbers of personnel and 
equipment. Though much of the equipment is old, China is on a path to 
develop a highly technical Navy with the ability to travel the globe as it 
protects its interests abroad and along its shores. Currently there are 
approximately 260,000 naval personnel supporting 63 destroyers and 
frigates. China also has 62 diesel submarines with five nuclear attack 
submarines. What China has done over the last seventeen years is to 
modernize its fleet by replacing many of its ships with fewer but more 
effective ships, giving China blue water capabilities that can cover the 
globe. This aspect of China's security not only gives China the capability 
to secure its ports and coastlines and also provide many of its new allies 
with additional support if needed. The largest component of China's 
military in terms of manpower is its Army. China has the largest ground 
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force in the world and has also increased its capability through training 
and technology. Currently Chinese active forces number 1.6 million and a 
reserve force that is estimated at another 1.5 million troops. One other 
aspect of China's ground forces is that there is another five hundred 
thousand forces in the People's Armed Police which functions as China's 
internal security force. Over the last seventeen China has placed greater 
emphasis on modern warfare using special operations trained forces 
which number approximately twenty percent of the combined ground 
forces. 
Another aspect of China's military is its new focus on technology. 
China understands that the forces of the developed world are highly 
advanced technically and that to defend its interests, it will have to combat 
this highly computerized military of what could be at some point in time its 
enemy. China has developed a new military division that is trained in new 
technologies. These troops are needed to counter the vast military forces 
in the area that are dependent on complex electronic systems. China has 
moved into the realm of asymmetric warfare that has trained troops to 
counter the newer technologies of states like the United States, Japan, 
and Taiwan. 
Looking past the sheer numbers of China's military from the size of 
its force alone, China's budget is also growing. Graph 8 below depicts 
China's military budget in U.S. Dollars. From the perspective of the graph, 
there does not seem to be any respective gain relative to that of the 
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United States. One reason for this is China does not include any military 
purchases within its budget numbers, nor does it provide fully accurate 
numbers. From another prospective, the budget that China spends on its 
military buys a considerably larger supply of goods within China than if 
China was buying the same items from the United States. As an example, 
if the United States were to spend $35 million on a fighter aircraft with the 
aircraft built and paid for in America. If one were to apply the IMF PPP 
rate of 2006 used in this dissertation, China would build the same aircraft 
in China but would spend $5 million. Applying the PPP rate the number 
would equal $35 million spent in China. Granted, the Chinese do not 
currently have the technology to build the same fighter aircraft, but 
Chinese Yuan spent in China go as far or farther than U.S. dollars spent in 
the United States. There are estimates that China's actual spending is at 
least twice that of what it publishes. 
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Graph 8: China and the United States Military Budgets in US Dollars 
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Looking at Graph 9, purchasing power parity is included along with 
a second graph of China's estimated real spending. One can see that 
with either calculation, its published spending and its estimated spending, 
China has made considerable gains compared to the spending of the 
United States, even with the jump in the U.S. spending after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. At this point in time, the U.S. budget 
grows considerably and only in the last few years has it begun to fall back. 
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Graph 9: China and the United States Military Budgets with Purchasing 
Power Parity applied 
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Looking at military spending as a percentage of GDP in Graph 10, it 
is also visible that China's spending on a year-to-year basis also has 
grown relative to that of the United States. Only in the years after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks does the United States spend more 
from a GDP perspective than China spends. Another aspect is there are 
only three periods in the last seventeen years when China has spent less 
than ten percent of its GDP on its military budget, and that is just what is 
published or included when China presents its information. It is important 
to remember that China does not include external purchases of military 
goods as part of its budget. 
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Graph 10: Military Budget as a Percentage of GDP 
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China's increased spending over the last seventeen years has 
moved China closer to the United States in its spending as a percentage 
of gross domestic product. China's increase over the last seventeen 
years has closed the gap with the United States considerably. Looking* 
back at Graph 9, China's estimate exceeds the spending of the United 
States when one considers China's true estimated spending. From the 
perspective of realism and neo-realism China has provided the needed 
military security and as a rising power in the international system China 
has the ability to provide security for itself, but also its new allies in the 
system. China's increased spending has been made possible by the 
increased economic activity. As China's economy has grown over the last 
seventeen years, China's increased revenues have provided a surplus 
that China has been able to direct to its military spending. The increased 
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military spending in newer hardware and technologies will be needed to 
secure the resources in the event of conflict. As the tenants of realism 
and neo-realism posit, securing not only a sovereign border but also its 
assets abroad. China's developments over the last seventeen years have 
produced a military that has this needed ability to secure these assets, 
especially around the globe with its newly found allies. The increased 
military capabilities bring greater confidence in China's ability to ensure 
the security of the resources that China needs to acquire and continue its 
current growth. One of the main concerns of rising powers is the ability 
provide the security and hard power that will allow that power access to 
the resources needed. China's growth in gross domestic product and 
greater revenues has provided the needed monies to support the growth 
in its military. 
China, with its powerful military, can calm the fear of a newly 
acquired ally that has aligned with China to balance the power of the 
United States. As this dissertation has posited, China is now the 
balancing power against the United States and other states will align with 
China, especially those with similar ideologies like Venezuela, Iran, 
Sudan, and Cuba. China's ability to counter the power of the United 
States will ease the fear of states that would like to stand up against the 
United States, now have that ability to align with a state that can support 
its opinion and ideology. 
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In the area of alliances, Harris and Cooper (2000) find that China 
accepts that sovereign countries are entitled to form alliances though 
through history China's only real formal alliance was with the Soviet Union 
that lasted from 1950 to the early 1960s and ended on a bad note 
between the two states. China's position is based on resistance to 
domination by the United States, what China would like to see is an 
alternative to formal alliances but what China identifies as a new security 
concept, or a global collective security. China feels that dialogue as 
opposed to conflict should be the method that states should resolve 
problems (Pablo-Baviera, 2003). 
However, China's position on specific pairs of allied relationships 
will still depend on their assessment of whether such alliances are 
perceived as useful to its own goals, or instrumental only to a U.S. 
hegemonic agenda or the defense of Taiwan. As long as no explicit 
linkage between alliance goals and containment of Chinese power is 
made, pragmatic factors may still come into play after all, where China still 
expects to get some benefit from alliance systems. What China intends to 
achieve through the relationships of other alliances that do not include 
China is that ability to keep arms length from states like Korea though it 
does have power and influence through its position in the region allowing 
states like Japan providing the greater military influence in the area. 
Because of this relationship China is able to extend its strategic role with 
little cost. What China is working to improve in the area, though, is a 
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collective security by allowing the United States to continue its 
relationships in the area rather than the vacuum that would be created if 
the United States pulled out. If China can continue its current strategy in 
this area, it will give China time to continue to grow its capability without 
being perceived as challenging the United States or any of its allies in the 
region. 
In the years to come, it will be interesting to follow how China will 
react to formal alliances as China still positions itself as the leader in 
promoting collective security although China has the largest military in the 
world from a personnel perspective. China is easily the biggest threat in 
the region to those states not aligning itself with China's ideology. Looking 
at China's 'new security concept', China's advances in the region is at the 
expense of the United States and its allies in the region and that China is 
looking to promote a bipolar balance of power with that of the United 
States (Lovell, 2003). 
From a security perspective, it is important to remember that China 
does not believe in formal military alliances, as China would like to see a 
collective security arrangement with all states participating. One of 
China's most important allies, though there is no formal military 
agreement, is with Russia. China and Russia have voiced their opinion 
against the missile defense system that the United States has proposed 
with Poland and the Czech Republic. 
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What is evident as the data in Chapter IV and Chapter V support is 
that China is increasing in military power. China has increased its 
spending on par with the United States in procuring new hardware and 
technologies. China's ability to balance the United States has grown 
considerably as the data presented in this dissertation supports and is 
consistent with the behavior of a rising power and the tenants of realism 
and neo-realism through the ability to provide greater security within its 
sovereign borders and around the globe in support of its assets and allies 
providing the natural resources China needs to continue its growth. 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has increased its power 
significantly relative to that of the United States. With a population of over 
1.3 billion people, China has a need for natural resources that cannot be 
satisfied within its borders. China has had to develop its relationships 
form three perspectives, economically, politically, and militarily in order to 
ensure that it will be able to fulfill its needs now and in the future. China's 
actions and behavior have been consistent with the tendencies of a rising 
power within the international system and under the tenants of realism and 
neo-realism providing the security, economically, politically, and militarily 
to its people. 
Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this dissertation support the hypothesis 
as China has increased its power economically by growing its gross 
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domestic product at an average rate of 8-10 percent per year as a result of 
its increased access to natural resources from non-domestic sources. 
This growth is a considerable rate when compared to that of the United 
States. This growth has been accomplished through the development of 
economic relationships that have increased considerably around the 
globe. China has developed its relationships with resource rich states that 
usually have ideologies that run counter to that of the United States. 
China has also grown its political influence by reaching out to states 
that have a different ideology than that of the United States as well as 
some that have a similar ideology. China has increased its standing in 
International Governmental Organizations by 60 percent of that of the 
United States and has also stepped up its voice within the United Nations 
countering many of the votes of the United States. China's soft power in 
the realm of international relations and international systems has benefited 
from its change in tactics by pursuing the relationships that will help China 
to secure the resources that it needs to sustain its rapidly growing 
economy and need for natural resources. China continues to court world 
leaders as China's need for political relationships grow which in turn 
supports the need to satisfy the need to secure natural resources. China's 
efforts are in line with the tenants of realism and neo-realism as China 
facilitates its growing power by ensuring it sits as a world leader. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this dissertation considered the research question 
that states, what factors have driven China to increase its power relative to 
that of the United States through the development of economic, political 
and security relationships with other states in the international system 
since the end of the Cold War? 
More significantly, the dissertation was designed to examine and 
assess the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis: As a result of 
its growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy 
and military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, 
political and security relationships with other states in the international 
system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United 
States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these 
objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising 
powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-
realism. The evidence submitted in this dissertation supports the 
contention that China has made significant gains relative to that of the 
United States since the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union 
and the communist governments it supported in the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe from 1989-91 left a void in the balance of power opposing 
the superpower of the United States in the international system. As the 
evidence presented in this dissertation supports, China has filled that void 
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and increased its power significantly relative to that of the United States. 
China has expanded its economic and military power and political 
influence considerably over the past seventeen years. From the realist 
perspective, a state's sovereignty, security, and needs are of utmost 
importance and through any means necessary, China has increased its 
ability to maintain its sovereignty and security through the growth of its 
economic, political, and security relationships relative to that of the United 
States by expanding its economy at a considerable pace that has 
surpassed that of the United States and has managed to sustain that 
growth for the past nineteen years. China has also increased the 
percentage of military spending against domestic GDP at greater levels 
than that of the United States in every year since 1989, except for the two 
years post- September 11, 2001. And lastly, China has increased its 
influence in the political arena by increasing its voice outside its borders 
through China's acceptance into international governmental organizations, 
giving China a podium to voice its opinions and ideology. Over the last 
seventeen China has also increased its bilateral relationships with other 
states. Since 1993 China has signed 17 bilateral partnerships based on 
mutual trust and cooperation. 
In answering the research question, what factors have driven China 
to increase its power relative to that of the United States through the 
development of economic, political and security relationships with other 
states in the international system since the end of the Cold War, this 
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dissertation posits that the need for natural resources is the primary factor 
that has driven China to expand those relationships, thus providing the 
avenue to secure access to the resources needed to continue its growth. 
The dependent variable therefore is China's acquisition of natural 
resources, which are necessary to continue to expand its economy, 
military power, and political standing relative to the United States. China's 
need for resources has been driven by China's growth in its economy and 
military. Increasing each of these areas is consistent behavior for a rising 
power in the international system and is consistent with the tenets of 
realism and neo-realism, which is to provide for the security of the state, 
economically, politically, and militarily, and to maintain its sovereignty by 
performing as a unitary actor for the whole in a rational manner. One of 
the major tenants of neo-realism as Waltz (1979) identifies is the pursuit of 
power by a state, which explains China's actions since the end of the Cold 
War. By increasing power, a state will increase its ability to provide for its 
people, which is exactly what China has done since the end of the Cold 
War. China has increased it security relationships, economic 
relationships, and its political relationships as supports the hypothesis 
posited in'this dissertation. The independent variables are the economic, 
political, and security relationships China has built with other states and 
international organizations since the end of the Cold War. China has 
developed these relationships that have been identified in Chapters IV and 
V, which support the hypothesis that has been presented. 
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As this dissertation has identified, China has an increased need for 
natural resources due to the substantial growth of its economy over the 
last seventeen years. In order for China to secure the needed resources, 
that are required to fuel this growth, China has used economic 
relationships with other states in the international system to increase its 
power significantly relative to that of the United States since the end of the 
Cold War. The economic relationships identified in this dissertation 
support the hypothesis that China has managed to increase both the 
number and extent of its economic relationships with other states over the 
last seventeen years, in order to secure the resources to fuel China's 
economic growth, which has been between eight and 10 percent each 
year since 1989. With a country of over 1.3 billion people, China does not 
have the needed natural resources within its borders to support its 
population and the ensuing growth of its economy. As China's population 
moves into the urban cities, China's need to acquire resources to continue 
to fuel its economic growth rate has also increased. 
The second independent variable is the development of political 
relationships, which have also had to increase in order to secure 
resources needed to fuel its growth. The data presented in Chapter's IV 
and V support the hypothesis that China has used the development of 
political relationships with other states in the international system to 
increase its power significantly relative to the United States since the end 
of the Cold War. As the data presented in this dissertation support, China 
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has increased its political relationships relative to that of the United States 
China's increased activity in international governmental organizations has 
increased by 60% of those the United States belongs to over the last 
seventeen years. This growth in political relationships and the bilateral 
partnerships that China has signed since the end of the Cold War with 
resource rich states has given China access to the additional resources it 
needs in order to continue its growth. 
The third independent variable is the development of security 
relationships with other states. Over the last seventeen years China has 
increased its military capacity considerable relative to that of the United 
States by increasing its military hardware, technologies, and relationships 
with other states in order to secure its resources and assets at home and 
abroad. As the data presented in Chapter's IV and V support, China's 
growth in this area is on par with that of the United States. China's 
security relationships with other states have provided the security needed 
to comfort its allies with an ability to balance the power of the United 
States that has had an impact on states that balance with China. One of 
the most important relationships that China has developed is with Russia, 
which has provided China with much of the oil that is has needed to fuel 
its growth. Though China has no security relationship with Sudan, China 
does have access to much of Sudan's oil, and it could be assumed that 
China would protect its assets here and elsewhere China holds assets in 
states where there is an agreement with China. 
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Strengths and Weaknesses 
The viability of this hypothesis lies in the acceptance of realist 
principles and the assumptions that lie within. A state's sovereignty and 
security are of the most important matters of the state acting in a rational 
unitary manner for the good of the people. Another aspect on the central 
arguments of realism and neo-realism that explain China's behavior is that 
with realism is about maximizing power, and with neo-realism the focus is 
the need to pursue power to ensure a state's survival which is exactly 
what China is doing by increasing it's military, political relationships, and 
it's economic relationships in order to secure the resources needed for it's 
people. China has a need to provide for its people and that is inclusive of 
economic, political, and security matters within its borders and the assets 
and allies it has around the globe. China's need for natural resources has 
increased considerably over the last seventeen years, and as natural 
resources become scarce, there will be escalations and conflict over those 
scarce resources. The state that has the ability to secure those resources 
will have the upper hand. China, by growing its economic, political, and 
security relationships will increase its ability to secure those resources. 
Alternative Arguments 
One of the opposing arguments to this hypothesis and the theory of 
realism and neo-realism is that of liberalism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism. The main concept of the realist positions of this 
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dissertation is the sovereignty and security of a state and the tendencies 
of a rising power to expand its military security, economic security, and 
political security. The counter argument of liberalism and neo-liberalism 
would support that economic growth would be the compelling explanations 
for the actions that China has undertaken over the last seventeen years. 
Considering China's economic and political growth in this period, this 
could be a plausible argument, though the one outlier would be China's 
increase in military spending which would null this argument. 
China's cooperation with other states within the international 
system would also add to the liberalism and neo-liberalism argument. 
China, over the last seventeen years has increased its participation within 
the international system considerably and has provided humanitarian relief 
and support around the globe and its communication between individuals 
and groups around the globe. The factor that nulls this argument is with 
its sovereignty, where China's actions suggest that other states within the 
system should have no say in Chinese political matters. 
Closing Thoughts and Future of Sino-American Relations 
Since the end of the Cold War China has developed into a 
superpower that can offset the power of the United States within the 
international system. As the evidence presented in this dissertation 
supports, China has increased its power significantly as an economic and 
political player at the global level. China has developed relationships with 
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new allies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Within each 
of these regions of the world China has courted the leaders, made huge 
investments, and provided support on the international level in the political 
arena. China has also increased its presence as it has grown its 
memberships in international organizations considerably. By doing so, 
China has increased its ability to influence other members, voice its 
opinions, and counter the power and influence of the United States and its 
allies as necessary. This is especially true in the realm of economics as 
the corporations waiting at the gate attempt to get the business and labor 
of the 1.3 billion people within the borders of China when the Chinese 
government allows such entrance. Also presented in this dissertation is 
the growth of China's 'soft power,' along with its 'hard power,' as it has 
developed into a superpower. China has managed to befriend many of 
the leaders of states that have values running counter to those of the 
United States and its allies across the globe and has enhanced its military 
through training and technology it has gained from other states like Russia 
or through the observation of the United States. From a political 
perspective, China has changed its method of dealing in international 
politics from a quite closed border government to a government that is 
more vocal and outwardly reaching, influencing governments that have 
ideologies that run counter to the United States and especially states that 
are rich in natural resources like oil and natural gas. States like 
Venezuela or the Sudan, where China has spent billions of dollars 
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investing in research and production in gathering what China needs to fuel 
its growth, natural resources have developed into China's ally, supplying 
China with the needed resources to fuel its growth. The increase in 
China's memberships in international governmental organizations and as 
a member of the United Nations Security Council where it continues to 
vote counter to that of the United States on agenda items that are 
important to the United States remains constant. Possibly the most 
important new membership is China's admission to the World Trade 
Organization has also given China a podium to voice its direction as to the 
realm of trade. One of the major topics at the World Trade Organization is 
the topic of intellectual property and technology transfer. These two areas 
have been a benefit to China as it has grown its infrastructure and military 
through advances in these two areas. China is also a member of the 
Asian Development Bank, which provides help to its developing member 
countries in reducing poverty and improving the quality of life. China has 
donated $20 million dollars in funding the People's Republic of China 
Regional Cooperation and Poverty Reduction Fund in an effort to 
strengthen the capacity of developing member countries. The Asian 
Development also publishes the Asian Development Outlook, which is an 
analysis of the 44 member countries. The 2008 outlook suggests that 
China will continue its economic growth though it will be moderate(/As/an 
Development Outlook 2008 Update, 2008). 
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Though China is not a member of ASEAN, China and the ASEAN 
have met regularly since 1991. The cooperation between the two is 
considered to be deepening in trust and cooperation. The member 
countries along with China are called the 10+1 cooperation, which plays a 
considerable role in strengthening the partnership. Looking at the trade 
between China and the ASEAN members, growth between the two has 
increased considerably since 1991. 
As a country with 1.3 billion people, China has the resources for not 
only consumption but to fill the inexpensive labor force that other states 
utilize. Over the last seventeen years over 30 percent of the rural 
population have moved to urban areas to fill labor needs created by the 
exceptional growth. China and the United States are now on par with 
each other as the percentage of the urban populations is within a point or 
so of each other at 55%. With the United States comprising of about 300 
million people, using round numbers, which would equate to 165 million 
people. Considering China's numbers with a population of 1.3 billion 
people, 55% of that population would equate to 715 million people, more 
than four time that of the United States. 
China and Russia have also begun joint military operations that 
could not only be considered a military operation but a political statement. 
In August 2005, China and Russia held joint military operations for the first 
time in 40 years. China. This operation is considered to counter that of 
the United States and its allies as the controlling world power over 
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international affairs. China is currently consumes approximately 45% of 
Russia's arms exports. Since 2000 China has bought some $2 billion 
dollars of Russian military weapons systems, including aircraft, destroyers, 
and submarines. Prior to striking this deal, China and Russia had 
reconciled its border disputes indicating cooperation between the two 
countries. China and Russia have also joined forces to counter the desire 
of the United States working with Poland and the Czech Republic on the 
installation of defensive missile and radar sites along the border in an 
effort to counter possible attacks from Iran or other rogue states. 
China's soft power is enhanced by China's 'hard power' as the 
growth and capabilities of China's military have become more efficient and 
modern in more ways than just hardware. China's military training has 
also developed as a result of the incorporation of newer technologies and 
training enhancements gained through not only Russia but also through 
the United States. China and the United States have held frequent 
exchanges and dialogues between military leaders of both countries since 
1996, mainly to discuss regional security but also to develop a mutual 
understanding and the development of trust between the two countries. 
The senior military leaders of China and the United States also work as a 
consultative body on military and maritime safety, and to establish a 
mechanism for dialogue to manage problems that may occur in the future. 
China and the United States have also agreed to exchanges between the 
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two militaries through training, logistics, and through the military 
academies. 
China has spent as much on security as the United States has, 
though as a percentage of GDP, China has outpaced the United States 
over the last seventeen years. One assumption that has been made is 
that China's military spending figures are low. As with GDP over 
producing, many think that China spends at least twice as much on its 
military than it says it spends. It is important to remember that China does 
not include external spending for military goods in its published military 
budget. Looking back at Chapter VI (Analysis), there are both depictions 
as to China's spending, as it is important to truly understand the whole 
picture. 
Along with China's political and military gains supported in this 
dissertation, China has grown and sustained its economy for more than 
two decades and it appears that it will continue. China's economic growth 
since 1989 is also seen as exceptional. China has been able to maintain 
its substantial growth indicating that this is not just a glitch in the economy. 
With China's 1.3 billion people, corporations outside of China are working 
hard to gain, maintain or increase existing access and act in a fashion that 
will open new markets helping to drive growth. This continued growth 
within China continues as China continues to court heads of State, other 
dignitaries, and heads of corporations that will bring growth to China. 
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One of the most important assumptions made is that the statistics 
on China's growth that have been published are accurate. Looking at 
China's GDP growth over the last seventeen years, China's GDP growth 
has been phenomenal. There are, however, those who do not believe the 
statistics to be completely true. There are those that do not believe that 
China has grown at the pace that is published and that there are 
inconsistencies in the numbers. 
The literature review for this dissertation is of great value as it lays 
the foundation and basis on the many theories as to a State's growth, 
international systems, international relations theories, and alliance 
theories as to a State's behavior and how a balance of power is produced 
within the international system. From the realist perspective, China has 
touted that it is a sovereign state and that all other states should keep to 
themselves, especially when it comes to human rights issues. The 
problems around Tibet as China continues to maintain control of the area 
and Tiananmen Square killing of protesters alone have brought light the 
problems within China's governing authority. One of the major areas 
China continues to have it around the issue of human rights. Looking at 
the United Nations and what the United States considers important votes, 
China has continued to voice its opinion of a states sovereignty through its 
continued vote against human rights issues and regulation. In the past the 
United States has led the charge against China through sanctions and 
support of keeping China out of organizations like the World Trade 
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Organization. Though the United States continues this support for human 
rights much has changed in the last seventeen years as China's soft 
power and new relationships with states of similar ideology have come to 
its aid and China has been allowed membership into the World Trade 
Organization and has even given China most favored nation status. From 
the economic perspective, China has also developed the needed 
relationships required to maintain its economic growth and infrastructure 
needs through access to natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and 
hard metals. 
China's continued growth also suggests that to support such growth 
China will need to secure the natural resources needed to maintain this 
growth. Much of China's political and economic relationships are centered 
on securing the needed resources for much of the future as it continues to 
grow. China's relationships with Cuba, Venezuela and the Sudan are 
good examples as China invests huge sums of money in development and 
exploration for resources while at the same time developing relationships 
with states that have similar ideologies. 
Only time will tell what the future holds for China and the United 
States. If China can continue its growth in the areas supported by this 
dissertation, China not only balances the Power of the United States but 
also could surpass the United States as the world's greatest superpower. 
China and the United States will continue to exist and work together as the 
effects of global economies, trade, and labor forces expand, so they will 
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continue to work with each other to set policies that can be cohesive in 
growing both economies and infrastructures. In times of national 
disasters, China and the United States have worked together supporting 
each other and other states in need. After September 11, 2001 China 
came to the support of the United States in supporting the war on terror 
and continues to do so, though there is some hypocrisy as China 
continues to trade with terrorist states. There will also continue to be 
conflict and disagreement as the sovereignty of each state will also be of 
focus by the leaders heading both China and the United States as each 
state continues to expand its power. 
Currently the future of Sino-Amehcan relations appears it will 
maintain a stable relationship with support for terrorism and humanitarian 
aid around the globe from both countries. China's will continue to voice its 
opposition to interference from outside governments as to any decisions 
made within its sovereign borders. China's ability to provide a labor force 
to the world will also continue to grow as states, especially the United 
States, will look for outside labor at rates that could not be found within its 
borders. China's ability to maintain this labor force will also continue to 
grow as education and training of its people increases. U.S. corporations 
will also look to China to provide the cost benefits needed to grow the 
bottom line and increase profits. China and the United States will continue 
to work together to maintain world order and a common balance between 
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the two states though both nations have differing ideologies and 
perspectives on maintaining this balance. 
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